For over one month, pressure has mounted from the MB and Salafi groups for the removal of al-Azhar’s head, the Grand Imam Ahmed al-Tayeb. The controversy began on April 1 when an obscure food poisoning took place on al-Azhar’s campus, affecting hundreds of students. The MB and Islamist students started calling for the resignation of the Grand Imam, using the poisoned food controversy as a cause for his removal. The escalation included protests at the Grand Imam’s office, an unprecedented challenge against a traditionally highly respected figure.

Dr. Ahmed al-Tayeb, known by his official title as “H. E. The Grand Imam Sheikh of al-Azhar,” is a religious scholar from al-Azhar University. He is considered by many of the world’s one billion Sunni Muslims to be the highest authority in Sunni Islamic thought and broader Islamic jurisprudence.

The Grand Imam, who also holds a PhD from the Sorbonne University in Paris, seeks to maintain al-Azhar as an institution that promotes a tolerant Islam that accepts plurality within the faith, as well as embraces tolerance toward non-Muslims. He defends al-Azhar’s independence from both the state and political or ideological influence.

Until the Iranian revolution and Wahhabi proselytism that started about three decades ago, al-Azhar produced more liberal thinkers than Islamists. Scholars from al-Azhar, such as Imam Mohamed Abdu in the late 19^th century or Ali Abdul-Raziq in the 1920s, made invaluable contributions to the evolution of enlightened thinking and liberal politics in Egypt.

Should the MB, the Salafis, or any other political organization control al-Azhar, it would transform the institution from a place of scholarly learning into a tool of a political ideology that distorts Islam, while continuing to shape Muslim thought.  It would be nearly impossible to challenge the discourse of this lofty institution — however twisted — given the historic role that al-Azhar has played among Sunni Muslims.

The scope of Al-Azhar’s influence on Sunni Muslim thinking goes far beyond Egypt. It is the only “pan-Sunni” religious institution that survived the fall of the Caliphate in 1924. Its scholars, alumni, and branches of learning reside wherever there are concentrations of Sunni Muslims, from the United States to Libya to South Africa to Indonesia. Students from over 110 countries attend Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Whoever controls al-Azhar will reign over its global network, taking advantage of the legitimacy of the organization. This could put Islam at the mercy of the extended networks of the more radical versions of Wahhabism and Salafism, should they take over al-Azhar, or at the whim of smaller local institutions in each country or Sunni community. Consequently, there would be no global Sunni voice to counter non-pluralistic and intolerant misinterpretations of Islam.

For Egyptians, al-Azhar is more than a religious institution. With ten centuries of existence, it is the oldest surviving institution in Egypt after the Coptic Church. Politically, it played an important role after the Ottoman invasion in the 16^th century, when Azhari scholars elected the Ottoman governor of Egypt, an arrangement that balanced the relationship between Istanbul and Cairo.

Al-Azhar remained an independent institution that elected its own leader throughout its history until the dictatorship of Gamal Abdul Nasser. In 1961, al-Azhar was integrated as a state institution and its Grand Imam was appointed from al-Azhar’s scholars by the president of the republic. By nationalizing the institution, Nasser sought to limit the power and independence of its religious scholars. Since then, al-Azhar has lost a great deal of independence and appointed Grand Imams have become involved in presidents’ political goals. The Grand Imam under Nasser in the 1960s gave socialism an Islamic cover, while under Mubarak in the 1990s, the Grand Imam supported privatization and declared nationalization to be un-Islamic. Over the past three decades, al-Azhar has been caught  in a difficult position, maneuvering between the pressures of the regime and that of the Islamists while trying to maintain relative autonomy.

However, Azhari scholars and their supporters continued the demand for independence; in fact, reforming al-Azhar was a key demand of the 2011 revolution. The Azharis hoped to regain their lost independence and the right to elect their own leader. They argued that the way forward for al-Azhar is not control by the MB, Salafists, socialists, liberals, or the regime, but an independent institution immune from politics, financially secure with endowments.

The Islamists’ move to control al-Azhar has led to a formidable backlash, rallying the public around the institution. All shades of non-Islamist Egyptians, including Coptic Christians, are rallying today around al-Azhar and its leadership to prevent a MB take-over.

On May 5, representing a sudden change in position, a delegation of Salafi Nour Party and other Salafi leadership visited the Grand Imam and expressed their support of al-Azhar’s leadership and independence. The Salafis may realize that an independent Azhar is better for them than one that is a MB tool that could eventually be used against them. The Salafis may be trying to avoid a repeat scenario in which the MB used them for a power grab, and then marginalized them once they fulfilled their purpose of overpowering the government.

The MB and the Salafis maintain that they seek to reform al-Azhar. Yet, the attack on the Grand Imam has ironically made the Islamist take-over more difficult. Azhari scholars and students are now becoming more vigilant toward Islamists, some seeing this as an opportunity to counter the Islamist influence that has penetrated the institution over the last three decades.

The fall of al-Azhar to MB or Islamist control would be a significant blow for moderation and tolerance in Islam. However, if it succeeds in regaining its independence, it will be a step forward for tolerance and pluralism. Last Sunday, when Salafi and MB scholars were debating whether or not it is a sin to greet Copts on Easter, the Grand Imam went in person to greet Pope Tawadros II. When the Pope, during mass, conveyed President Morsi’s greetings, it was met by silence, but when he mentioned the Grand Imam’s visit and greetings, the Church burst into a long and enthusiastic applause. That is the genuine Azhar, a force of tolerance and progress that creates harmony in society, not a force of intolerance and darkness that will bring division and misery.

