The following is part two of a commentary by Sherif Joseph Rizk on the current state of the Egyptian revolution.
Regime Engineered Violence, Distraction, and Fear Mongering
In the meantime, fragmented and leaderless groups of activists and intellectuals continue to stage sit-ins demanding the adherence to requests of the protestors and the removal of state security. They are also debating the constitution and starting to organize parties, while the regime is acting on two fronts. First, they are perpetuating insecurity by keeping the police force off the streets and continue to pay thugs and militias to foment chaos in lower and upper class neighborhoods and at protests. According to diplomatic sources cited by Al Arabiya, Habib Al Adly—by means of a black ops militia—was behind the attacks on the Saints Church in Alexandria last year; the burning of the church in Helwan and of Christian homes in Upper Egypt now must be seen in that regard. The second front of attack by the regime is the launching of a media campaign which is aimed at spreading the fallacies of insecurity and economic stagnation, blaming these issues on the “people in Tahrir.” Former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq’s interview last Wednesday included largely exaggerated statements on food reserves running out in two months (recent statistics indicate reserves for six months, in addition to the ability to make further purchases)- an allegation which represents a direct threat against those calling for change. As those familiar with economic cycles know, fear mongering is often a self-fulfilling prophecy. Recent documents found in State Security files attest to the use of the media in fear mongering to subvert the revolution. In fact, some have argued that the whole State Security affair is simply another diversionary and divisive tactic; the regime has done this for decades. The strategy serves one purpose: garnering internal and external support for the regime as a savior and guarantor of stability against threats and thus subverting all hopes for genuine change. In the words of Joshua Stacher, "The regime engineers violence and manufactures safety."
As a result, insecurity, economic fears, and food inflation have caused a considerable segment of Egyptian society to fall prey to the perception that the protests are the source of all of their problems and that stability is more valuable than change or, at least, more convenient. The eternal Egyptian bureaucrat – the “muwathaf” (civil servant) has prevailed. To seal the plan, the military has given the protesters a new carrot in the form of a new technocratic cabinet. This is sure to garner more support against the protesters, now being seen as obstinate and in charge of the country despite having gained all of their requests. The stick was given to the protesters in the form of two rounds of force in collaboration with thugs followed by arrests, military court sentences, and numerous arrests and detentions of striking workers. Cases of army-instigated torture have been documented by the New York Times among other credible sources. In the media, the general now in charge of the state radio and television fired Amr al Leithy (a renowned TV anchor) for recommending that the former prime minister resign and the episode was barred from being re-aired. In this atmosphere, heated demands for a new constitution as opposed to an amended version are unlikely to be met with much enthusiasm.
How Democratic Reform Leads to Stability
Had the armed forces joined a presidential council, they would have quickly begun steering the transition while their appointed technocratic cabinet would have restored stability by dealing with the myriad of institutional and social problems facing the country including strikes, safety, institutional corruption, and capital flight. Both the council and the cabinet could have made public the disasters they have inherited from the regime and communicated the problems in an open and transparent manner. To demonstrate, let us take the example of security. The ministry of interior is itself a hive of corruption. It operates under the pyramid system based on a strong-man model—as opposed to the institutional-organizational model—in which the powerful minister surrounds himself with people based on their loyalty rather than their merit. In time, the loyal inner circle could become protected beneficiaries of the strong man, sharing the returns of illegal and corrupt practices ranging from bogus accounting to kleptocracy and bribery.
According to some in the Ministry, not only the Minister is a billionaire (USD), but some of his closest aides are even wealthier. On the other end of the scale, some patrol officers average only five hundred Egyptian pounds (USD $85) a month, though it is of no surprise to anyone that they may often make another five hundred pounds on bribes. To reform the institution, the following must happen: 1) minimal and maximal wages and incentive programs must be rationalized 2) internal investigations into corruption circles must be quick and just 3) all those involved in past violations must be publicly tried and brought to justice and the police must apologize for past practices in a PR campaign 4) other institutions must help in promoting a new chapter with the police. While each institution has its own set of problems, the pyramid model must be broken. Had guided leadership prevailed at the presidential and cabinet level, much of the instability could have been avoided and the anger could have fueled real national reform and democratic transition.
Why and For Whom?
