The current controversy over United States aid given to Egyptian civil society stems from a lack of clarity pervading relations between the two countries on this issue. This comes at a time when Egypt is going through a decisive period—the birth of a democratic state— for which millions of Egyptians took to the streets last January in order to bring down the regime of Hosni Mubarak.
The crisis was ignited following the remarks of Anne Patterson, the new U.S. ambassador to Egypt, in testimony before Congress a few months ago, in which she noted that Washington spent 40 million dollars in support of democracy in Egypt in months subsequent to the revolution.
These poorly-timed statements were sufficient to incur the wrath of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Egyptian government, both of whom were trying to convince the U.S. administration to provide aid to salvage the Egyptian economy, as well as to encourage investors to return once again.
Preoccupied with domestic concerns, Washington continued to ignore the crisis, allowing it to compound to the point where the Egyptian government dealt a direct blow to Egypt’s civil society. Last month, the Egyptian government directed the state security prosecutor to open an investigation of ‘unapproved’ foreign funds received by Egyptian civil society organizations. According to Egyptian newspapers, the government acted to identify assistance that "could potentially harm Egyptian national interests and the security of the country.”
The real surprise was not so much the position taken by the SCAF, which made statements about the April 6th Youth Movement having received training in foreign countries to overthrow the government. Nor was it even that Washington ignored the severity of the problem. The surprise was the position taken by the forces of the long-standing political opposition (here, meaning, the Wafd, the Nasserist and Progressive Unionist parties), which bolstered the SCAF’s allegations and demanded an end to foreign funding of civil society organizations and to any form of "external interference," according to Sayyid Badawi, president of the Wafd Party, in remarks last month.
So, Egyptian civil society, which is supposed to be a key player in building democratic institutions in Egypt after the revolution, now finds itself straitjacketed between a military ruler attempting to limit its role, and an international partner that deals with Egypt with a blend of indifference and naiveté as the country goes through this most critical phase.
Domestically, the peril of crisis is that foreign funding could become a weapon wielded by Islamic movements and former regime loyalists to tarnish the image of the secular movement in Egypt, which is vying at present for a ‘civil’ (i.e., secular) Egyptian state and trying to prevent a system of religious, autocratic rule.
In a statement by Rafik Habib, Vice President of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, Habib stated, "U.S. funding for civil society organizations that help parties build their capacities is intervention in support of the secular trend to fortify them against the Islamic trend in Egypt." The Brotherhood subsequently issued an official statement on August 18 to investigate this funding and to determine the legality of human rights organizations receiving foreign funding.
To be certain, the use of these accusations by the Islamist trend will have a negative impact on liberals at the voting polls in upcoming parliamentary elections, particularly given the extensive media coverage the subject has received, to a much bewildered public.
The force of this sword of Damocles hanging over Egyptian civil society in particular—and liberals in general—lies in the lack of transparency and full disclosure over foreign funding. Presently, there exists no clear data about the 40 to 65 million dollars that the United States pledged to provide for civil society in Egypt during the transition phase.
Similar lack of transparency exists surrounding the economic aid that U.S. President Obama offered to Egypt last May. No one has been invited from Egypt, whether governmental or non-governmental, to discuss the form that this assistance should take and how it would be spent. Some workshops were held in both capitals and were attended by activists and experts on these topics, but these have been insufficient.
Egyptian civil society, which played an enormous role in fueling the January revolution, aspires to expunge the dictionary of authoritarian terminology used by the former regime to curtail its role in reform. The terms ‘spying,’ ‘foreign funding,’ and ‘international intervention’ are among the most prominent terms employed by the disciples of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) to make an example of human rights groups and their continuing capacity in exposing the NDP’s role in corrupting political life. These disciples of the NDP tailored conditions for Gamal Mubarak, son of the former president, with a view to paving a smooth succession of power to him.
Transparency with regard to aid, therefore, is key in the next stage. All Egyptian human rights groups that receive foreign aid should accordingly declare it and explain the details of its expenditure, so as not to provide fuel for doubt from any political force as to the fundamental role these groups will play in building Egypt after Mubarak.
For its part, Washington should refrain from making overblown statements about the provision of aid before the details of this aid are made clear and are agreed upon by the various Egyptian parties concerned in order to achieve the best results from such assistance.
Mohamed Abdelbaky is an Egyptian journalist who specializes in democracy and human rights.
The crisis was ignited following the remarks of Anne Patterson, the new U.S. ambassador to Egypt, in testimony before Congress a few months ago, in which she noted that Washington spent 40 million dollars in support of democracy in Egypt in months subsequent to the revolution.
These poorly-timed statements were sufficient to incur the wrath of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Egyptian government, both of whom were trying to convince the U.S. administration to provide aid to salvage the Egyptian economy, as well as to encourage investors to return once again.
Preoccupied with domestic concerns, Washington continued to ignore the crisis, allowing it to compound to the point where the Egyptian government dealt a direct blow to Egypt’s civil society. Last month, the Egyptian government directed the state security prosecutor to open an investigation of ‘unapproved’ foreign funds received by Egyptian civil society organizations. According to Egyptian newspapers, the government acted to identify assistance that "could potentially harm Egyptian national interests and the security of the country.”
