For more than two days now, Arab and international media have hesitated to use the term “revolution” to describe what happened in Tunisia. Instead, they are using the term “intifada,” which represents a lesser degree of resistance than a revolution and marks the end of any governing system or occupation.
The media is rightfully hesitant. It is not easy to believe that the Arab tongue has finally dissented and pronounced its right to peaceful change. Without a moment of fear, the people took to the streets to realize this change, despite the oppressive security apparatus that used bullets to take the lives of seventy young Tunisians who chose freedom over life. Fate had no choice but to respond to their bold demands for democracy.
It was unexpected that what began as a tense situation in the town of Sidi Bouzeid would ultimately transform into a fever that overtook the entire nation and demanded the removal of President Zein El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime. As is the case of most marriages between Arab regimes and their people, Ben Ali’s party was ultimately divorced from an illegitimate marriage to the Tunisian people. However, the state of tension that accompanied the Tunisian Jasmine revolution was distinguished by two factors that allowed it to continue and spread to other Tunisian cities, ultimately leading to success.
The tension that caused the crisis did not start in the capital, but rather in the provinces, where the Tunisian regime least expected it to occur. The wave of protests reached the capital after approximately twenty-two days, making it a very difficult task for the fragile government institutions of the Tunisian regime to deal with the crisis. Adopting the security solution was the only way to kill the courage of the protesters.
However, security did not succeed in deterring Tunisian citizens who combined their social demands with anger to defend their dignity, as represented by the young man who committed an act of self-immolation, rejecting helplessness in the face of humiliation. It was an uprising for bread and dignity, not bread alone. The compounded rejection of deprivation and humiliation led to the Tunisian people’s unyielding expression of anger, as described by the Arab thinker Azmi Bishara.
Perhaps this is summed up best by a video clip posted on YouTube of a Tunisian girl, a university student, who stood in front of security forces with hundreds of protesters behind her and shouted, “Hungry, naked, unemployed, and without dignity.” These are the elements that created the state of resilience that defeated Ben Ali.
It is likely that officials close to Ben Ali assured him in the weeks leading up to the revolution that security forces had the situation under control, as usual.
The fact that the Jasmine revolution was spontaneous from beginning to end was the second factor that led to its success. It was championed by ordinary citizens who forced all organizational entities and labor unions to stand behind the people and who took to the streets when necessary.
The “political security solution” typically used by authoritarian regimes, especially Arab regimes, could not withstand such spontaneity. The security solution penetrates any wave of organized protest and creates divisions between its organizers to abort it from within. This explains why there was no spokesman for the opposition throughout the intifada, which lasted almost one month and culminated in the Jasmine revolution.
Though Ben Ali has since fled Tunisia, the road toward democratic change for a government whose institutions were characterized by authoritarianism is long. The first step is to get rid of the ruling party and to remove its leaders from sensitive positions in the state administration—with the exception of the military, which refused to get involved in the oppression from the start.
A new constitution that builds decentralized and democratic legislative, executive, and judicial institutions must precede the elections. This should be coupled with fair elections and clear mechanisms for accountability and inquiry.
The international community is in an unenviable position; the United States and France were clearly embarrassed by Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia. Paris refused to receive Ben Ali and announced that his family is not welcome in France. In a belated White House statement from, President Obama applauded the courage of the Tunisian people. Such acts and statements are ironic, considering that both countries have always boasted of their strong relationship with Ben Ali while refusing to support democracy in Tunisia or to protect activists.
The Tunisian people came to hate Ben Ali, and to hate the West’s support of him. Will Paris and Washington learn to expect democracy and change to be pronounced by every Arab tongue in the near future? And are they ready for it? I expect not.
Mohamed Abdelbaky is a journalist and researcher specialized in democratic affairs.
The media is rightfully hesitant. It is not easy to believe that the Arab tongue has finally dissented and pronounced its right to peaceful change. Without a moment of fear, the people took to the streets to realize this change, despite the oppressive security apparatus that used bullets to take the lives of seventy young Tunisians who chose freedom over life. Fate had no choice but to respond to their bold demands for democracy.
It was unexpected that what began as a tense situation in the town of Sidi Bouzeid would ultimately transform into a fever that overtook the entire nation and demanded the removal of President Zein El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime. As is the case of most marriages between Arab regimes and their people, Ben Ali’s party was ultimately divorced from an illegitimate marriage to the Tunisian people. However, the state of tension that accompanied the Tunisian Jasmine revolution was distinguished by two factors that allowed it to continue and spread to other Tunisian cities, ultimately leading to success.
The tension that caused the crisis did not start in the capital, but rather in the provinces, where the Tunisian regime least expected it to occur. The wave of protests reached the capital after approximately twenty-two days, making it a very difficult task for the fragile government institutions of the Tunisian regime to deal with the crisis. Adopting the security solution was the only way to kill the courage of the protesters.