Why are the armed forces not allowing this to happen? In order to begin to answer this question, we should look at the role of the armed forces within the regime. According to a New York Times report and other sources, the army received substantial kickbacks from the regime including cash handouts, Gulfstream private jets, valuable cuts in arms trades, and commercial enterprises that are valued at up to thirty percent of the overall GDP. The role of specific army officers in relation to those enterprises is clouded in secrecy, however. If the army is ruled by those sympathetic to the regime, the system can continue with the military ruling but not governing--thus benefiting itself without any of the risks of political life. It has recently emerged that the highly influential Chief of Staff Zakaria Azmi is now operating in the same capacity to Field Marshall Tantawi. It is quite clear that a government with true civilian supremacy threatens the status quo. To complicate matters, the Americans have extremely strong links with the army and are equally vested in the status quo. Espousing a political vision based on true liberal values—the rule of law, the rights of the individual, democracy, and civilian supremacy—it is no surprise that El Baradei is the number one enemy of both the Americans and the army. While many Egyptians are more aware than we have assessed, it turns out that many are willing to trade in for stability rather than risk change. Meanwhile, a powerful minority has been the direct or indirect beneficiaries of the system and, like the army, they are not easily willing to sacrifice their positions. Essam Sharaf and his cabinet may largely be filled with people with clean histories and good intentions. However, it is doubtful they alone can bring about genuine political and institutional transformation. As has been demonstrated, only continued collective citizen power can guarantee change. The situation calls for activism and cautious optimism.
Joseph Rizk is the founder of Lighthouse Consulting, a company that advises governments and the private sector in culture related industries and projects.
Regime Engineered Violence, Distraction, and Fear Mongering
In the meantime, fragmented and leaderless groups of activists and intellectuals continue to stage sit-ins demanding the adherence to requests of the protestors and the removal of state security. They are also debating the constitution and starting to organize parties, while the regime is acting on two fronts. First, they are perpetuating insecurity by keeping the police force off the streets and continue to pay thugs and militias to foment chaos in lower and upper class neighborhoods and at protests. According to diplomatic sources cited by Al Arabiya, Habib Al Adly—by means of a black ops militia—was behind the attacks on the Saints Church in Alexandria last year; the burning of the church in Helwan and of Christian homes in Upper Egypt now must be seen in that regard. The second front of attack by the regime is the launching of a media campaign which is aimed at spreading the fallacies of insecurity and economic stagnation, blaming these issues on the “people in Tahrir.” Former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq’s interview last Wednesday included largely exaggerated statements on food reserves running out in two months (recent statistics indicate reserves for six months, in addition to the ability to make further purchases)- an allegation which represents a direct threat against those calling for change. As those familiar with economic cycles know, fear mongering is often a self-fulfilling prophecy. Recent documents found in State Security files attest to the use of the media in fear mongering to subvert the revolution. In fact, some have argued that the whole State Security affair is simply another diversionary and divisive tactic; the regime has done this for decades. The strategy serves one purpose: garnering internal and external support for the regime as a savior and guarantor of stability against threats and thus subverting all hopes for genuine change. In the words of Joshua Stacher, "The regime engineers violence and manufactures safety."
As a result, insecurity, economic fears, and food inflation have caused a considerable segment of Egyptian society to fall prey to the perception that the protests are the source of all of their problems and that stability is more valuable than change or, at least, more convenient. The eternal Egyptian bureaucrat – the “muwathaf” (civil servant) has prevailed. To seal the plan, the military has given the protesters a new carrot in the form of a new technocratic cabinet. This is sure to garner more support against the protesters, now being seen as obstinate and in charge of the country despite having gained all of their requests. The stick was given to the protesters in the form of two rounds of force in collaboration with thugs followed by arrests, military court sentences, and numerous arrests and detentions of striking workers. Cases of army-instigated torture have been documented by the New York Times among other credible sources. In the media, the general now in charge of the state radio and television fired Amr al Leithy (a renowned TV anchor) for recommending that the former prime minister resign and the episode was barred from being re-aired. In this atmosphere, heated demands for a new constitution as opposed to an amended version are unlikely to be met with much enthusiasm.
How Democratic Reform Leads to Stability
Had the armed forces joined a presidential council, they would have quickly begun steering the transition while their appointed technocratic cabinet would have restored stability by dealing with the myriad of institutional and social problems facing the country including strikes, safety, institutional corruption, and capital flight. Both the council and the cabinet could have made public the disasters they have inherited from the regime and communicated the problems in an open and transparent manner. To demonstrate, let us take the example of security. The ministry of interior is itself a hive of corruption. It operates under the pyramid system based on a strong-man model—as opposed to the institutional-organizational model—in which the powerful minister surrounds himself with people based on their loyalty rather than their merit. In time, the loyal inner circle could become protected beneficiaries of the strong man, sharing the returns of illegal and corrupt practices ranging from bogus accounting to kleptocracy and bribery.
