I’m presently attending the Global Strategy Group for the Middle East in Kuwait. The group gathers once a year to reflect on the current dynamics in the region and attempt to project five to seven years into the future. This particular meeting takes place in the aftermath of the greatest political earthquake to hit the Middle East in at least fifty years, the people’s revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. It was not predicted last year, though everyone reports not to have seen it coming.
Led by Shafeeq Gabra, the CEO of Jusoor Arabiya and former president of the American University of Kuwait, the gathering is small but high-level. This year it includes Saudis, Kuwaitis, Emiratis, Jordanians, Lebanese, Egyptians, Tunisians, Iraqis, an Iranian, a Chinese, a few Europeans and a couple of Americans.
The meetings are held under Chatham House rule so I cannot attribute any comments to particular individuals. So far, however, what I have heard in response to the developments of the Arab Winter of Discontent has been remarkable for its optimism, despite the occasional note of doom. I thought I would share a few quick reactions and conclusions from the first day:
The first broad take-away has been the conclusion that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions are not just regional but global. The fact that China has blocked internet searches on Egypt and has not covered the revolution in its national news is indicative of the challenge authoritarian governments continue to face in a world in which younger people are not using the internet as a communication and information tool but as a place to live freely. As one person here put it, “If you put a person who is free in the virtual world and bring him into a stupid reality, he needs the two worlds to converge… This new global reality will impact all of us but will be much more destructive to less responsive systems.”
The “revolutions,” led from the virtual world, were perceived—and were in my view—largely youthful, secular, non-violent civil movements. As one participant noted, “the methods [of the protestors] were distinctly non-Islamist from the symbols to the organization.” Interestingly, many of those from the Gulf, even when speaking positively about the movements, referred to them as a “flu” that others might catch, most hopefully Iran.
In the Middle East, “dynastic republics” are threatened much more than “monarchical dynasties.” One participant went further saying that monarchies are “reform-only countries” while republics “will have to go through regime change within one to two years.” When asked why, the person replied that this was “because monarchies do not promise elections or democracy; republics base their legitimacy on them.”
Though most concluded that the primary difference between the two is the basis of legitimacy and that level of wealth can be used to buy time, this was not universally agreed upon. Demands and grievances are not exclusively economic and the concept of legitimacy is a fluid one that must be constantly refreshed. The group consensus seemed to be that Jordan and Morocco would be forced ineluctably in the direction of constitutional monarchies and that Bahrain, due to its demographics, was an outlier in the Gulf. Algeria, Libya, Syria and Yemen were in deep and mounting trouble.
There were a number of noted firsts related to the people’s revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab world:
“I cannot remember a time when a mass revolution took place without reference to an ideology or even any intellectual reference. This is a good thing: ideologies are usually exclusionary…”
“This is the first time in the Arab world that regime change has been brought by the people…”
“The ossification of the Arab World has ended. For the first time, Arabs are subjects of history and not objects.”
“This is the first time the Palestinian cause was not used to trigger challenges against a regime; the first time broad protests were not anti-American or anti-Israeli in nature…”
Although there were numerous questions about the future of both Tunisia and Egypt the expectation was that numerous aspects of the regimes had been shattered, hopefully forever. The barrier of fear raised against human liberty was the first among them; the institutions of state security and Ministries of Interior would be relegated to the dustbin as well. Still, the Iraqis pointed to their own pained experience with a rapid transition and the challenges of establishing a democratic order in a country that had no experience with it. Others wondered how the Egyptian military would proceed with the transition; as a guardian or as a guide. The Egyptian people would accept a guardian, one participant thought, but not as a guide.
All agreed that the most hopeful scenario would parallel Indonesia’s experience in 1998. After a rocky period of about five years, Indonesia has emerged as an economic powerhouse and a vibrant, if occasionally troubled, democracy—the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the world. If Egypt can successfully make the transition, one Saudi concluded, “the New Arab Order will be defined by Egypt, supported by Tunisia and perhaps by Algeria. Freedom, social justice and human dignity will set the agenda.”