Khairi Abaza is an Egyptian Reformer, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and former official in the liberal Wafd Party.

Given the acute discrepancy over both issues between the pro-independence March 14 and the Hezbollah-led March 8 coalitions, and owing to recent events in neighboring Syria, which are heavily influencing progress on both tracks, the fragile political stability in Beirut seems to hang from thin air.

The Electoral Law and Parliament’s Vote

In advance of Parliament’s General Assembly vote on Wednesday, two main electoral proposals assume center stage: the Orthodox Law proposal, whereby each community elects its own representatives under a proportional system; and the Hybrid system, an offshoot of the 2005 Fouad Boutros Electoral Commission proposal, combining large districts known as muhafazza under a proportional system, with small districts known as qadas under a majority system.

In much of the deliberations over the electoral law, the crux of the issue has centered on how to marry fair representation (particularly for the Christians of March 8 and 14, who support the Orthodox proposal to varying degrees on the grounds of fair representation for their community) with a broad national consensus that will comfort opponents of the Orthodox, most prominently the Future Movement of former PM Saad Hariri and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. It is under this support that the Hybrid system has gained traction as a middle-ground compromise.

But the Hybrid system is not without its opponents. If Speaker Nabih Berri’s Amal parliamentary bloc welcomes it along with the Future Movement, Kataeb Party, and Lebanese Forces Party of the March 14 coalition, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of General Michel Aoun, backed by Hezbollah, will reject it, while PSP leader Walid Jumblatt has expressed reservation, preferring the current electoral law known as the 1960 law (adopting small districts under a majority system).

Amid this deadlock, Parliament will be heading to a vote this week. The Future Movement and the PSP have made it clear that if the Orthodox proposal is presented as the first or exclusive item on the session’s agenda, which seems to be a likely scenario, then they will withdraw from the General Assembly, rendering the Orthodox vulnerable to a contestation by the Constitutional Council on grounds of violation of the National Pact (Lebanon’s extra-constitutional agreement stating that all of the country’s communities must agree on major decisions to avoid a “tyranny of the majority” against one or more minorities. In this instance, both the predominantly Sunni Future Movement and the mainly Druze PSP are against the Orthodox proposal).

On the other hand, both Hezbollah and the FPM have stated their voting preference for the Orthodox law. As for the Christian parties in March 14, namely Kataeb and Lebanese Forces, their efforts have been focused on forging a difficult consensus on the Hybrid proposal as a last resort from the Orthodox, which they still prefer in comparison with the current 1960 law.

Ultimately for Hezbollah, the preference is for a proportionality-based law rather than the Orthodox. Earlier this year, during the deliberations of the parliamentary ad hoc committee tasked with the formulation of an electoral law, Kataeb MP Samy Gemayel considered an Orthodox proposal that adopted majority voting, only to be met with reservations from Hezbollah representative MP Ali Fayyad. For Hezbollah, not only does a proportional system guarantee it a majority in parliament and leverage its Christian allies in the FPM, it also serves to undermine the moderate elements within the Sunni community, particularly the Future Movement.

Speaker Berri, with his Amal bloc behind him, finds himself in a delicate position balancing his role as head of parliament with his Hezbollah alliance. For this reason, it is anticipated that Berri, who is known for his eleventh-hour political craftsmanship, will open the floor for deliberations before submitting any proposal for a vote. It is also probable that the session will be diluted by pressing security priorities, such as extending the term of the military council members of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

An Impending Cabinet Formation?

Exacerbating the gridlock on the electoral front has been the pending formation of PM-designate Salam’s cabinet, which will take over the caretaking cabinet of PM Najib Mikati following his resignation at the end of March.

Over the weekend, in an attempt to hedge against Hezbollah’s Orthodox proposal drive on May 15, it was reported that the Future Movement and the so-called centrist bloc, comprised of President Michel Suleiman, PSP leader Walid Jumblatt, and PM-designate Salam, have been favoring a cabinet formation of 14 to 24 technocrat ministers in advance of the May 15 vote. The cabinet’s main task will be to oversee elections and will most likely strip Hezbollah of its veto right (known as the blocking third) demand, which it gained following the troubles of May 2008.

Jumblatt’s abrupt travel to Saudi Arabia on Saturday and his meetings with Prince Bandar Bin Sultan and former PM Saad Hariri were seen as exploratory of such a scenario and whether or not the formation of a cabinet will be further delayed or expedited.

Hezbollah and its allies Amal and FPM were prompt in their rejection of such a “one-sided” cabinet, cautioning its repercussions on public order and the tense stability in the country. Such “cautionary remarks” by Hezbollah should not be taken lightly as the group has repeatedly demonstrated its disregard for rule of law by employing extra-democratic measures anytime it feels its immediate interests are threatened.

Likely Outcomes

On Sunday, May 19, the deadline for arriving at a new electoral law comes to an end, and with it, the door for filing candidacies opens again under the existing 1960 law, which is still valid, legally speaking.

More than any other party, Hezbollah and its allies understand the limits of the 1960 law to their interests. Most polls and surveys point to a March 14 parliamentary majority if elections are held under the 1960 law this year. They also point to a shrinking popularity of the FPM, Hezbollah’s Christian ally, in predominantly Christian districts.

