It is becoming increasingly clear that the departure of Ali Abdullah Saleh from power as president of Yemen is more about “when” it will occur rather than “if.” This unique opportunity will be a significant test for U.S. policymakers as they adjust to a post-Saleh political reality within Yemen even as the threat of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues. U.S. interests in Yemen have principally been dominated by counter-terrorism concerns and as part of that effort the United States has been working with Yemen’s government to professionalize its counter-terrorism forces and to improve intelligence cooperation. While the United States has also increased its non-military aid in an effort to address many of the pressing economic, development, and political challenges confronting Yemen’s citizens, the great bulk of the American presence in Yemen has been counter-terrorism related. The possible departure of Saleh from power is a unique opportunity for the United States to establish a new relationship with the Yemeni government as well as its people. Too much of the U.S.-Yemen relationship has been dominated by counter-terrorism concerns and in the eyes of many of Yemen’s residents, U.S. cooperation with the Saleh government has only deepened resentment against the United States as well as strengthened support for AQAP.
The United States must dramatically signal a new relationship with the Yemeni people once Saleh leaves demonstrating the commitment of the United States to the interests of its population. This new initiative should not be narrowly construed as simply increasing the funding levels of development assistance but should be multi-faceted, comprehensive, and long-term. A number of lessons have been learned from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that should also inform a new U.S. approach to Yemen. Local support to al-Qaeda is often rooted in fundamentally more pragmatic concerns such as lack of representation within government, abuses by host government security forces, or a simple willingness to be left alone rather than a predilection for international Islamist jihad. Additionally, the U.S. response should mirror as much as possible our enemy’s organization. Former U.S. Army General Stanley A. McChrystal’s article in Foreign Policy argues that “it takes a network to defeat a network” and the U.S. response to AQAP’s network should be similar. Much like AQAP in Yemen, the U.S. approach must be decentralized, locally-based, long-term, and holistic, blending kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. This strategy must also have a robust and complementary effort in Yemen’s capital of Sana’a that seeks to strengthen central government institutions and make them more representative.
The following recommendations are made to signal a new U.S. strategy for Yemen and indicate a departure from U.S. policy under the Saleh government:
If the United States adopts a new approach to Yemen following President Saleh’s departure that signals a strong commitment to the interests of the Yemeni people, the fight against AQAP will become significantly easier. It will also have the added effect of improving the image of the United States within Yemen. While security-focused approaches will continue, and will most likely expand, a long-term strategy that creates a broadly capable and legitimate government that serves the people will greatly diminish the pools of discontent that al-Qaeda capitalizes on for support. While many of the approaches advocated by this article will, of necessity, put U.S. personnel in harms way, the threat al-Qaeda poses to the United States requires a deepening of our engagement with the population, not a retreat behind concrete walls in Sana’a. President Saleh’s departure from Yemen will provide a unique moment for U.S. policymakers to re-orient the United States’ approach to the Yemeni people and to provide a greater balance between kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. The stronger the relationship between the Yemeni people and the United States, the less likely al-Qaeda will have a safe haven within which to launch attacks against the United States.
Daniel Green is a Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, focusing on Yemen, al-Qaeda, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.
The United States must dramatically signal a new relationship with the Yemeni people once Saleh leaves demonstrating the commitment of the United States to the interests of its population. This new initiative should not be narrowly construed as simply increasing the funding levels of development assistance but should be multi-faceted, comprehensive, and long-term. A number of lessons have been learned from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq that should also inform a new U.S. approach to Yemen. Local support to al-Qaeda is often rooted in fundamentally more pragmatic concerns such as lack of representation within government, abuses by host government security forces, or a simple willingness to be left alone rather than a predilection for international Islamist jihad. Additionally, the U.S. response should mirror as much as possible our enemy’s organization. Former U.S. Army General Stanley A. McChrystal’s article in Foreign Policy argues that “it takes a network to defeat a network” and the U.S. response to AQAP’s network should be similar. Much like AQAP in Yemen, the U.S. approach must be decentralized, locally-based, long-term, and holistic, blending kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. This strategy must also have a robust and complementary effort in Yemen’s capital of Sana’a that seeks to strengthen central government institutions and make them more representative.
The following recommendations are made to signal a new U.S. strategy for Yemen and indicate a departure from U.S. policy under the Saleh government:
- Support the creation of a broadly representative government that is legitimate, capable, and effective that respects the rights of its people.
- Significantly increase development assistance.
- Enlarge the U.S. diplomatic and development presence within Yemen
- Establish a special envoy to partner with the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen to (1) concentrate on adopting a regional approach to Yemen’s political, development, and security challenges, (2) raise the profile of Yemen within Washington, D.C., and (3) free up the U.S. Ambassador to concentrate on internal Yemen issues.
- Establish a “Yemen Hands” program that will allow select personnel to serve in Yemen for a longer period of time than typical diplomatic and military rotations allow. This will allow U.S. Government personnel to establish Yemen expertise and to have the personal relationships required to get U.S. objectives accomplished.
- Review the practical aspects of establishing Provincial Reconstruction Team-type capabilities in Yemen’s provinces to partner with local government officials, tribes, and disadvantaged groups to facilitate good governance, reconstruction, and development while also improving security and extending the reach of the central government.
- Support an extensive civil society outreach program that (1) brings together academics who have studied Yemen in order to improve the understanding of U.S. Government officials, (2) will broaden U.S. engagement efforts beyond central government officials, and (3) allows U.S. officials to establish better relationships with tribal, religious, and ethnic leaders.
- Dispatch U.S. Government resources and private sector advisors to Yemen to improve its overall economic situation with a particular focus on improving the efficacy of Yemen’s oil sector, the sustainability of its water resources, as well as improving its overall economic health.
- Facilitate deeper cross-cultural understanding by increasing participation in Fulbright Scholarships, the International Visitor Program, the Moderate Voices Program, and other initiatives designed to improve U.S. and Yemeni understanding.
If the United States adopts a new approach to Yemen following President Saleh’s departure that signals a strong commitment to the interests of the Yemeni people, the fight against AQAP will become significantly easier. It will also have the added effect of improving the image of the United States within Yemen. While security-focused approaches will continue, and will most likely expand, a long-term strategy that creates a broadly capable and legitimate government that serves the people will greatly diminish the pools of discontent that al-Qaeda capitalizes on for support. While many of the approaches advocated by this article will, of necessity, put U.S. personnel in harms way, the threat al-Qaeda poses to the United States requires a deepening of our engagement with the population, not a retreat behind concrete walls in Sana’a. President Saleh’s departure from Yemen will provide a unique moment for U.S. policymakers to re-orient the United States’ approach to the Yemeni people and to provide a greater balance between kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. The stronger the relationship between the Yemeni people and the United States, the less likely al-Qaeda will have a safe haven within which to launch attacks against the United States.
Daniel Green is a Soref fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, focusing on Yemen, al-Qaeda, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.
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