The real surprise was not so much the position taken by the SCAF, which made statements about the April 6th Youth Movement having received training in foreign countries to overthrow the government. Nor was it even that Washington ignored the severity of the problem. The surprise was the position taken by the forces of the long-standing political opposition (here, meaning, the Wafd, the Nasserist and Progressive Unionist parties), which bolstered the SCAF’s allegations and demanded an end to foreign funding of civil society organizations and to any form of "external interference," according to Sayyid Badawi, president of the Wafd Party, in remarks last month.
So, Egyptian civil society, which is supposed to be a key player in building democratic institutions in Egypt after the revolution, now finds itself straitjacketed between a military ruler attempting to limit its role, and an international partner that deals with Egypt with a blend of indifference and naiveté as the country goes through this most critical phase.
Domestically, the peril of crisis is that foreign funding could become a weapon wielded by Islamic movements and former regime loyalists to tarnish the image of the secular movement in Egypt, which is vying at present for a ‘civil’ (i.e., secular) Egyptian state and trying to prevent a system of religious, autocratic rule.
In a statement by Rafik Habib, Vice President of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, Habib stated, "U.S. funding for civil society organizations that help parties build their capacities is intervention in support of the secular trend to fortify them against the Islamic trend in Egypt." The Brotherhood subsequently issued an official statement on August 18 to investigate this funding and to determine the legality of human rights organizations receiving foreign funding.
To be certain, the use of these accusations by the Islamist trend will have a negative impact on liberals at the voting polls in upcoming parliamentary elections, particularly given the extensive media coverage the subject has received, to a much bewildered public.
The force of this sword of Damocles hanging over Egyptian civil society in particular—and liberals in general—lies in the lack of transparency and full disclosure over foreign funding. Presently, there exists no clear data about the 40 to 65 million dollars that the United States pledged to provide for civil society in Egypt during the transition phase.
Similar lack of transparency exists surrounding the economic aid that U.S. President Obama offered to Egypt last May. No one has been invited from Egypt, whether governmental or non-governmental, to discuss the form that this assistance should take and how it would be spent. Some workshops were held in both capitals and were attended by activists and experts on these topics, but these have been insufficient.
Egyptian civil society, which played an enormous role in fueling the January revolution, aspires to expunge the dictionary of authoritarian terminology used by the former regime to curtail its role in reform. The terms ‘spying,’ ‘foreign funding,’ and ‘international intervention’ are among the most prominent terms employed by the disciples of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) to make an example of human rights groups and their continuing capacity in exposing the NDP’s role in corrupting political life. These disciples of the NDP tailored conditions for Gamal Mubarak, son of the former president, with a view to paving a smooth succession of power to him.
Transparency with regard to aid, therefore, is key in the next stage. All Egyptian human rights groups that receive foreign aid should accordingly declare it and explain the details of its expenditure, so as not to provide fuel for doubt from any political force as to the fundamental role these groups will play in building Egypt after Mubarak.
For its part, Washington should refrain from making overblown statements about the provision of aid before the details of this aid are made clear and are agreed upon by the various Egyptian parties concerned in order to achieve the best results from such assistance.
Mohamed Abdelbaky is an Egyptian journalist who specializes in democracy and human rights.
Mohamed Abdelbaky is right to highlight the dangers that the foreign funding issue, and especially that of U.S. funding, could become very damaging for liberal democratic forces in the forthcoming crucial months in Egypt.
This is not a new problem. Civil society organizations in Egypt, especially those working in areas like human rights that are critical of government policies, have long relied on foreign funding, largely because the government made it impossible for them to raise funds domestically. Nonetheless, however involuntary their reliance on foreign funding may be, it is a vulnerability that has been mercilessly exploited by those hostile to human rights and democracy within Egypt. The decades long campaign questioning the legitimacy of foreign funding and impugning the motives of those who receive it has been so successful that many Egyptians, including many civil society activists, believe that there is something wrong with foreign funding, and especially American funding.
Transparency and consultation, the remedies advocated by Abdelbaky, while necessary and welcome, will, I fear, be insufficient to overcome the long legacy of mistrust and misinformation. The U.S. government (and sadly it is the U.S. that bears the major burden here since other countries’ aid programs are subject to much less opprobrium) should take advantage of this moment of transition in Egypt to make clear to the Egyptian government and to the Egyptian people the motives and basis for its democracy assistance programs in Egypt. In particular, it should make clear that it provides funds to independent civil society organizations working in the fields of human rights and democracy promotion in accordance with guiding principles adopted by the State Department in 2006. Therefore, these funds are intended to be applied in all U.S. bi-lateral relationships, in accordance with international standards like the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1998 with Egypt’s approval.
The Egyptian government has a right to expect that in its operations in Egypt the U.S. government should respect Egyptian law. At the same time, where Egyptian law falls short of international standards and contravenes international law (as is currently the case with laws governing the regulation of non-governmental organizations) the U.S. government is fully entitled to provide resources “for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means,” in the language of the UN Declaration.
The problem can be resolved if the Egyptian government amends its law governing the regulation of NGOs to bring it into compliance with international standards. If that were done, government oversight and regulation of foreign assistance could be carried out uncontroversially without the intrusive powers found in the current law that effectively make registered NGOs subject to overbearing government control and strip them of their independence.