The parameters of Hezbollah’s options are clear in this regard. It cannot bless an electoral process that strips it of a national majority, just as it cannot approve of a cabinet that does not guarantee it a much-needed veto right. This is particularly true when the stature of its longtime Syrian backer is dwindling and its involvement in events next door is becoming more problematic by the day. And therein lies the impasse.

Ultimately, given that a majority in March 14 will not approve of a vote on the Orthodox proposal during the parliamentary session this Wednesday — particularly its Sunni component and the centrist Druze party of Jumblatt — and given that the Hezbollah-led March 8 will not succumb to a lost electoral process under the current 1960 law, an extension for parliament’s term, which comes to an end June 20, might be a face-saving outcome come Wednesday’s parliamentary session.

The extension will be “technical” in nature, stretching over a six-month period, and allowing a consensus over a new electoral law to be reached. Above all, the extension will spare parliament a contestation at the Constitutional Council, as its pretext is technical, not political.

Short of such a compromise, the parliamentary vote might be adjourned altogether if it is projected that two (the Sunnis and the Druze) out of Lebanon’s four main communities will boycott the session.

As for the cabinet, and owing to a loophole in the constitution that does not specify a fixed period for its formation following designation, it too appears to be an extension-in-progress.

Eventually, the centrist bloc, mindful of the national interest and cautious of Hezbollah’s proven adventurism, might opt not to endorse a unilateral cabinet formation. This will allow more time to reach consensus over an electoral law that will in turn expedite a cabinet that will oversee its implementation.

For now, predicting no tangible progress on the electoral and cabinet tracks, the pressing priority for Lebanon is to limit the spillover from neighboring Syria onto its turf — particularly at the level of refugees, Sunni-Shia tensions, extremism and transfer of weapons, and militants across the border.

If the security situation in the country degenerates, then it is not only the pending constitutional imperatives that Lebanon and the international community must worry about. It is in this context that Washington and the international community should firmly advance the notion of neutrality for Lebanon (otherwise referred to as the “dissociation policy”), and strengthen their assistances to Syrian refugees and domestic security apparatuses.

Jean-Pierre Katrib is a Beirut-based university lecturer and human rights activist.

Though Khattabi’s arrest began to receive Libyan media coverage on February 28 when he went on hunger strike in protest of his unjust imprisonment, the majority gave his case little to no attention. While several factors could be attributed to this press deficiency, from lack of public interest to poor media coverage, it was a clear demonstration of the constraints on the freedom of expression in post-revolution Libya.

The demand for freedom of speech was one of the main sparks that triggered the Libyan revolution in 2011. People felt the need to express their feelings about various political and even social issues that were deemed taboo or criminalized by the Gaddafi regime. Many Libyans also felt that true freedom of expression would enable them to voice their opinions and ideas to advocate for change.

Since the revolution, a quick glance at Libyan television, social media, and newspapers, or a listen-in to the radio demonstrates the overwhelming number of people eager to speak their minds. There are more media outlets today in Libya then there are jelly bean colors; however, the quantity of media platforms does not necessarily reflect the quality of freedom of expression in Libya.

The most obvious limitations to freedom of expression, despite this being an era in Libya that promises the people more freedoms, are the absence of security and rule of law. Secondarily, further limitations are biased media platforms and cultural habits. Understandably, given the current stage of Libya’s political transition, any hot media subject discussed by journalists, activists, politicians, or any influential person will undoubtedly be politicized to a certain extent.

It is fair to say that armed groups, or the remaining active militias in Libya, are currently among the most significant actors. To speak badly about them or to say something they might disagree with means that the speakers are voicing their ideas against armed men. These armed men want to be part of the new Libya, and one of the ways they do so is by emphasizing their presence and putting restrictions on the freedoms of civilians.

Putting the issue of the militias aside, security in the current environment would still present a threat to the freedom of expression. There is no government body such as the police force or army that would actually protect a person and allow them to freely and comfortably have a voice. Adding to that is the broken judicial system, which is preventing impartial justice from being served in freedom of expression related cases. Libyan citizens find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle between a lack of both law and order and justice, which have become compounded principles; you cannot have one without the other.

The February 17 revolution brought hopes of a new era of freedom of expression whereby everyone would be entitled to voice their opinions. During the difficult months prior to Libya’s liberation, oppressing the truth was out of the question.

Freedom in Libya has no doubt improved since the Gaddafi era, as indicated by the annual “Freedom in the World” report issued by Freedom House. In the 2013 report, Libya’s civil liberties rating improved from 6 to 5 and overall, Libya moved up from the status of “Not free” to “Partially Free.” This, according to Freedom House, is thanks to “the proliferation and sustained activism of media outlets and civil society organizations.”

Until the ideal governance begins to take form, it will be up to whistleblowers like activists and human rights organizations to flag constraints placed on freedoms.  A large portion of Libyan society has turned to online media to express themselves, and in some areas, radio has become an inexpensive medium used to voice one’s opinion. Journalists in particular recognize the limits on freedom of expression and are slowly working toward improving the constraints they work under. It is evident, however, that only until new laws are established that respect human rights, until people feel safe, and until the media matures, can we begin to see freedom of expression flourish in a healthy and democratic environment.

Khadija Ali is a Libyan freelance journalist based in Tripoli.

Politicians and clerics behind the most recent divisive sectarian statements forget that the principle of complete equality was born out of necessity in 1919 as a concession that the Muslim majority had to make to the Copts for the nation to survive.

