George Orwell once defined “doublethink” as “the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them.” Such a dichotomy can only be a source of tension, discomfort, and confusion. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s close relationship with once-sturdy Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a prime example of such a dilemma.
If not for Erdogan, it would have been nearly impossible for Assad to break away from his isolation after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005. The Bush administration was unhappy with Erdogan’s Syria approach, and the White House also initially opposed Turkey acting as a go-between between Syria and Israel. There’s been a lot of water under the bridge since then, and today the Obama administration welcomes Erdogan’s harsh criticism of Assad’s brutal crackdown on anti-government protestors. “It sends a critical message to President Assad that again he cannot crack down and repress the aspirations of his people,” said deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes last week.
But Erdogan’s instincts and timing regarding his partnership with Assad are suspect. Did he get a return on his investment in this relationship? As of last Thursday, his answer was a blunt no. “Our sincere cooperation with the Syrian government in the past to help them implement reforms in a healthy and speedy way unfortunately was not reciprocated,” he said. This relationship, however, goes back years; in 2009, Turkey held a joint ministerial meeting with Syria in Damascus – and the two nations also agreed to hold a joint military exercise shortly after Turkey cancelled a scheduled military exercise with Israel. Erdogan said many times that he believed the Syrian people loved Assad and that the uprising surprised him.
The first Syrian protests began in January, and Erdogan and Assad led a groundbreaking ceremony the following month for a “friendship dam” to be built jointly, straddling the Syria-Turkey border. In March, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria agreed to allow their citizens to freely enter one another’s countries without visas. Turkey and Syria had in fact abandoned entry visas between the countries in 2009, and the agreement this year made little impact. Politically, however, this year’s agreement demonstrates that Erdogan still believed in March that Assad would hang onto power.
The question now is whether Erdogan was naïve not to see how brutal the Assad regime could be toward its own people. Considering the AKP government, though—which claims to oversee Middle East affairs—such naivety is difficult to comprehend. The AKP has made politically loaded claims that previous Turkish governments turned their backs on the Middle East and chose to partner only with the West and Israel—even though, following to the Orwellian model, the AKP government clearly also wants to be in good standing with the West.
But since Erdogan’s Islamist-based government rose to power, the pendulum has continued to swing between common values with the West and religious brotherhood with the Middle East. A master public communicator, Erdogan cleverly cited religion as a common denominator that binds all Muslim nations in the region together. While Turkey once criticized the European Union for acting like a Christian club, the Islamist-based AKP government is in fact acting no different when it comes to showing solidarity with Muslim nations in the region and elsewhere. But the Arab Spring made it impossible for Erdogan to make blanket statements like “Muslims don’t kill” or “Muslims don’t do genocide.” The United Nations estimates that more than 3,500 people—some 200 of whom are children—have been killed in Syria since the anti-government protests began.
Now Erdogan has thrown in the towel on his relationship with Assad—a friendship that seems unlikely to be repaired even if the Syrian president finds a way to stay in power. On Thursday, Erdogan even blamed the West’s indifference to the bloodshed in Syria on the fact that the country possesses no natural resources, as opposed to Libya. These constant contradictory messages make it difficult to understand the Turkish leader’s position. Turkey opposed foreign intervention in Libya before jumping on the bandwagon, but the AKP leadership in principle has always objected to foreign intervention. Furthermore, no one seems eager to engage militarily with Syria – a situation more complicated than Libya by virtue of Russian and Iranian support of Assad.
Clearly Erdogan enjoys his celebrity status on the Arab street. He speaks boldly and bluntly, slamming Israel and whoever else comes his way – and the Arab world loves him for it. But although he leads cheering crowds, his personal investment in building a close relationship with Assad has saved no lives. He has solved no conflict and eased no tensions, even though he projects the image of a man who wants to speak the loudest and be heard by everyone. Erdogan believes in the goodwill of Muslim people and does not see Muslims according to their nationalist identities. He considers the uprising in Syria an “internal problem” for Turkey, but it is totally ambiguous as to where those developments turn into a foreign issue for his country.
To that end, Erdogan’s relationship with Assad does not quite fit his ideology; the Syrian leader’s regime, representing the minority Alawites, dominates the majority Sunni population. It raises the question of whether Erdogan was able to hold two distinct opinions about Assad: one as a sincere, close friend, the other as a terminator pushing for a regime change.
Many in Turkey believe that the separatist Kurdish PKK’s leadership in Syria staged the latest attack in Hakkari, which killed 26 Turkish military servicemen. Only after that incident did the Turkish government allow access to Syrian opposition figures in Turkey, and it’s still unclear what kind of support Turkey’s government provides to them.
The bottom line is, Turkey should focus on fighting PKK terrorism, and deterring its neighbors’ impulses to exploit the Kurdish card. It is time for the Turkish leadership to abandon its loud, bold remarks, which will prove nothing but a trap for Turkey if it ever militarily engages in Syria. Even if a United Nations Security Council resolution is proposed to approve such intervention, Erdogan should not be lauded for saying the right things today. His record is complicated, and the outcome of the Syrian uprising is still mysterious. Any Turkish intervention can only open Pandora’s Box, and no one could even imagine the magnitude of devastation to which it may lead on all sides.
If not for Erdogan, it would have been nearly impossible for Assad to break away from his isolation after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri was assassinated in 2005. The Bush administration was unhappy with Erdogan’s Syria approach, and the White House also initially opposed Turkey acting as a go-between between Syria and Israel. There’s been a lot of water under the bridge since then, and today the Obama administration welcomes Erdogan’s harsh criticism of Assad’s brutal crackdown on anti-government protestors. “It sends a critical message to President Assad that again he cannot crack down and repress the aspirations of his people,” said deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes last week.
But Erdogan’s instincts and timing regarding his partnership with Assad are suspect. Did he get a return on his investment in this relationship? As of last Thursday, his answer was a blunt no. “Our sincere cooperation with the Syrian government in the past to help them implement reforms in a healthy and speedy way unfortunately was not reciprocated,” he said. This relationship, however, goes back years; in 2009, Turkey held a joint ministerial meeting with Syria in Damascus – and the two nations also agreed to hold a joint military exercise shortly after Turkey cancelled a scheduled military exercise with Israel. Erdogan said many times that he believed the Syrian people loved Assad and that the uprising surprised him.
The first Syrian protests began in January, and Erdogan and Assad led a groundbreaking ceremony the following month for a “friendship dam” to be built jointly, straddling the Syria-Turkey border. In March, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria agreed to allow their citizens to freely enter one another’s countries without visas. Turkey and Syria had in fact abandoned entry visas between the countries in 2009, and the agreement this year made little impact. Politically, however, this year’s agreement demonstrates that Erdogan still believed in March that Assad would hang onto power.
The question now is whether Erdogan was naïve not to see how brutal the Assad regime could be toward its own people. Considering the AKP government, though—which claims to oversee Middle East affairs—such naivety is difficult to comprehend. The AKP has made politically loaded claims that previous Turkish governments turned their backs on the Middle East and chose to partner only with the West and Israel—even though, following to the Orwellian model, the AKP government clearly also wants to be in good standing with the West.
But since Erdogan’s Islamist-based government rose to power, the pendulum has continued to swing between common values with the West and religious brotherhood with the Middle East. A master public communicator, Erdogan cleverly cited religion as a common denominator that binds all Muslim nations in the region together. While Turkey once criticized the European Union for acting like a Christian club, the Islamist-based AKP government is in fact acting no different when it comes to showing solidarity with Muslim nations in the region and elsewhere. But the Arab Spring made it impossible for Erdogan to make blanket statements like “Muslims don’t kill” or “Muslims don’t do genocide.” The United Nations estimates that more than 3,500 people—some 200 of whom are children—have been killed in Syria since the anti-government protests began.
Now Erdogan has thrown in the towel on his relationship with Assad—a friendship that seems unlikely to be repaired even if the Syrian president finds a way to stay in power. On Thursday, Erdogan even blamed the West’s indifference to the bloodshed in Syria on the fact that the country possesses no natural resources, as opposed to Libya. These constant contradictory messages make it difficult to understand the Turkish leader’s position. Turkey opposed foreign intervention in Libya before jumping on the bandwagon, but the AKP leadership in principle has always objected to foreign intervention. Furthermore, no one seems eager to engage militarily with Syria – a situation more complicated than Libya by virtue of Russian and Iranian support of Assad.
Clearly Erdogan enjoys his celebrity status on the Arab street. He speaks boldly and bluntly, slamming Israel and whoever else comes his way – and the Arab world loves him for it. But although he leads cheering crowds, his personal investment in building a close relationship with Assad has saved no lives. He has solved no conflict and eased no tensions, even though he projects the image of a man who wants to speak the loudest and be heard by everyone. Erdogan believes in the goodwill of Muslim people and does not see Muslims according to their nationalist identities. He considers the uprising in Syria an “internal problem” for Turkey, but it is totally ambiguous as to where those developments turn into a foreign issue for his country.
To that end, Erdogan’s relationship with Assad does not quite fit his ideology; the Syrian leader’s regime, representing the minority Alawites, dominates the majority Sunni population. It raises the question of whether Erdogan was able to hold two distinct opinions about Assad: one as a sincere, close friend, the other as a terminator pushing for a regime change.
Many in Turkey believe that the separatist Kurdish PKK’s leadership in Syria staged the latest attack in Hakkari, which killed 26 Turkish military servicemen. Only after that incident did the Turkish government allow access to Syrian opposition figures in Turkey, and it’s still unclear what kind of support Turkey’s government provides to them.
The bottom line is, Turkey should focus on fighting PKK terrorism, and deterring its neighbors’ impulses to exploit the Kurdish card. It is time for the Turkish leadership to abandon its loud, bold remarks, which will prove nothing but a trap for Turkey if it ever militarily engages in Syria. Even if a United Nations Security Council resolution is proposed to approve such intervention, Erdogan should not be lauded for saying the right things today. His record is complicated, and the outcome of the Syrian uprising is still mysterious. Any Turkish intervention can only open Pandora’s Box, and no one could even imagine the magnitude of devastation to which it may lead on all sides.
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