Contrary to the expectations of many observers and well-wishers of Bahrain, it seems unlikely that the state of affairs is heading toward a quick political solution after the publication of the fact-finding committee’s report on November 23. Because of this not positive but not necessarily pessimistic outlook, mutual accusations quickly surfaced between the regime and its supporters on one end and political forces or the opposition on the other.
Under the leadership of the al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, the opposition refused the regime's orientation toward establishing a joint committee bringing together policy makers and national figures to present suggestions for how to implement the recommendations of the fact-finding commission report. The opposition stressed that the report confirms that the committee must be made up of high-level representatives from the government, opposition groups, and civil society institutions. Furthermore—as twenty invites went out on a personal basis and not on their membership in opposition groups—the opposition stressed that appointments to the committee are not to be made solely by the regime. Indeed, invites were sent out to two representatives of al-Wefaq, who refused the invites based on the Society’s decision.
Furthermore, the opposition refused to formally specify the work mandated to the committee by means of suggestions on implementing the report's recommendations. Likewise, opposition groups stressed the expansion of the committee's mandate to include introducing suggestions and monitoring the implementation of the recommendations of the report.
International Framework
In a statement, al-Wefaq went even further by asking for international support and a deadline for implementing the committee’s recommendations in order to reestablish mutual trust between the regime and the opposition. The statement, issued on November 27, described the government as an oppressive, vengeful dictatorship that led the excessive violations of the rights of tens of thousands of Bahrainis under the formal auspices of the state. The Society saw that forming the committee was simply an attempt to circumvent the report’s recommendations and that solving the crisis gripping the country requires serious and comprehensive dialogue resulting in political solutions.
For its part, the government did not comment on al-Wefaq’s demands to open up to international support. However, the Justice Minister Sheikh Khaled bin Ali, a member of the royal family, released a fiery statement wherein he accused the Society of continuing its previous policies by refusing to enter the joint committee. Sheikh Khaled is the grandson of the family patriarch, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Khaled, who was previously the Minister of Justice and is therefore in the inner circle of the royal office.
Political forces stress the necessity of popular will in forming a government and of ceding full powers to the legislature and ensuring fair distribution of electoral districts, thus enacting the principle of one person, one vote. In addition, security for all in the context of an independent judiciary with no discrimination between citizens was also stressed. However, it seems unlikely that the regime is willing to enter into direct negotiations to reach an understanding with the opposition, which means the Bahrain problem will continue in the foreseeable future.
The Ambiguous Role of Iran
From any point of view, the international dimension is an important aspect in the issue of Bahrain. On the one side, Saudi Arabia supports the regime and sent armed forces through the King Fahd Bridge in mid-March, marking the first time the bridge has been used as such since it was constructed in the in the mid-Eighties. (The pretext that was used was the necessity of protecting vital facilities from the aggression of hostile forces—pointing the finger at Iran.) On the other side is Iran, providing through its protected media a platform for the opposition to freely express itself.
Tehran has succeeded in establishing itself as a key variable in Bahrain’s political process, becoming part of the daily political discourse. More precisely, the Bahraini media that supports the regime is engaged in daily campaigns against Iran, accusing the opposition in general—and al-Wefaq in particular—of being tied to an Iranian agenda, although no proof has been brought forward.
In this role, Iranian satellite channels, particularly those in Arabic, make sure to focus on developments in Bahrain at every news hour without exception. In that regard, it is noteworthy to point out the channel al-Alem, which broadcasts its programs in Arabic from Tehran and Beirut. Similarly, other Iranian channels—such as al-Kawthar, al-Itejah in Iraq, or even al-Manar, which is under the aegis of Hezbollah—all regularly broadcast events in Bahrain. The Iranian Press TV provides additional English language coverage supportive of the opposition.
Perhaps the commission’s report was right to point out that Iran was not the reason behind the outbreak of events in Bahrain—a development which surprised everyone, including policymakers in Tehran. However, it is possible to blame Bahraini officials for poor management of the crisis from the start on February 14, when a protester was gunned down at his front door by a policeman. This was followed by another protester’s death the next day, during the first protester's funeral in the Sulmania Medical Complex. The rest became history when some protesters decided to go to Pearl Square in the middle of Manama to express their anger at the two protesters’ deaths.