The intolerant and insensitive discourse comes less than a month after the most traumatic attack on the Coptic Orthodox Church. In April, a group of extremists attacked the seat of the Church, a compound in central Cairo, where hundreds were gathered for the funerals of five men killed in earlier sectarian clashes over offensive graffiti written on a mosque, allegedly done by a group of young Copts.

Both the target and the intensity of the April attack were unprecedented. After the assault on their most sacred site, the Coptic community feels further alienated in an increasingly divided Egypt. The dilemma faced by the Copts encapsulates in a sense the experience of a large segment of Egyptian society in the current political environment. As demonstrated by the daily nationwide protests, many in the bureaucracy, non-Islamist parties, revolutionary youth groups, and much of civil society are against the country’s new rulers and their authoritarian tendencies.

Egyptians feel they live in an alarmingly polarized society, and a broad consensus is the only way for the country to move forward.

Throughout history, despite the clichés about iron-fisted despots, even the most repressive rulers had to rely on an established consensus between Egyptian society-at-large and interest groups. In the modern age, these include the bureaucracy, judiciary, unions, the Azhar (the country’s Islamic authority), and the Coptic Church, to name a few. With its two millennia of existence, the Coptic Church is of particular importance as the oldest surviving Egyptian institution.

The tenet of national consensus in governance is fundamental, but not codified; no government can function without it, and any attempt to consolidate power or establish a new consensus must be gradual. The last two major regime changes in Egypt’s history each took about a decade to establish a new order. The first came in the early 1800s when Mohamed Ali Pasha founded modern Egypt, and the second in 1952 when Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew the constitutional monarchy. In both cases, the rulers dismantled the previous order, but gradually created a new one over the course of several years.

As Egypt undergoes its third regime change in modern history under the direction of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), its leadership fails to recognize the importance of rule backed by consensus, instead rapidly assuming control of Egypt on its own. The faster it tries to do so, the faster the backlash. Ten months after rising to power, the MB is proving that it is not conducive to stability. On the contrary; as time passes, Egypt slides closer toward instability and chaos. The economy is in ruin, parts of Sinai are beyond the government’s control, crime is increasing, daily protests create instability on the streets, and last but not least, sectarian violence is dangerously on the rise.

Accordingly, for the first time since Mohamed Ali emancipated non-Muslims into the fabric of a supra-sectarian Egyptian national identity, Copts feel that Egypt is being built anew on a foundation from which they are excluded. Together with non-Islamists and women, the Copts and other Christians were left out of the constitutional drafting process that the Islamists insisted on promulgating.

One of the pillars of consensus that built modern Egypt two centuries ago was the emancipation of minorities. After the assassination of the second Christian prime minister in 1910, sectarian tensions escalated. By 1919, Saad Zaghlul Pasha, leader of the nationalist movement against the British, was able to reestablish national unity, launching a slogan that would remain the basis of Egyptian citizenship: “Religion belongs to God, and the Nation belongs to all.” Even as Coptic rights were being eroded well into the Mubarak era, this principle and slogan were reiterated often, and coexistence endured.

Today, the Brotherhood fails to understand the importance of this unwritten tenet of consensus with the Copts, as well as other groups and institutions. As such, a new Egypt is being built upon a shaky foundation. The issue of the constitution was a turning point that demonstrated the lack of consensus, alienating large segments of the society.

An Egypt in which one group seeks to dominate all others without consensus will not function. The stubborn facts on the ground prove that consensus is still the only viable option. Sooner or later, the MB will realize this, but at what cost?

Khairi Abaza is an Egyptian reformer, senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and former official of the liberal Wafd party.

In spite of the oath that he took to respect and apply the Egyptian legal code, the prosecutor decided to instead apply sharia law and Mohammed Ragheb was flogged. Following the prosecutor’s decision, the section officer entrusted with administering the lashing could not work up the nerve to follow through with the punishment. In the meantime, the story began to leak to social media and suddenly, the world turned upside down as outside social pressure began to build. The attorney general was then forced to personally look into the case and cancelled the prosecutor’s decision.

This story is of great significance. Although it was a source of great panic for many, it clearly points to something very encouraging: it tells the story of true community resistance against the realization of Islamization of the state.

In Egypt, the ruling Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is trying to change and force society into a particular religious mold, but their efforts have consistently faced overwhelming rejection, forcing them to retreat.

Recently, this confrontation with the MB has taken a different form. Today’s Egypt is divided between society-at-large versus the Brotherhood and its supporters. Egyptian society is now engaged in war similar to that of a war of tribes, in which every ‘tribe’ is engaged in their own isolated struggle with the MB. Judges are now fighting to stop the progression of the Brotherhood’s consolidation of the judiciary. Women have taken up a fight against the media minister’s (MB-affiliated) tireless verbal sexual harassment of female TV presenters. And for the first time since 1976, students are organizing demonstrations against the minister of education (MB-affiliated) after issuing a decision to ban political demonstrations at universities.

In summary, the Muslim Brotherhood currently faces a great social resistance movement (albeit disorganized and fragmented) that has shattered its own multiplicity and diversity on all fronts. And this social resistance movement continues to triumph even today, as seen in the story of al-Minya’s prosecutor. This, and other such stories, all represent a real threat in the face of the Muslim Brotherhood’s attempt to Islamicize the nation.