However, security did not succeed in deterring Tunisian citizens who combined their social demands with anger to defend their dignity, as represented by the young man who committed an act of self-immolation, rejecting helplessness in the face of humiliation. It was an uprising for bread and dignity, not bread alone. The compounded rejection of deprivation and humiliation led to the Tunisian people’s unyielding expression of anger, as described by the Arab thinker Azmi Bishara.
Perhaps this is summed up best by a video clip posted on YouTube of a Tunisian girl, a university student, who stood in front of security forces with hundreds of protesters behind her and shouted, “Hungry, naked, unemployed, and without dignity.” These are the elements that created the state of resilience that defeated Ben Ali.
It is likely that officials close to Ben Ali assured him in the weeks leading up to the revolution that security forces had the situation under control, as usual.
The fact that the Jasmine revolution was spontaneous from beginning to end was the second factor that led to its success. It was championed by ordinary citizens who forced all organizational entities and labor unions to stand behind the people and who took to the streets when necessary.
The “political security solution” typically used by authoritarian regimes, especially Arab regimes, could not withstand such spontaneity. The security solution penetrates any wave of organized protest and creates divisions between its organizers to abort it from within. This explains why there was no spokesman for the opposition throughout the intifada, which lasted almost one month and culminated in the Jasmine revolution.
Though Ben Ali has since fled Tunisia, the road toward democratic change for a government whose institutions were characterized by authoritarianism is long. The first step is to get rid of the ruling party and to remove its leaders from sensitive positions in the state administration—with the exception of the military, which refused to get involved in the oppression from the start.
A new constitution that builds decentralized and democratic legislative, executive, and judicial institutions must precede the elections. This should be coupled with fair elections and clear mechanisms for accountability and inquiry.
The international community is in an unenviable position; the United States and France were clearly embarrassed by Ben Ali’s flight from Tunisia. Paris refused to receive Ben Ali and announced that his family is not welcome in France. In a belated White House statement from, President Obama applauded the courage of the Tunisian people. Such acts and statements are ironic, considering that both countries have always boasted of their strong relationship with Ben Ali while refusing to support democracy in Tunisia or to protect activists.
The Tunisian people came to hate Ben Ali, and to hate the West’s support of him. Will Paris and Washington learn to expect democracy and change to be pronounced by every Arab tongue in the near future? And are they ready for it? I expect not.
Mohamed Abdelbaky is a journalist and researcher specialized in democratic affairs.
Almost a week after Ben Ali’s dramatic departure from Tunis, the direction of this revolution (or intifada as Mohammed says) remains unclear. Predictably, the Democratic Constitution Party (DCP) continues to try and cling to the reins of power, while the opposition, ever skeptical, presses to maximize the gains of the insurrection and end the DCP’s political monopoly. It’s amazing to watch the daily jockeying.
As Mohammed noted in his posting, the hallmarks of this movement were that it started on the periphery and that it was spontaneous. To this, I’d add one more important point: the populist movement was by almost every account secular in orientation.
Of course, Ben Ali and his predecessor Habib Bourguiba were anti-Islamist. Indeed, Bourguiba himself famously once took a drink during a Ramadan television appearance. And relatively speaking, Tunisians are widely thought to be moderate in their religious practices. That said, in the 1989 elections, independents associated with the Islamist Nahda party took 17 percent of the vote.
There is a broad debate about the nature of the Nahda party and the beliefs of its exiled but soon-to-return leader Rachid Ghannoushi. I for one do not admire the man and do not consider him a moderate. It seems inevitable, however, that he will return and that Nahda—and perhaps other Islamist parties—will participate in Tunisian elections.
Some twenty years after Ghannoushi’s departure, I don’t know how much Nahda—or other Islamist parties—will resonate. It’s possible that at least initially there may be some backlash to the decades of repressive policies targeting Tunisian Islamists, reflected at the ballot boxes. Notwithstanding the return of Nahda to Tunisian parliament, in Washington, the revolution is currently being viewed as a positive development. That view may change if Washington’s friends in Cairo and Amman are swallowed up by the aftershocks of Tunis. And Washington would also be no doubt concerned if Tunis followed the Ankara model of “moderate” political Islam.
Over at the National Security Council, Tunisia has been a backwater of U.S. policy. Now front and center, it’s all but certain that senior U.S. government officials are tasking their daily intelligence briefers to answer questions about Islamism in Tunisia. If they aren’t, they should be.
David Schenker is the Aufzien fellow and director of the Program on Arab Politics at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Previously, he served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Levant country director, the Pentagon’s top policy aide on the Arab countries of the Levant.