The Syrian regime has learned from the successes of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and the failures of the fallen autocracies. Since the Syrian demonstrations began in March, the regime has prohibited all media presence and declared the army’s mandatory involvement a reliable help to demonstrators. The chiefs of security directed forces to open fire on the protestors, declaring this the only way to deter more young people from joining them. Indeed, the snipers responsible for shooting unarmed protestors received orders directly from military intelligence and air force leadership.

The Syrian security services consist of four departments – including military intelligence and air force –  which follow orders directly from the Head of State. When Hafez al-Asad built the Syrian government, he envisioned a state in the form of a pyramid, with himself as both the head and the base. The subsequent components include government administration; army security and intelligence; and the Baath party. These systems are founded on hierarchical structures descending from the regime’s leadership to the cities, towns, and villages.

The Syrian regime’s continued violence has two potential outcomes. On one hand, the army may choose to interfere to protect the demonstrators. This act would most likely involve a semi-military coup against the security services, which have continued killing with impunity in cooperation with the Syrian army’s fourth division, led by Maher al-Asad, brother of the Syrian President. On the other hand, if the Syrian army fails to intervene, demonstrators might call for international intervention as protection from the regime’s aggressive crimes against them.

Although the army consists of a broad representation of Syrian society, the majority of military leadership belongs to the Alawite sect. Most Alawite leaders joined for economic reasons, as opportunities are lacking on Syria’s coast, where Alawites are highly concentrated. In turn, Alawites favor their own, who are often well-educated and have high literacy rates. The trend toward Alawite leadership is even higher in the security services, as they are considered the demographic most loyal to the Asad regime.

If protests escalate as we have seen in cities such as Homs, Hama, Dier el-Zour, and al-Bukamal, Asad may doubt the military’s loyalty and consider the possibility of its abandoning the regime. Understanding the tenuous relationship between the army and the regime, the opposition—under the name of the National Initiative for Change—called on former defense minister Ali Habib and former chief-of-staff Dawood Rajeh in April to lead the transition period after the fall of the Asad regime. Unfortunately, the National Initiative for Change had little success once the regime removed Habib and Rajeh from these military positions, perhaps due to their refusal to attack the city of Hama.

The National Initiative for Change has confirmed that the military is the only institution that can effectively lead this transformation. Still, can the army play a role in a transitional period despite their lateness in assisting the people after the fall of 4,000 peaceful demonstrators? Will the Syrian army indeed follow in the footsteps of the Tunisian and Egyptian armies by protecting the revolution? And, should crimes against peaceful demonstrators continue and require international military intervention, will the army prevent such foreign involvement from tainting the homegrown Syrian Revolution?

Radwan Ziadeh is the director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies and a visiting scholar at Harvard University. His most recent book is Power and Policy in Syria: Intelligence Services, Foreign Relations and Democracy in the Modern Middle East.