No one postulated a worst case scenario…
There was surprisingly little fear or trepidation about the role of political Islam. Only the Iranian participant raised the Iranian revolutionary “model,” for instance, or suggested that democracy requires democrats. One of the participants from Jordan noted that for both the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the governments of the region, the revolutions present an opportunity and a test, but there seemed little real doubt that political Islam could be successfully integrated into the political systems within the next five to seven years. “Traditionally,” one participant said, “religion was used by both the regimes and the MB as the means to console the populace. The Internet has now replaced it as a place to live; on the Internet, religion is no longer the reference point.” Moreover, one Egyptian added, “With the absence of an authoritarian government the MB can no longer be manipulated—or manipulate. The parasitic symbiosis has come to an end.” These ruminations led many to conclude that the pendulum might finally swing back. Even in Iraq, the Islamist parties were operating within the system and idea that an Islamic State had been rejected as a political ideal by Sunni Islamists.
When a couple of Americans raised U.S. concerns about the MB in Egypt, and Islamists more generally, a number of participants plaintively asked that we “turn the tired page.” “The Islamists are part of the fabric of our society. We can contend with them,” one added. “Follow us on this one; do not try to lead us.” In almost the same breath, Turkey was praised uncritically as a model for how political Islam could be absorbed into a secular system, though no one thought that the Islamists would take such a large share of their respective parliaments. When challenged in side-bar conversations about what the AKP was doing in Turkey to democracy, few were aware of developments there.
Perhaps the most interesting take away for me on the first day was how little the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was discussed. In the concluding, brain-storming session, it was eighth on the list of nine questions to be considered, and was covered the quickest as we ran out of time to cover the ninth. In the discussion, President Obama’s hope of establishing a framework agreement by September was ridiculed and characterized as dead. Israel, of course, took some shots, but one Jordanian participant did offer some food for thought: “With Hamas in control of Gaza, Hezbollah in control in Beirut, and docile Palestinians in charge of the West Bank, Israel has not needed to feel the cost of the occupation. Maybe, just maybe, the Egyptian earthquake might change that. Soon they will not be the only democracy in the Middle East and change may come yet to the Palestinian Authority.” Today’s papers indicate he was right. About the latter anyway…
J. Scott Carpenter is the Keston Family fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of Project Fikra, which focuses on empowering Arab democrats in their struggle against extremism. Before coming to the Washington Institute, Scott served in various positions in the U.S. Department of State, including deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and coordinator for the State Department’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives.
Led by Shafeeq Gabra, the CEO of Jusoor Arabiya and former president of the American University of Kuwait, the gathering is small but high-level. This year it includes Saudis, Kuwaitis, Emiratis, Jordanians, Lebanese, Egyptians, Tunisians, Iraqis, an Iranian, a Chinese, a few Europeans and a couple of Americans.
The meetings are held under Chatham House rule so I cannot attribute any comments to particular individuals. So far, however, what I have heard in response to the developments of the Arab Winter of Discontent has been remarkable for its optimism, despite the occasional note of doom. I thought I would share a few quick reactions and conclusions from the first day:
The first broad take-away has been the conclusion that the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions are not just regional but global. The fact that China has blocked internet searches on Egypt and has not covered the revolution in its national news is indicative of the challenge authoritarian governments continue to face in a world in which younger people are not using the internet as a communication and information tool but as a place to live freely. As one person here put it, “If you put a person who is free in the virtual world and bring him into a stupid reality, he needs the two worlds to converge… This new global reality will impact all of us but will be much more destructive to less responsive systems.”
The “revolutions,” led from the virtual world, were perceived—and were in my view—largely youthful, secular, non-violent civil movements. As one participant noted, “the methods [of the protestors] were distinctly non-Islamist from the symbols to the organization.” Interestingly, many of those from the Gulf, even when speaking positively about the movements, referred to them as a “flu” that others might catch, most hopefully Iran.
In the Middle East, “dynastic republics” are threatened much more than “monarchical dynasties.” One participant went further saying that monarchies are “reform-only countries” while republics “will have to go through regime change within one to two years.” When asked why, the person replied that this was “because monarchies do not promise elections or democracy; republics base their legitimacy on them.”