In any case, it seems the commission’s conclusions regarding the lack of Iranian involvement in the Bahrain events left the King no option other than to make a speech strongly attacking the authorities in Tehran, accusing them of three decades of meddling in Bahrain’s internal affairs. It is not wrong to assume that the King’s attack was designed to please Saudi Arabia. The fact that the report discounted Iran from the events of Bahrain is a heavy blow to Saudi Arabia, which built its current policies toward Bahrain on the basis of Iranian involvement in the crisis from the start.
In contrast, the discourse on the supposed Iranian role pleases some stakeholders in Iran, who wish to see Tehran as a key player in the entire region. It is impossible to deny that Iran saw in the events of Bahrain an opportunity to strengthen its interests in this vital region—this is in the context of its rivalry with Saudi Arabia in winning the hearts and minds of people. Bahrain has been added as a new battlefield in the cold war between Riyadh and Tehran, along with Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, as well as the Palestinian question and the price of oil. In this context, Tehran may argue that it is necessary to create in its media outlets a space for the opposition to confront the regime’s media, which supports the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia.
The Hopes of the Wider Population
A wide segment of Bahrain’s citizens and traders desperately hope for a solution to the crisis so that Bahrain can begin confronting its growing economic challenges. For example, the Central Information Bureau, a government office, reported a 2.4 percent growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2011, as opposed to 4.7 percent in the same period last year.
This adds to a chain of negative reports on the performance of the Bahraini economy; the tourism sector dropped by as much as 60 percent between January and August 2011—the worst in the Gulf Cooperation Council, according to Ernst and Young. This decline is due to such developments as cancelling the Formula One racing for 2011, which normally increases revenues for a number of sectors, such as transportation and tourism. Furthermore, Bahrain lost a number of other activities, such as the Manama Dialogue, which was scheduled for December 2011. The event, organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, is known for attracting policymakers and security specialists from around the world; in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave the keynote speech.
In sum, it can be claimed that the various stakeholders in Bahrain—specifically the government and the opposition—have not succeeded in taking the country in the right direction, even several months after the outbreak of a crisis in which dozens have died, hundreds have been arrested, and thousands have been dismissed from their jobs. Observers can claim with complete confidence that if Bahrain does not implement the Fact-Finding Commission Report to solve the challenges facing the country at the macro and micro levels, then Bahrain, as a society and culture, and as a government and an opposition, has not learned from the crisis.
Under the leadership of the al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, the opposition refused the regime's orientation toward establishing a joint committee bringing together policy makers and national figures to present suggestions for how to implement the recommendations of the fact-finding commission report. The opposition stressed that the report confirms that the committee must be made up of high-level representatives from the government, opposition groups, and civil society institutions. Furthermore—as twenty invites went out on a personal basis and not on their membership in opposition groups—the opposition stressed that appointments to the committee are not to be made solely by the regime. Indeed, invites were sent out to two representatives of al-Wefaq, who refused the invites based on the Society’s decision.
Furthermore, the opposition refused to formally specify the work mandated to the committee by means of suggestions on implementing the report's recommendations. Likewise, opposition groups stressed the expansion of the committee's mandate to include introducing suggestions and monitoring the implementation of the recommendations of the report.
International Framework
In a statement, al-Wefaq went even further by asking for international support and a deadline for implementing the committee’s recommendations in order to reestablish mutual trust between the regime and the opposition. The statement, issued on November 27, described the government as an oppressive, vengeful dictatorship that led the excessive violations of the rights of tens of thousands of Bahrainis under the formal auspices of the state. The Society saw that forming the committee was simply an attempt to circumvent the report’s recommendations and that solving the crisis gripping the country requires serious and comprehensive dialogue resulting in political solutions.
For its part, the government did not comment on al-Wefaq’s demands to open up to international support. However, the Justice Minister Sheikh Khaled bin Ali, a member of the royal family, released a fiery statement wherein he accused the Society of continuing its previous policies by refusing to enter the joint committee. Sheikh Khaled is the grandson of the family patriarch, Sheikh Abdullah Bin Khaled, who was previously the Minister of Justice and is therefore in the inner circle of the royal office.
Political forces stress the necessity of popular will in forming a government and of ceding full powers to the legislature and ensuring fair distribution of electoral districts, thus enacting the principle of one person, one vote. In addition, security for all in the context of an independent judiciary with no discrimination between citizens was also stressed. However, it seems unlikely that the regime is willing to enter into direct negotiations to reach an understanding with the opposition, which means the Bahrain problem will continue in the foreseeable future.
