On October 23, Tunisia held the first free elections following the Arab Spring uprisings that have swept the Middle East and North Africa this year. As expected, the Islamist Ennahda party won a plurality in the new National Constituent Assembly (90 of 217 seats), the body that will draft Tunisia’s new constitution and appoint an interim president and cabinet to govern for the next year. The next nearest party – the secular, center-left Congress for the Republic (CPR) – won 30 seats in the election, representing roughly 14 percent.
Ahead of the elections, many predicted that electoral success by Ennahda would be likely to stoke fear within two camps: Tunisian secularists anxious that the party may exploit this democratic opening to impose puritanical restrictions (in the Arab country known as the most socially liberal in the region), and political observers in the West who fear that Islamist parties will inevitably advocate policies less aligned with Western interests and values.
Indeed, some American observers view Ennahda’s victory as a setback and are encouraging the U.S. administration to isolate Ennahda and back its secular rivals. This type of alarmist reaction would in fact undermine American interests both in Tunisia and beyond. Instead, the U.S. should view Tunisia as an opportunity to confidently engage with all parties as this historic transition continues.
Understanding Ennahda and Its Electoral Victory
It would be a mistake to attribute Ennahda’s electoral success to its Islamic character alone. The party also benefitted from a strong desire by voters for a clean break from the corruption-riddled politics of Ben Ali’s era. All of the political parties that had operated during the Ben Ali era struggled to separate themselves from that past. One key characteristic that Ennahda shares with secular runner-up CPR is that each was banned by Ben Ali and its leaders forced into exile, only becoming recognized as a legal party in the wake of the revolution.
It would likewise be a mistake to view Ennahda as identical to other Islamist parties across the Arab world. Some commentators have mentioned Ennahda’s victory in comparison with the Hamas electoral victory in January 2006, but Ennahda bears very little in common with Hamas. Most importantly, Ennahda has no armed wing, has never engaged in violence, and was specifically founded as a nonviolent Islamic movement. In addition, Ennahda’s leadership has taken many positions that put itself at odds not only with violent organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah, but also with more conservative Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
One fear pervasive in the West is that Islamists will inevitably undermine the rights of women, but Ennahda does not appear to conform to this stereotype. Ennahda was among the first Tunisian parties to publicly endorse the gender-parity policy requiring all parties to submit equal number of men and women as candidates. Ennahda also included women at the top of many of their candidate lists, including the charismatic Souad Abderrahim, who notably does not wear the traditional Islamic hijab (headscarf) and has been rumored as a possible choice to be president of the new assembly. In all, a remarkable 47% (42 out of 90) of Ennahda’s seats in the constituent assembly will be held by women, which compares very favorably with Western countries – for example, only 17% of members of the U.S. Congress are women. With only 7 women from all other parties winning seats in Tunisia’s constituent assembly, more than 80% of all women in the body will represent Ennahda, eroding fears that the party aims to reduce the role of women in the public sphere.
Reasons for U.S. Engagement
While some comments from Ennahda leaders have given cause for concern, and it is too early to know how the group will conduct itself as a leading actor in the Tunisian government, there are nonetheless several reasons for the U.S. to clearly engage with the party.
First, the U.S. administration has rightly stressed the importance of Tunisia’s transition to democracy and declared that it will support that transition. Now that the Tunisian people have elevated Ennahda through historic elections certified as free and fair by thousands of local and international observers, the U.S. simply cannot credibly support the transition without engaging directly with Tunisia’s most influential party.
Moreover, any effort to isolate the party would ignore not only the wishes of the millions of Tunisians who cast their ballots for Ennahda, but also many of those voters who did not. Notably, the secular parties who performed most strongly in the elections – CPR and Ettakatol – were precisely the parties most open to cooperation with Ennahda. Other secular parties such as the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and Ettajdid that forswore any possible coalition with Ennahda and campaigned through fierce opposition to Islamism performed extremely poorly in the elections, despite their more established networks of members and supporters. Following this clear rejection by the Tunisian voters – Islamist and secular alike – of efforts to isolate Ennahda, any efforts by the U.S. to ostracize the party would be unpopular and would erode the U.S. position in the country.
In a region where antipathy to U.S. policies is the norm and U.S. mistrust of Islamist groups is often reciprocated, Ennahda appears to be different in that regard as well. Early signs point to an eagerness by Ennahda to cooperate with both their secular counterparts in Tunisia as well as with the international community, particularly the United States. Ennahda leaders including the party’s Secretary-General Hamadi Jebali visited Washington in May and met with numerous U.S. officials, and the party appears to prefer U.S. support and engagement as an alternative to what it views as the radical secularism of the French.
The U.S. should seize this opportunity. Engagement with all parties, including Ennahda, is not only the way to strengthen U.S. relations with Tunisia, but can also send a powerful signal to the entire region that U.S. support for Arab democracy does not aim to exclude parties with which it may have disagreements. This could be one modest step toward restoring U.S. credibility with Arab populations just as those populations become increasingly empowered across the region, which is an opportunity the U.S. cannot afford to miss.
Stephen McInerney is the executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy.
Ahead of the elections, many predicted that electoral success by Ennahda would be likely to stoke fear within two camps: Tunisian secularists anxious that the party may exploit this democratic opening to impose puritanical restrictions (in the Arab country known as the most socially liberal in the region), and political observers in the West who fear that Islamist parties will inevitably advocate policies less aligned with Western interests and values.
Indeed, some American observers view Ennahda’s victory as a setback and are encouraging the U.S. administration to isolate Ennahda and back its secular rivals. This type of alarmist reaction would in fact undermine American interests both in Tunisia and beyond. Instead, the U.S. should view Tunisia as an opportunity to confidently engage with all parties as this historic transition continues.
Understanding Ennahda and Its Electoral Victory
It would be a mistake to attribute Ennahda’s electoral success to its Islamic character alone. The party also benefitted from a strong desire by voters for a clean break from the corruption-riddled politics of Ben Ali’s era. All of the political parties that had operated during the Ben Ali era struggled to separate themselves from that past. One key characteristic that Ennahda shares with secular runner-up CPR is that each was banned by Ben Ali and its leaders forced into exile, only becoming recognized as a legal party in the wake of the revolution.
It would likewise be a mistake to view Ennahda as identical to other Islamist parties across the Arab world. Some commentators have mentioned Ennahda’s victory in comparison with the Hamas electoral victory in January 2006, but Ennahda bears very little in common with Hamas. Most importantly, Ennahda has no armed wing, has never engaged in violence, and was specifically founded as a nonviolent Islamic movement. In addition, Ennahda’s leadership has taken many positions that put itself at odds not only with violent organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah, but also with more conservative Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
One fear pervasive in the West is that Islamists will inevitably undermine the rights of women, but Ennahda does not appear to conform to this stereotype. Ennahda was among the first Tunisian parties to publicly endorse the gender-parity policy requiring all parties to submit equal number of men and women as candidates. Ennahda also included women at the top of many of their candidate lists, including the charismatic Souad Abderrahim, who notably does not wear the traditional Islamic hijab (headscarf) and has been rumored as a possible choice to be president of the new assembly. In all, a remarkable 47% (42 out of 90) of Ennahda’s seats in the constituent assembly will be held by women, which compares very favorably with Western countries – for example, only 17% of members of the U.S. Congress are women. With only 7 women from all other parties winning seats in Tunisia’s constituent assembly, more than 80% of all women in the body will represent Ennahda, eroding fears that the party aims to reduce the role of women in the public sphere.
Reasons for U.S. Engagement
While some comments from Ennahda leaders have given cause for concern, and it is too early to know how the group will conduct itself as a leading actor in the Tunisian government, there are nonetheless several reasons for the U.S. to clearly engage with the party.
First, the U.S. administration has rightly stressed the importance of Tunisia’s transition to democracy and declared that it will support that transition. Now that the Tunisian people have elevated Ennahda through historic elections certified as free and fair by thousands of local and international observers, the U.S. simply cannot credibly support the transition without engaging directly with Tunisia’s most influential party.
Moreover, any effort to isolate the party would ignore not only the wishes of the millions of Tunisians who cast their ballots for Ennahda, but also many of those voters who did not. Notably, the secular parties who performed most strongly in the elections – CPR and Ettakatol – were precisely the parties most open to cooperation with Ennahda. Other secular parties such as the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) and Ettajdid that forswore any possible coalition with Ennahda and campaigned through fierce opposition to Islamism performed extremely poorly in the elections, despite their more established networks of members and supporters. Following this clear rejection by the Tunisian voters – Islamist and secular alike – of efforts to isolate Ennahda, any efforts by the U.S. to ostracize the party would be unpopular and would erode the U.S. position in the country.
In a region where antipathy to U.S. policies is the norm and U.S. mistrust of Islamist groups is often reciprocated, Ennahda appears to be different in that regard as well. Early signs point to an eagerness by Ennahda to cooperate with both their secular counterparts in Tunisia as well as with the international community, particularly the United States. Ennahda leaders including the party’s Secretary-General Hamadi Jebali visited Washington in May and met with numerous U.S. officials, and the party appears to prefer U.S. support and engagement as an alternative to what it views as the radical secularism of the French.
The U.S. should seize this opportunity. Engagement with all parties, including Ennahda, is not only the way to strengthen U.S. relations with Tunisia, but can also send a powerful signal to the entire region that U.S. support for Arab democracy does not aim to exclude parties with which it may have disagreements. This could be one modest step toward restoring U.S. credibility with Arab populations just as those populations become increasingly empowered across the region, which is an opportunity the U.S. cannot afford to miss.
Stephen McInerney is the executive director of the Project on Middle East Democracy.
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