Though most concluded that the primary difference between the two is the basis of legitimacy and that level of wealth can be used to buy time, this was not universally agreed upon. Demands and grievances are not exclusively economic and the concept of legitimacy is a fluid one that must be constantly refreshed. The group consensus seemed to be that Jordan and Morocco would be forced ineluctably in the direction of constitutional monarchies and that Bahrain, due to its demographics, was an outlier in the Gulf. Algeria, Libya, Syria and Yemen were in deep and mounting trouble.
There were a number of noted firsts related to the people’s revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt in the Arab world:
“I cannot remember a time when a mass revolution took place without reference to an ideology or even any intellectual reference. This is a good thing: ideologies are usually exclusionary…”
“This is the first time in the Arab world that regime change has been brought by the people…”
“The ossification of the Arab World has ended. For the first time, Arabs are subjects of history and not objects.”
“This is the first time the Palestinian cause was not used to trigger challenges against a regime; the first time broad protests were not anti-American or anti-Israeli in nature…”
Although there were numerous questions about the future of both Tunisia and Egypt the expectation was that numerous aspects of the regimes had been shattered, hopefully forever. The barrier of fear raised against human liberty was the first among them; the institutions of state security and Ministries of Interior would be relegated to the dustbin as well. Still, the Iraqis pointed to their own pained experience with a rapid transition and the challenges of establishing a democratic order in a country that had no experience with it. Others wondered how the Egyptian military would proceed with the transition; as a guardian or as a guide. The Egyptian people would accept a guardian, one participant thought, but not as a guide.
All agreed that the most hopeful scenario would parallel Indonesia’s experience in 1998. After a rocky period of about five years, Indonesia has emerged as an economic powerhouse and a vibrant, if occasionally troubled, democracy—the largest Muslim-majority democracy in the world. If Egypt can successfully make the transition, one Saudi concluded, “the New Arab Order will be defined by Egypt, supported by Tunisia and perhaps by Algeria. Freedom, social justice and human dignity will set the agenda.”
No one postulated a worst case scenario…
There was surprisingly little fear or trepidation about the role of political Islam. Only the Iranian participant raised the Iranian revolutionary “model,” for instance, or suggested that democracy requires democrats. One of the participants from Jordan noted that for both the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the governments of the region, the revolutions present an opportunity and a test, but there seemed little real doubt that political Islam could be successfully integrated into the political systems within the next five to seven years. “Traditionally,” one participant said, “religion was used by both the regimes and the MB as the means to console the populace. The Internet has now replaced it as a place to live; on the Internet, religion is no longer the reference point.” Moreover, one Egyptian added, “With the absence of an authoritarian government the MB can no longer be manipulated—or manipulate. The parasitic symbiosis has come to an end.” These ruminations led many to conclude that the pendulum might finally swing back. Even in Iraq, the Islamist parties were operating within the system and idea that an Islamic State had been rejected as a political ideal by Sunni Islamists.
When a couple of Americans raised U.S. concerns about the MB in Egypt, and Islamists more generally, a number of participants plaintively asked that we “turn the tired page.” “The Islamists are part of the fabric of our society. We can contend with them,” one added. “Follow us on this one; do not try to lead us.” In almost the same breath, Turkey was praised uncritically as a model for how political Islam could be absorbed into a secular system, though no one thought that the Islamists would take such a large share of their respective parliaments. When challenged in side-bar conversations about what the AKP was doing in Turkey to democracy, few were aware of developments there.
Perhaps the most interesting take away for me on the first day was how little the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was discussed. In the concluding, brain-storming session, it was eighth on the list of nine questions to be considered, and was covered the quickest as we ran out of time to cover the ninth. In the discussion, President Obama’s hope of establishing a framework agreement by September was ridiculed and characterized as dead. Israel, of course, took some shots, but one Jordanian participant did offer some food for thought: “With Hamas in control of Gaza, Hezbollah in control in Beirut, and docile Palestinians in charge of the West Bank, Israel has not needed to feel the cost of the occupation. Maybe, just maybe, the Egyptian earthquake might change that. Soon they will not be the only democracy in the Middle East and change may come yet to the Palestinian Authority.” Today’s papers indicate he was right. About the latter anyway…
J. Scott Carpenter is the Keston Family fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of Project Fikra, which focuses on empowering Arab democrats in their struggle against extremism. Before coming to the Washington Institute, Scott served in various positions in the U.S. Department of State, including deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and coordinator for the State Department’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiatives.
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