The Ambiguous Role of Iran
From any point of view, the international dimension is an important aspect in the issue of Bahrain. On the one side, Saudi Arabia supports the regime and sent armed forces through the King Fahd Bridge in mid-March, marking the first time the bridge has been used as such since it was constructed in the in the mid-Eighties. (The pretext that was used was the necessity of protecting vital facilities from the aggression of hostile forces—pointing the finger at Iran.) On the other side is Iran, providing through its protected media a platform for the opposition to freely express itself.
Tehran has succeeded in establishing itself as a key variable in Bahrain’s political process, becoming part of the daily political discourse. More precisely, the Bahraini media that supports the regime is engaged in daily campaigns against Iran, accusing the opposition in general—and al-Wefaq in particular—of being tied to an Iranian agenda, although no proof has been brought forward.
In this role, Iranian satellite channels, particularly those in Arabic, make sure to focus on developments in Bahrain at every news hour without exception. In that regard, it is noteworthy to point out the channel al-Alem, which broadcasts its programs in Arabic from Tehran and Beirut. Similarly, other Iranian channels—such as al-Kawthar, al-Itejah in Iraq, or even al-Manar, which is under the aegis of Hezbollah—all regularly broadcast events in Bahrain. The Iranian Press TV provides additional English language coverage supportive of the opposition.
Perhaps the commission’s report was right to point out that Iran was not the reason behind the outbreak of events in Bahrain—a development which surprised everyone, including policymakers in Tehran. However, it is possible to blame Bahraini officials for poor management of the crisis from the start on February 14, when a protester was gunned down at his front door by a policeman. This was followed by another protester’s death the next day, during the first protester's funeral in the Sulmania Medical Complex. The rest became history when some protesters decided to go to Pearl Square in the middle of Manama to express their anger at the two protesters’ deaths.
In any case, it seems the commission’s conclusions regarding the lack of Iranian involvement in the Bahrain events left the King no option other than to make a speech strongly attacking the authorities in Tehran, accusing them of three decades of meddling in Bahrain’s internal affairs. It is not wrong to assume that the King’s attack was designed to please Saudi Arabia. The fact that the report discounted Iran from the events of Bahrain is a heavy blow to Saudi Arabia, which built its current policies toward Bahrain on the basis of Iranian involvement in the crisis from the start.
In contrast, the discourse on the supposed Iranian role pleases some stakeholders in Iran, who wish to see Tehran as a key player in the entire region. It is impossible to deny that Iran saw in the events of Bahrain an opportunity to strengthen its interests in this vital region—this is in the context of its rivalry with Saudi Arabia in winning the hearts and minds of people. Bahrain has been added as a new battlefield in the cold war between Riyadh and Tehran, along with Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, as well as the Palestinian question and the price of oil. In this context, Tehran may argue that it is necessary to create in its media outlets a space for the opposition to confront the regime’s media, which supports the foreign policy of Saudi Arabia.
The Hopes of the Wider Population
A wide segment of Bahrain’s citizens and traders desperately hope for a solution to the crisis so that Bahrain can begin confronting its growing economic challenges. For example, the Central Information Bureau, a government office, reported a 2.4 percent growth rate in the fourth quarter of 2011, as opposed to 4.7 percent in the same period last year.
This adds to a chain of negative reports on the performance of the Bahraini economy; the tourism sector dropped by as much as 60 percent between January and August 2011—the worst in the Gulf Cooperation Council, according to Ernst and Young. This decline is due to such developments as cancelling the Formula One racing for 2011, which normally increases revenues for a number of sectors, such as transportation and tourism. Furthermore, Bahrain lost a number of other activities, such as the Manama Dialogue, which was scheduled for December 2011. The event, organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, is known for attracting policymakers and security specialists from around the world; in 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave the keynote speech.
In sum, it can be claimed that the various stakeholders in Bahrain—specifically the government and the opposition—have not succeeded in taking the country in the right direction, even several months after the outbreak of a crisis in which dozens have died, hundreds have been arrested, and thousands have been dismissed from their jobs. Observers can claim with complete confidence that if Bahrain does not implement the Fact-Finding Commission Report to solve the challenges facing the country at the macro and micro levels, then Bahrain, as a society and culture, and as a government and an opposition, has not learned from the crisis.
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