Behind this resistance is a political struggle (or a civil struggle, as it’s often called) that isn’t a propelling force behind these events, but benefits from them, and in the best case scenario, supports it. The struggle of the political “opposition” is still vulnerable due to its own weakness and internal conflict, which have served as a political cover for the clashes happening on the ground.

Maged Atef is the general manager of EgyptFixer and a political activist based in Cairo.

The End of Iraqiyya and the Rise of Sunni Extremism

While Iraqiyya floundered in recent elections, the new player on the electoral map on the level of the Arab Sunni street was the United List, which has an Islamic foundation and ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. Judging by the Iraqiyya list results, the noticeable decline in its popularity likely benefitted the United List. In the absence of election results from Anbar and Ninawa, it is difficult to appreciate the size of the regionalization bloc in comparison to the Arab Sunni bloc that rejects regionalization. At the same time, the United List achieved first or second place among the Sunni lists in Diyala, Baghdad, and Salah ad-Din, confirming continued sectarian polarization between the Sunni and Shia.

The prevailing impression in Sunni Arab regions is that the security measures and other obstacles targeted Sunni voters in order to help Shia parties. The most serious threat to the political process, however, would be the loss of Sunni voter confidence in the ballot box, and could give constituents the impression that the only alternatives are either dividing the country or resorting to boxes of bullets. Instead of elections constituting the means to resolve disputes, they themselves have become obstacles.

The regime’s use of force in order to disperse the protesters occupying Hawija Square in Kirkuk, in addition to the loss of hope and confidence in the elections, have increased sectarian tensions in a way that encourages extremism. All of these things threaten more violence and military confrontations, making a slide into a real sectarian war ever more possible.

The government’s decision to postpone the elections in Ninawa and Anbar added a new dimension to the electoral process, which is the regime’s use of authority to alter election dates to serve its interests. In 2005, the ruling parties insisted on holding parliamentary elections when it was to their advantage, despite the atmosphere of sectarian division and insecurity, and demands by many that the elections be postponed.

The situation in Ninawa and Anbar today is one of political competition between residents who do not live divided by sect, and who enjoy an exceptional level of security, while other provinces such as Baghdad have registered levels of violence and disruption that have never been more severe. However, the centers of power have reason to fear the election results in Ninawa and Anbar, so they sought to postpone the elections in those provinces under one pretext or another. The manipulation of election dates in a way that favors the regime undermines the election process, which is one of the most important aspects of democracy.

The Sunni Arab forces, which have been credited with doing the most to combat al-Qaeda and Islamic militant groups, find themselves today between the government’s reluctance to respond to the humanitarian and constitutional demands of their citizens, and the Takfiri and Ikhwani forces of violence.

Forces of Civil Moderation

The escalation of sectarian tensions that Iraq is witnessing today benefits the forces of sectarian extremism, which have made moderates their first victims, and is reflected in the election results. The participation of moderate national forces, represented by cross-sectarian entities including Arabists, leftists, and liberal forces, was limited and fragmented, thus failing to break down the sectarian electoral wall.

The importance of this movement comes from the need to attract enough voters to change the sectarian equation of Iraqi politics. Sectarian and ethnically-based parties will not be able to build a solution to the national impasse; what is needed is an Iraqi solution instead of one that is exclusively Shia, Sunni, or Kurdish.

But this movement has many obstacles, such as: the loss of desire for cooperation and unity, the tyranny of competition over political leadership, the dependence of some on the support of influential forces as a result of material insufficiencies, and the lack of vision and tactics of working together.

By reviewing the coalitions that participated in the elections in the Baghdad governorate, we can distinguish the following civil blocs: the National Will, Justice and Democracy, the Goodness list, and the United National Christian list. Similar coalitions exist in other governorates.

These coalitions expect to claim about ten seats out of the total 378. Judging by the previous elections, that would represent a relative success that could form a foundation for an alliance at the provincial level – and more than that, pave the way to form a political front to contest the parliamentary elections next year.

Ghassan Atiyyah is the founder of the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy based in Baghdad and is a former visiting fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

These elections were the first to take place after the withdrawal of U.S. forces at the end of 2011. According to the IHEC, the average overall level of participation was 51% (including general and special voting), whereas in the Baghdad governorate, the percent of participation did not exceed 33%, reflecting the state of popular discontent with the performance of the ruling party. In the 2009 elections, voter participation in the Baghdad governorate was 40%.

Ten years have passed since the ruling parties failed to enact legislation requiring political parties to disclose funding sources. This has created a style of campaign spending that serves the interests of foreign or governmental political financing, which was reflected in some election campaign budgets exceeding $250 million.

Throughout Iraq, the security situation has worsened. Recent electoral conflict and sectarian violence has driven Sunni ministers to resign and the Kurds to boycott the Council of Ministers and the Parliament. In most Iraqi provinces, there have been explosions; sit-ins and protests have continued for over one hundred days in Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Ninawa; and candidates in these provinces as well as Baghdad and Diyala received threats in the lead up to elections, sixteen of which resulted in killings (all victims were Sunni Arab).

On the outskirts of Baghdad and Diyala provinces, large numbers of voters were prevented from participating in the elections due to either security measures and a subsequent curfew, or the far distance of voting centers. When the curfew was lifted at 4 o’clock in the afternoon on the day of elections, concerned parties demanded that voting hours be extended. Officials refused, and the doors of voting centers were closed by 5 o’clock that evening. In addition to such irregularities, there were other regulatory violations such as the presence of soldiers in some of the voting centers under the pretext of security; the absence of female staff to inspect women voters, effectively preventing them from voting in those centers; and the burning down of polling stations in Sunni areas (Diyala and al-Taaji).