According to some in the Ministry, not only the Minister is a billionaire (USD), but some of his closest aides are even wealthier. On the other end of the scale, some patrol officers average only five hundred Egyptian pounds (USD $85) a month, though it is of no surprise to anyone that they may often make another five hundred pounds on bribes. To reform the institution, the following must happen: 1) minimal and maximal wages and incentive programs must be rationalized 2) internal investigations into corruption circles must be quick and just 3) all those involved in past violations must be publicly tried and brought to justice and the police must apologize for past practices in a PR campaign 4) other institutions must help in promoting a new chapter with the police. While each institution has its own set of problems, the pyramid model must be broken. Had guided leadership prevailed at the presidential and cabinet level, much of the instability could have been avoided and the anger could have fueled real national reform and democratic transition.
Why and For Whom?
Why are the armed forces not allowing this to happen? In order to begin to answer this question, we should look at the role of the armed forces within the regime. According to a New York Times report and other sources, the army received substantial kickbacks from the regime including cash handouts, Gulfstream private jets, valuable cuts in arms trades, and commercial enterprises that are valued at up to thirty percent of the overall GDP. The role of specific army officers in relation to those enterprises is clouded in secrecy, however. If the army is ruled by those sympathetic to the regime, the system can continue with the military ruling but not governing--thus benefiting itself without any of the risks of political life. It has recently emerged that the highly influential Chief of Staff Zakaria Azmi is now operating in the same capacity to Field Marshall Tantawi. It is quite clear that a government with true civilian supremacy threatens the status quo. To complicate matters, the Americans have extremely strong links with the army and are equally vested in the status quo. Espousing a political vision based on true liberal values—the rule of law, the rights of the individual, democracy, and civilian supremacy—it is no surprise that El Baradei is the number one enemy of both the Americans and the army. While many Egyptians are more aware than we have assessed, it turns out that many are willing to trade in for stability rather than risk change. Meanwhile, a powerful minority has been the direct or indirect beneficiaries of the system and, like the army, they are not easily willing to sacrifice their positions. Essam Sharaf and his cabinet may largely be filled with people with clean histories and good intentions. However, it is doubtful they alone can bring about genuine political and institutional transformation. As has been demonstrated, only continued collective citizen power can guarantee change. The situation calls for activism and cautious optimism.
Joseph Rizk is the founder of Lighthouse Consulting, a company that advises governments and the private sector in culture related industries and projects.
The short piece “Revolution Held Hostage: Counterrevolutionary Measures” raises a host of important issues, not the least of which is the role of the military. It suggests—as one of my Egypt gurus told me a long time ago—nothing in Egypt is as it seems. No doubt a cliché, but it is particularly apt when considering the Egyptian military establishment and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. Is the military a savior? A force for stability? Democrats despite themselves? A conservative force clinging to a thoroughly discredited ancient regime? We have heard all of these things since the military first appeared on Egyptian streets on the evening of January 28.
Analysts should keep in mind a few salient facts about the Egyptian military. Ruling, but not governing (see Ruling But Not Governing) is a strategy that suits the senior command and they would like nothing more than to return to a more comfortable low-profile, but influential position in the political system. The military has not been involved in politics since 1967 and it likes it that way. Their goals are stability and to ensure that whatever the outcome of the revolution, the military’s coherence, organization, and prestige remains fully intact. This is going to be difficult because the officers are engaged in a struggle over the legitimacy of their own role as pillars of Egypt’s political system. For the past 60 years, the authenticity and legitimacy of the political order—to the extent it still existed—rested on a particular narrative that morphed the free officers’ coup into a “revolution” and placed the military at the center of Egypt’s nationalist pantheon. Yet suddenly, the top military brass is confronted with a powerful competitor for legitimacy in the form of the revolutionaries of Tahrir Square. In one sense it is not a fair fight as the opposition is flush with legitimacy and authenticity having managed to dislodge Mubarak and discredit a regime from which the armed forces benefited. This may be the reason why we are seeing the military gradually using the coercive power at its disposal to fracture the opposition and reconstitute an authoritarian order.
Steven Cook is Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy.