From the moment the armed forces first appeared on Egypt’s political scene on January 28^th to the moment they gained complete control and confronted the situation, there has been a lack of clarity and certainty, characterized by the military’s slogans. The air of opacity that enveloped the Egyptian political scene for many years under Mubarak inevitably reached the military, a common effect of authoritarian regimes. The nature of the relationship between the military and the political system and the lack of any parliamentary monitoring of the military’s budget or performance is an additional factor found in Egypt and other authoritarian regimes. Between chants of “the army and the people, one hand” and the screams of the revolutionaries being subjected to torture, beatings and electric shocks, the level of uncertainty during this phase has heightened, fueling analysis and commentary surrounding the military’s position on the following four points:

• The tolerant and encouraging attitude towards moderate Islamists and radicals


• The referendum and the position regarding the Constitution


• The extremely slow rate at which the regime is being cleansed and the lack of initiative unless under extreme pressure from the revolutionaries


• The military trials, torture, human rights violations, and the stance against protests and rights to demonstrate, protest and strike

To simplify the analysis, I will put forward four hypotheses that address the first point regarding the position of the Islamists. Then, I will answer questions regarding the other three points, in light of the four hypotheses. They are as follows:

1) The Algerian case: The use of Islamists as scarecrows: In October 1988, the Algerian revolution broke out against the Liberation Front Party system, which ruled Algeria since its independence. El Shazly Ben Jadid became the country’s president. He instituted a wide range of political reforms and gave legitimacy to political parties which were formerly banned from political action. Consequently, the Islamic Salvation Front was formed, participated in the municipal elections, and won a large number of seats. Then, a dispute ignited between the Islamic Salvation Front and the ruling party, followed by the arrests of Islamic Salvation Front leaders. Despite these arrests, the party still managed to run in the legislative elections and won most of the seats. Subsequently, the military stepped in to intervene and cancelled the elections. Thus, military generals once again took control of politics in 1992. Against the backdrop of this Algerian scenario, we can view the Egyptian army's position regarding Islamists as an attempt to use the scarecrow Islamists as a point of entry to regain power in the future. Hypothetically, the military’s return to power would occur with acceptance by the international community and Egyptian society would favor the military as a substitute for Islamist rule. The Algerian case shows how Algeria got caught in a cycle of armed violence, which the country escaped with great difficulty and headed into the direction of another authoritarian military regime.

2) The Turkish model: Half a democracy governed and dominated by the military: The Egyptian army enjoyed (and still enjoys) non-material as well as material privileges under the Mubarak regime and privileges in general under the July 1952 system. It is not easy to give up those privileges, especially in light of popular general consent of the people towards the military establishment. This popular approval came as a result of the initial positive steps taken by the military to face corruption as well as the military’s support of the revolution.

This vision is based on two ideas:

• In countries such as Egypt, which have been dominated by the military for a long time, there is a lack of acceptance of the military. Instead, there is a preference favoring the jurisdiction of a loyal civil authority.


• The military gains monetary privileges not subject to any kind of political pressure or control, whether through the private sector as an institution or through the involvement of military leaders in business and large enterprises. Considering these privileges, the Islamic forces in Egypt are historically the most willing to negotiate on a permanent basis and offer the greatest number of concessions. From the military’s perspective, these forces can always be ended even after gaining full support and can be put in prison with the utmost ease if the popular opinion of the people and the international community calls for it. Under this scenario, the military would likely try to re-draw the face of an old system—not Mubarak or his son—or even repeat a coup that takes place when strong civilian governments come to power and threaten the military’s absolute control of the situation.

3) The conservative mood of the military institution: To set the terms here, I use the word "conservative" as opposed to the word "radical." I have personally encountered this mentality when meeting with some leaders of the military council and by talking to people who have spoken with them. The military’s mentality is unable to comprehend historical exceptions created by revolutions. They continue to deal with the situation in the same logic of progressive reform, unwilling to partake in radical adventures or introducing any radical changes in fear that the system would collapse. Incidentally, their position can be understood even if it is unacceptable to the revolutionaries. As "conservatism" is the basis of military mentalities in most of the world’s armies, especially those that are responsible for basic defense, not initiative, it is a fundamental part of professionalism within any army. This mentality cannot extradite the country after the Revolution to anything other than a strong, organized social force with clear dimensions and willingness to negotiate, features clearly found in Islamic forces. We would not be exaggerating by saying that the Islamic force is the only organized social force. Islamic forces did not subjugate themselves to the political dredging of the former regime, but used their position positively and reversed it to their advantage by strengthening their ranks and making them more cohesive.

4) Division within the military institution: In spite of the ability of the leadership of the armed forces to overcome the bottleneck within the military when it sided with the revolutionaries in order to avoid the ravages of civil war taking place in countries like Libya and Yemen, it only makes sense that there is loyalty within the military of both the former regime and also the revolution. The power relations between these factions changes from one moment to the next according to shifts in power relations among revolutionaries on the ground, the strength or weakness of their popular support, and unity in their positions. I cannot determine whether this split is horizontal or vertical. By vertical split, I mean a division in which the higher ranks support the former regime and the lower ranks support the revolution. Logically, this makes sense since higher ranks enjoyed the greatest amount of privileges under the former regime and can be considered, without reservation, part of that regime or, at the very least, supporters of that regime. However, a vertical division is also a split between sectors or certain weaponry of the military, either in the direction of the former regime or the revolution. On that basis, it would likely result in a change in the balance of power in favor of the revolutionary groups within the army to accelerate the pace of reforms and transition to democracy. Those in favor of the former regime, however, may use the reactionary forces in all possible ways to block the march of the revolution and to acquire the largest possible gains against them. Therefore, the Islamist scarecrow may be used, the cleansing may be slowed down, human rights may be violated, and there may be an attempt to divide the people from the army.

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Within the framework of the four assumptions, I will try to answer the other three questions put forward day after day due to the ambiguity and complexity of the overall situation in Egypt, namely:

• The referendum and the stance towards the Constitution.


• The sharp slowdown in the clean-up and the military’s lack of initiative unless under pressure by the revolutionaries.


• The military trials, torture, violations of human rights, and the stance of the military towards the protests and the rights to demonstrate, protest, and strike.

1. The referendum and the Constitution: No one can hide the amount of surprise and wonder in our minds regarding the secret that made the armed forces spend a lot of money on the referendum process of the Constitution. This instigated a wide divide in Egypt between supporters and opponents, horribly inciting sectarian tendencies in order to produce an outcome of support amidst a time of general de-motivation for the majority of activists and dissidents. Furthermore, the referendum could have led to a negative outcome, leaving everyone asking "what was the use of the referendum and the mental distress?" I argue that we can answer that question based on the four main assumptions as mentioned above:

• The Islamist scarecrow hypothesis: The purpose of the referendum process was to send a message to the Egyptian and international community that the Islamists influenced 77.2% of the vote. In this context, it is possible to consider the scarecrow in a positive way. It may actually dissuade people from the Islamist rhetoric by placing them in a spotlight under extreme lights.


• The military dominance hypothesis: In this context, the referendum can be viewed as a means of withholding the legitimacy of the ballot boxes from the revolutionaries, bringing about a majority in favor of an argument that is clearly the official opinion of the military institution and of the State.


• The military’s conservative mentality hypothesis: According to this hypothesis, the referendum can be seen as a test and analysis of the political orientations of Egyptian society and the extent of readiness of the people for the electoral process. It also served as a test of the impact of the Islamists, non-religious parties, and other factions as well as the media's ability to guide people in the wake of the revolution. This is indicative of the military’s lack of political and constitutional experience along with their inability to decipher between the views of very different experts, putting them in a state of confusion. It reveals an important aspect of military mentality that does not condone a leader rescinding his decision once it is issued.


• The division hypothesis: In the same fashion that this hypothesis is disproven, everything can be attributed to the division within the military institution in both the direction of the revolution and in a backward direction of the old regime. Changes in the attitudes of the institution as a whole may shift according to power shifts within the military for the benefit of one direction over another.

2.    The delay in the cleansing process: This concern can be understood in the context of conspiratorial hypotheses (the scarecrow hypothesis and the military dominance hypothesis) or in the context of non-conspiratorial hypotheses (the mental conservatism hypothesis and the division hypothesis) as follows:

• Conspiratorial hypotheses: The army is part of the old system, has won privileges, and is now entangled in that system’s negative deeds. Logically, it does not correspond that there would be an initiative within the military to hold its own figures accountable without the rise of major public pressure reaching a degree that cannot be ignored, when there is no other choice.


• Non-conspiratorial hypotheses: Once again, either the military’s conservative mentality does not accept the sudden drastic changes and believes they may cause a collapse of the state, or the split within the military institution grows and adjusts according to the changing balance of power in favor of the parties who want to divide it.

3. The violations of human rights and the stance towards protests: Whatever the rationale or assumptions, the torture of an individual for any reason is inhumane and is in no way justifiable no matter the reason. Likewise, military trials naturally ignore standards of justice, especially if carried out in great numbers, eliminating the chance that the prosecutors would seek any justice. Military trials in and of themselves are a form of punishment even if the person is acquitted. Adding to the ugliness is that this punishment was directed at innocent, peaceful civilians. Certainly, there is no room for error when it comes to the freedom and safety of a human being. As for dismantling protests, there are dozens of other ways to deal with them other than through repression and criminalization. What might be accepted as an exception now could become a basis for standard practice in the future. In all cases, these violations can be understood as an unacceptable means of control, whether to execute the evil plans (in the case of conspiratorial hypotheses) or good (in the case of non-conspiratorial hypotheses).

Basem Fathy is the Media Coordinator for Egyptian Democracy Academy, and the founder of the “4democracy” blog.