Furthermore, chaos engulfed efforts to update voter registrations, which had a significant impact when thousands found themselves unable to vote due to the absence of their names in the voter registry. This shortcoming can be partially blamed on the IHEC, but it was also due to voters’ inability to renew their voter registration in time.

Despite the typical focus on public service in provincial council elections, these elections took on a newly politicized dimension: they became a referendum of the Prime Minister’s credibility in Shia popular opinion. Accordingly, the Prime Minster threw his political and material weight behind election campaigns, stepping up his visits to the southern Shia provinces and Diyala, presenting himself in a charged sectarian context as the protector of the Shia from Sunni “danger,” invoking the names of the Baath party, al-Qaeda, and threatening protesters.

Before election results were officially announced, the government raised the stakes by storming Hawija Square in Kirkuk on April 23, resulting in dozens of casualties. This move constitutes a dangerous precedent for the government’s handling of protesters that could be applied to similar demonstrations in Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Mosul. As a result, two Sunni ministers resigned in protest.

The elections solidified Maliki’s identity as a Shia leader and his list won in most of the Shia provinces, followed by the Citizen Coalition (founded by Ammar al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council), then the Sadrist movement, which bears the responsibility for splitting the Shia vote after its cooperation with the Kurds and the Iraqiyya list in the withdrawal of confidence from Prime Minister Maliki.

With the exception of the Diyala province, the parties of the Iraqi National Alliance (Shia) entered the election lists individually. The Rule of Law Coalition achieved a great success, followed by the Citizen Coalition, and then the Sadrist movement, with the exception of Maysan province, where the Sadrists came in first. With these results, the Shia parties consolidated their hegemony over the councils of the Shia provinces, though with an important change: it is now possible for the Rule of Law Coalition and the Citizen Coalition to form an alliance at a provincial level and exclude the Sadrist movement. This development will impact the parliamentary elections that are scheduled to take place in 2014, laying the groundwork for a majority government without the Sadrists.

Ghassan Atiyyah is the founder of the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy based in Baghdad and is a former visiting fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Bourguiba returns?

Destour (meaning “constitution” in Arabic) was the name of the nationalist party founded by the reformist Abdelaziz Thaalbi in 1920. More importantly, it refers to the Neo-Destour party and the Socialist Destourian party, founded by Bourguiba in 1934 and 1964, respectively. The name of the new coalition is a nod to Tunisia’s contemporary history, evoking the struggle for independence and the subsequent foundation of a modern state against cultural and economic underdevelopment. Destour also refers to a system of values, based on patriotism and a mix of Western Enlightenment philosophy and 19th century Tunisian liberal Islamic thought that led to the adoption of the 1956 Personal Status Code. Under Bourguiba’s influence, this law gave rights to women that were and still are, to some extent, progressive relative to other Arab countries.

The Destourian Front presents itself as a Bourguibist movement, but a closer look reveals a more complex reality. Indeed, the most prominent leaders of the Destourian Front are more evocative of the Ben Ali regime than the Bourguiba era. For instance, the frontman of the alliance, Kamel Morjane, served as Ben Ali’s Minister of Defense then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was seen as the dictator’s heir apparent. Another leader of the coalition, Mohamed Jegham, was Minister of Defense after having been Ben Ali’s Minister of Interior during the “iron years,” a period of brutal state-sponsored violence against Islamist and left-wing human rights activists.

The view that the Ben Ali regime upheld Bourguiba’s legacy is inaccurate, as many Tunisian public servants and some political leaders were repressed for their allegiance to Bourguiba after the coup that toppled him and led Ben Ali to power in 1987. Despite Ben Ali’s efforts to create such an illusion, his regime maintained and recycled the political structures of the Bourguiba era, but left the Destourian system of values behind, plunging Tunisia into an age of ignorance and oppression. The regime rewarded cronyism instead of competence and actively worked to weaken Tunisia’s educational and cultural capital, which was seen as a threat to the powers that be rather than the asset Bourguiba struggled to build.

Listening today to Destourian Front leaders, one wonders whether they are promoting the legacy of Bourguiba or Ben Ali. Former senior members of Ben Ali’s party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), who kept a low profile during the first months following the revolution, are now shamelessly speaking in defense of Ben Ali under the guise of Bourguibism. Many who used to conceal their admiration for Bourguiba when Ben Ali was in power now seem to be using the founding father’s legacy as a pretext to clear their names.

By perpetuating the confusion between Bourguiba and Ben Ali, and between the Destour and the RCD, they are undermining the potential for a revival of Bourguibism in Tunisia, thus serving the purposes of the Islamists and the left-wing who have undertaken a smear campaign against Bourguiba. This unabashed display of support for Ben Ali can also be seen as a sign of growing skepticism of the post-revolution direction the country is taking.

The Destourian Front of many divisions

Hardly mentioning the revolution, but instead referring to the glorious early days of the Tunisian Republic, the so-called Destourians appear to youth as backward-looking. The modernity they are espousing has its roots in the fifties, if not the ninetieth century. This may be the true modernity that Tunisia gradually lost over the Ben Ali years, but the past does not seem to be an appealing prospect for Tunisian youth.

