Egypt’s first parliamentary elections post-revolution is like old wine in new bottles. The public came out in droves to participate, but the participating parties employed tactics no different than those of the previous era. The elections revealed that the original revolutionary forces remain a minority, and despite an unprecedented turnout – some 52% of eligible voters – it appears that nothing has changed with regard to contempt for the will of the voting populace.
Indeed, these elections – the first round of which occurred on the 28th of November and are slated to run in stages through to the 10th of January – saw the continuation of many of the old Mubarak-era practices such as vote-buying in the form of care packages for the poor, campaigning outside and even inside polling stations, and observed vote counting irregularities. Add to these violations the widespread exploitation of the religion card, a tactic hitherto unseen in the country, while the number of allegations of election infractions are already compounding. This list of violations calls into question the veracity of the elections as well as the legitimacy of the council which will now oversee the enactment of a new constitution.
Additionally, a number of question marks remain concerning the Islamist trend’s commitment to respect the rules of the democracy game: respecting the equality of all citizens, their rights and freedoms, and accepting the notion of diversity. This also includes the operational component of democracy, which the trend supposedly bought into, but as exemplified by these elections, even this component was disregarded. Parties of the Islamist trend were the ones most broadly responsible for violations such as indirect vote-buying in the form of care packages for the poor and exploiting religion by portraying themselves as the ones who represent Muslims (and, by inference, accusing the secular trend of standing in the Christian camp), sounding notes of sectarianism. The question remains: if the Islamist trend hasn’t upheld the rules of democracy, and it hasn’t yet come to power, what will the situation be when it controls the reins of power in the country?
The revolutionary forces returned to Tahrir on the 19th of November, in confrontations reminiscent of the January uprising, resulting in forty-two deaths and around two hundred injured over the course of 10 days. Protests spread to nearly every governorate and very nearly revoked the legitimacy of the SCAF altogether, prompting some to term this the ‘second wave’ of the revolution. In addition, it almost caused the establishment of a civil national salvation government to run the country. Yet recent elections, which should have served to appropriate legitimacy from Tahrir Square, obliterated the ‘second wave’ just in the nick of time and sent the revolutionary protestors back to square one. The SCAF once again holds the reins, and the undemocratic forces -- embodied by the Islamists – have been given the upper hand in deciding the fate of the constitution, which will determine the rules of the political game for the country.
Thus the youth who led the revolution last January and who came out again on November 19th have returned to the status of opposition, while at the same time there is the sense that the message of change has not yet resonated with the grassroots base of the public who largely lay the blame for the country’s instability at the feet of Tahrir Square. Now those camping out in the square with slogans like ‘No Sound Above That of Tahrir’ have become the voice of a limited minority which feels it is putting forth the sacrifices while others of differing opinions reap the benefits to craft the system of governance. The youth see this as authoritarianism in another guise, following the revolution to a fork in the road, only to ready themselves to pounce and capitalize on it at the right time.
The current elections, then, are the culmination of years of the July Officers rule, during which we saw the Islamicization of Egyptian society and the spread of sectarian sentiment, having previously been inclined towards centrist liberalism prior to 1952. And even in the event that the political powers are able to draft a democratic constitution which guarantees fair and transparent criteria for political competition, the road ahead for secular trends and parties remains a long one. In this upcoming period, the upper hand, it seems, will rest with the Islamists, who have found support from the remnants of the old regime, locally and abroad.
Indeed, these elections – the first round of which occurred on the 28th of November and are slated to run in stages through to the 10th of January – saw the continuation of many of the old Mubarak-era practices such as vote-buying in the form of care packages for the poor, campaigning outside and even inside polling stations, and observed vote counting irregularities. Add to these violations the widespread exploitation of the religion card, a tactic hitherto unseen in the country, while the number of allegations of election infractions are already compounding. This list of violations calls into question the veracity of the elections as well as the legitimacy of the council which will now oversee the enactment of a new constitution.
Additionally, a number of question marks remain concerning the Islamist trend’s commitment to respect the rules of the democracy game: respecting the equality of all citizens, their rights and freedoms, and accepting the notion of diversity. This also includes the operational component of democracy, which the trend supposedly bought into, but as exemplified by these elections, even this component was disregarded. Parties of the Islamist trend were the ones most broadly responsible for violations such as indirect vote-buying in the form of care packages for the poor and exploiting religion by portraying themselves as the ones who represent Muslims (and, by inference, accusing the secular trend of standing in the Christian camp), sounding notes of sectarianism. The question remains: if the Islamist trend hasn’t upheld the rules of democracy, and it hasn’t yet come to power, what will the situation be when it controls the reins of power in the country?
The revolutionary forces returned to Tahrir on the 19th of November, in confrontations reminiscent of the January uprising, resulting in forty-two deaths and around two hundred injured over the course of 10 days. Protests spread to nearly every governorate and very nearly revoked the legitimacy of the SCAF altogether, prompting some to term this the ‘second wave’ of the revolution. In addition, it almost caused the establishment of a civil national salvation government to run the country. Yet recent elections, which should have served to appropriate legitimacy from Tahrir Square, obliterated the ‘second wave’ just in the nick of time and sent the revolutionary protestors back to square one. The SCAF once again holds the reins, and the undemocratic forces -- embodied by the Islamists – have been given the upper hand in deciding the fate of the constitution, which will determine the rules of the political game for the country.
Thus the youth who led the revolution last January and who came out again on November 19th have returned to the status of opposition, while at the same time there is the sense that the message of change has not yet resonated with the grassroots base of the public who largely lay the blame for the country’s instability at the feet of Tahrir Square. Now those camping out in the square with slogans like ‘No Sound Above That of Tahrir’ have become the voice of a limited minority which feels it is putting forth the sacrifices while others of differing opinions reap the benefits to craft the system of governance. The youth see this as authoritarianism in another guise, following the revolution to a fork in the road, only to ready themselves to pounce and capitalize on it at the right time.
The current elections, then, are the culmination of years of the July Officers rule, during which we saw the Islamicization of Egyptian society and the spread of sectarian sentiment, having previously been inclined towards centrist liberalism prior to 1952. And even in the event that the political powers are able to draft a democratic constitution which guarantees fair and transparent criteria for political competition, the road ahead for secular trends and parties remains a long one. In this upcoming period, the upper hand, it seems, will rest with the Islamists, who have found support from the remnants of the old regime, locally and abroad.
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