The Destourian Front was formed by small parties, the most prominent of which is al-Mubadara, Morjane’s party that enjoys five seats in the Constituent Assembly. All of al-Mubadara’s members of parliament were elected in the Sahel, Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s native and prosperous coastal region. In Monastir, Sousse, and Mahdia, the three provinces making up the Sahel, the Destourian Front relied on their solid popular base, with the help of RCD party remnants and the region’s disenchantment with post-revolution politics.

Al-Mubadara may have won the votes of the Sahelians in the first post-revolution elections in 2011, but from now on, the Destourian Front will face a serious challenger in Nidaa Tounes. Led by the magnetic former transitional Prime Minister Béji Caïd Essebsi, the party is now vying for the top position in the recent opinion polls. Nidaa Tounes is indeed playing in the same arena as the Destourian Front, but with stronger popular support and a more sophisticated strategy. Their audience is much broader than the “Destourian family,” as it includes centrists, leftists, and liberals, and could embrace a significant part of Tunisia’s mildly conservative middle class, which is disappointed with Ennahdha’s performance. Moreover, Nidaa Tounes is promoting genuine forward-looking Bourguibism by putting forth Bourguibist charismatic elders, such as Essebsi himself, and young human rights activists rather than reviled cronies of the Ben Ali years.

However powerful it may be, Nidaa Tounes is nonetheless a temporary coalition united around its elderly leader. The Destourian Front could strategically join forces with Nidaa Tounes, laying the foundations for a united Destourian party that would emerge from the remains of Nidaa Tounes in the event that Caïd Essebsi succeeds in his mission to topple the Islamist ruling party and his heterogeneous alliance dissolves.

Yet, the Destourian Front seems more tempted by another alliance. Wooed by Ennahdha, al-Mubadara’s five representatives voted in favor of Ali Laarayedh’s designation as Prime Minister. Despite a draft law which would temporarily exclude former senior members of the RCD from elected office, the party perplexingly now overtly supports the current Islamist-led government. In fact, Rached Ghannouchi was the guest of honor at a recent conference organized by al-Mubadara’s Morjane. This warming of relations between the Destourians and the Islamists is certainly the result of intensive efforts undertaken by Hamed Karoui, Ben Ali’s former Prime Minister. Karoui has built a close relationship with Ennahdha’s Secretary General and former Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali, a native of Sousse who grew up on the same street as Karoui’s son, who embraced Islamist ideology in his teens under Jebali’s influence.

This odd alliance may be temporary due to the ideological gap between the two factions, but it could also be a sign of a potential merger with Ennahdha’s moderate, pragmatic wing, which begrudgingly allies with Rached Ghannouchi’s hardliners. As the leaders of the Destourian Front and Nidaa Tounes seem to despise each other irrespective of their ideological proximity, their rivalry could in fact lead to political maneuvering among Ennahdha’s opposing factions, significantly transforming the Tunisian political landscape.

Habib M. Sayah is a Tunisian lawyer and the director of the Kheireddine Institute, a think-tank dedicated to promoting individual liberty and free-market ideas in Tunisia.

From the start, their mistake seems to have been their obsession with “Islamic Identity.” In Tunisia, mainstream Ennahdha turned the issue of an Islamic governance model into an electoral game, which improved its status among the people and secured its electoral victory in October 2011. Similarly in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) dove into politics when it presented a presidential candidate, reneging on its initial pledge to refrain from doing so. Then, the MB-led government submitted a hurriedly prepared constitution to referendum, exacerbating the country’s social polarization.

In an attempt to ease heightened tension and gain time, the ruling Islamists surrendered on some issues. In Tunisia, they gave up on some clauses in the constitution (sharia law, anti-blasphemy clause) and released their hold on key cabinet ministries (interior, justice, and foreign affairs). While in Egypt, President Morsi rescinded the “constitutional declaration” which would have granted him near-absolute power, called for dialogue with the opposition, and promised free and fair parliamentary elections.

These concessions, however, only exposed the Islamists’ vulnerability, thereby galvanizing the disenchanted groups who, in the absence of a unified and credible opposition, see no other choice but to resort to street protests. Such demonstrations have become increasingly violent, bordering on civil disobedience in towns in the Central Western region of Tunisia and in Egypt’s Port Said, where the Egyptian military has essentially become the ruling body.

In Tunisia, a senseless confrontation with labor unions compounded the problem. Attacks by Ennahdha vigilantes against the half-million strong national labour union, UGTT, led to general strikes in the cities of Kserine, Gafsa, Sfax and Sidi Bouzid (the launching pad of the revolution). In Egypt, labor strikes driven by discontent over dwindling purchasing power and mismanagement doubled in the second half of 2012, reaching over 2,000 strikes for the whole year according to the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights.

Meanwhile, the economic issues that remain a priority for the majority of society became marginalized by the governments of both countries. As the economic outlook fails to improve, unrest is likely to spread to different regions and poor neighborhoods in large cities, thereby providing an opportunity for radical opposition groups to keep the momentum of street protests and for terrorist cells to spread their roots.

As both countries become increasingly ungovernable, the medium term outcome may prioritize security, calling for heightened military presence. In Egypt, the army will almost certainly be pressured to return to some extent, since it is the country’s only respected, organized, credible institution. Tunisia’s “apolitical” army, however, refused early on to be dragged into power politics, even when the regime collapsed on January 14, 2011. Hence, the only remaining alternative will be protracted chaos.

Under such conditions in both Egypt and Tunisia, the best option for the secular opposition is to unify under a large centrist liberal front to prevent a complete power grab by the Islamist forces. The opposition groups, however, face serious challenges, namely: (1) the difficulty of standing against religious foes that have the advantage of mosque sermons and financial largesse, and (2) the negative popular view regarding seculars as westernized elites, espousing lofty ideological goals of free speech, democracy, and human rights, i.e., principles that do not necessarily meet the urgent demands of the people.

In this respect, Tunisia may have a better chance with political veteran Beji Caid Essebsi, who succeeded in security and economic policy as Prime Minister during the transitional period, and whose “Nidaa Tounes” Party is now running neck and neck with ruling Ennahdha in the opinion polls.

As for the West, its financial leverage becomes ever more important as the ruling Islamists run increasingly bankrupt governments that will need much more than the IMF loans that are currently being negotiated. Hence, putting socio-political conditions on Western aid would better serve the medium to long-term goals of inclusive governments, security, and economic progress in these countries. Meanwhile, the prevailing short-term view of accommodating the ruling Islamists to prevent imminent economic collapse will only increase polarization and undermine the transition.

Mohamed Bechri is the former president of the Tunisian Section of Amnesty International.

The Kurds are commonly considered the first group in Syria that took a stand against tyranny, even as far back as the 1970s when Hafiz al-Assad assumed power. But the most notable demonstration against the regime was in 2002 under Bashar al-Assad when the Kurdish Yekiti Party organized the first protest (led by Hassan Salah and Marwan Othman) on International Human Rights Day. During this demonstration, Kurds called for democracy in Syria, the protection of human rights, the release of political prisoners, and a just solution to the Kurdish national issue in Syria.

Since the start of the 2011 revolution, Kurds have demonstrated, taking a stand against repression, detention, and racial discrimination. After the events in Daraa, the men of Amuda tore down a statue of Assad, leading to an uprising in every Kurdish city and village to demand the overthrow of the regime. Despite this, members of the Syrian opposition still approach Kurds with suspicion and doubt.

The formation of the Kurdish National Council in October 2011 was of great importance to the Kurds. It was an attempt to appeal to fragmented Kurdish political groups to support the revolution as one united Kurdish political entity working to lay the foundation of a civil, democratic, and pluralistic state. However, internal political fragmentation kept the council’s activities at a stand-still.

In July 2012, President Barzani attempted to intervene via the Hawler (Erbil) Agreement to unite Kurds politically and announce the establishment of the Kurdish Higher Authority that would include all Kurdish parties, including the PKK-backed Democratic Union Party (PYD). However, internal conflict persisted. This isolated the PYD and reinforced their military power over the Kurdish region (though their “Committee for Popular Protection”) after the regime withdrew from all state institutions there. In a way, such an internally-conflicted Kurdish state was the intention of both the current and former regimes, which also aided Turkish meddling to turn Arab tribes and Islamist and Jihadi brigades against the Kurds. Attempts by Barzani, Talibani, and Ocalan to co-opt the Kurds of Syria in this political-partisan conflict have negatively affected the greater Kurdish community.

From Turkey, the PKK has used regional posturing to leverage power in Syria through the PYD. It has proven to be a major player between Kurds, the opposition, and the state. The PKK has taken great pride in this position of power, flaunting it in the face of the Kurds, Turkey, the Syrian opposition, and the international community. Recent developments in the peace process between the PKK and President Erdogan could transform the political layout of the region and determine the status of the Kurds going forward. It is likely that, through this peace agreement, Turkey will submit the Kurdish fate to the PKK and the PYD, inevitably creating an internal Kurdish struggle. This would of course be in Turkey’s best interest as the PKK will undoubtedly put its own regional aspirations before the good of the Kurdish community.

Meanwhile, the Syrian National Council (SNC) has made several attempts to marginalize Kurdish representation by excluding the Kurdish political movement and major Kurdish figures. Despite this, the Kurdish population remains the backbone of a Syrian civil democracy. It is critical that Kurds remain an effective and involved Syrian constituent so that  the national political arena is not left to fundamentalist political Islam (among other trends).

The Kurds have the ability to impact the political tension and stagnation within the Syrian Opposition Coalition through open dialogue with its leaders. This could help place Kurds on the Syrian political map, ensuring an inclusive transitional government, military, and civil society. However, this will require flexibility among the opposition and the eradication of the culture of superiority and exclusion that has long since worked against the Kurds. The organization of a transitional government without the Kurds will inevitably be incomplete. Without the inclusion of all minority groups, Kurds, Christians, and other minorities will be pushed to form an alternative government, which will negatively impact the revolution’s goals while prolonging the life of the regime.

Everyone is betting on the Kurdish role in the revolution and Syria’s future. Kurdish involvement  will depend on the readiness of the Syrian Opposition Coalition to establish a clear political stance on Kurdish grievances in addition to a democratic plan to establish a federal system for the Syria of tomorrow. This plan would include the constitutional recognition of nationalism in Syria and a resolution of the Kurdish issue according to international norms and regulations. Though political dynamics have caused some to ‘put the cart before the horse,’ both the SOC and the Kurdish parties must stay pragmatic in order to achieve national unity and bring down the regime.

Jehad Saleh is an independent Kurdish writer and researcher based in Washington, DC.