The savage beating of Nabeel Rajab, President of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, while leading an 'unauthorized protest' on the streets of Manama, has put Bahrain at least temporarily back in the spotlight. After nearly a full year of tumult in the Arab world, the tiny island monarchy remains the only regime to have successfully faced down a robust protest movement. Where Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gaddafi failed, the al-Khalifa family succeeded.
With the critical support of Saudi troops, demonstrators were swept from the streets last Spring—a crackdown that elicited only a muted reaction from the United States, branding the U.S. as a tacit accomplice in the eyes of much of the protest movement. This impression has only been reinforced as tensions have returned ahead of the anniversary of the first protests.
There should be no surprise at this spike, and beaten activist Nabeel Rajab articulated its origins succinctly: “The government of the United States is backing the royals in this part of the world. They are supporting the dictators. The U.S. looks very hard on Syria and Libya but, when they look at their allies, are very soft.” It is this hypocrisy, towards Saudi Arabia, towards Bahrain, that has the street in such a furor. Because while the U.S. offers praise and lip service to the reconciliation process, the opposition knows that such efforts are illusory. Even if it were possible to bridge the gap between the protesters’ demands for a truly representative democracy, and the al-Khalifa's efforts to retain a Sunni dominated society, the reality is that the ultimate impediment lies in Riyadh, not Manama.
The al-Saud have sunk their talons deep into Bahrain, having staked much on retaining the Gulf monarchy as an autocratic Sunni buffer, both against an Iranian beachhead and against the threat of democratic contagion. From the Saudi vantage point, which sees its future at stake, this is a zero-sum issue. The only acceptable outcome is the continuation of the al-Khalifa monarchy, the continued suppression of protesters, and the retention in substance if not in form of the basic composition of the regime. To lose means opening up a wound which could imperil the Saudi crown.
Before the Saudi-led intervention, there was a battle of wills between the United States and Saudi Arabia. While U.S. diplomats were making the rounds in Manama, Saudi royals were on the phone with key members of the al-Khalifa family. Vigorously opposing the American advice for reform and steps towards reconciliation, the Saudi advice for a brutal crackdown won the day. By the time Saudi troops arrived on the streets of Manama, American diplomats found themselves temporarily locked out of government circles.
Where Saudi Arabia was forced to rely on advice and pressure a year ago, it can now depend upon military leverage. In mid-April of last year, the al-Khalifa family, bowing to the reality of its dependency upon the Gulf monarchies, made permanent the deployment of Saudi troops in the kingdom, ostensibly to ward off threats from Iran. This was confirmed when Saudi troops withdrew in June, leaving behind a permanent contingent. With this military presence, and the precedent established last spring when Saudi troops rumbling across the King Fahd causeway, the situation has changed significantly. The al-Khalifa family now realizes—and the U.S. should realize—that the Saudi veto is now a decisive factor in the islands’ politics.
This is not to say that the monarchy is held hostage in terms of its current political course. They are certainly complicit in the arrangement, and hope to stifle substantive reform and strangle the protest movement. However, the growing shadow that Saudi Arabia casts over Bahrain has prompted concern that the beginnings of a Syria-Lebanon style relationship is starting to take form. When the military lever is combined with the already substantial economic and cultural levers Saudi Arabia holds via its subsidies and media companies, it is easy to see the foundations of this fear. Before the Saudi intervention, observers used to say that Bahrain depended upon Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for its continued survival. Now it might be said that Bahrain and its beleaguered monarchy are reliant solely upon Saudi Arabia.
Though Saudi Arabia has firmly entrenched itself as the political gatekeeper in Bahrain, it may not mean the situation is entirely immovable. The al-Saud family opposes equitable dialogue between the people and the monarchy, but pointedly not the reconciliation process itself. They support the process in form if not in substance as a way to try and tame the furor that is building on the street. The prospect of tensions boiling over into street violence and major confrontations is not an appealing scenario to the Saudis. It would come at a time when Saudi Arabia is just beginning to emerge from its protective cocoon and flex its muscles in the region, and when the specter of the ever present Iranian menace is looming larger than ever across the region. Instability and a political black eye from imposing another crackdown is not desirable.
As always, stability is the watchword of the royal family, an ethos which affords the dim, but nonetheless existing prospect of a political opening. Though Saudi Arabia will not go easily, it may be possible to convince them to accede and support reforms like the gradual integration of the Shiite workforce and the relaxation of discriminatory policies and legislation, such as the closing of Shiite mosques. This is a move that does not surrender much power and has precedent in Saudi Arabia's own limited efforts after the Shiite rebellions in the Eastern Province in the early 1980's. To push for further and more substantive reform such as on electoral or legislative topics would be far more difficult. It would require major pressure from Washington and a significant increase in the al-Saud's own impression of their security both at home and abroad.
So, while the U.S. raises its concern over the beating of Bahraini street activists like Mr. Rajab, it should remember that the process of reform in Bahrain begins in Riyadh, not Manama. Accomplishing anything of substance will require the United States to make a decision on whether it is ready to take some risks in its relationship with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf security doctrine.
Joshua Jacobs is a Gulf Policy Analyst at the Institute for Gulf Affairs.
With the critical support of Saudi troops, demonstrators were swept from the streets last Spring—a crackdown that elicited only a muted reaction from the United States, branding the U.S. as a tacit accomplice in the eyes of much of the protest movement. This impression has only been reinforced as tensions have returned ahead of the anniversary of the first protests.
There should be no surprise at this spike, and beaten activist Nabeel Rajab articulated its origins succinctly: “The government of the United States is backing the royals in this part of the world. They are supporting the dictators. The U.S. looks very hard on Syria and Libya but, when they look at their allies, are very soft.” It is this hypocrisy, towards Saudi Arabia, towards Bahrain, that has the street in such a furor. Because while the U.S. offers praise and lip service to the reconciliation process, the opposition knows that such efforts are illusory. Even if it were possible to bridge the gap between the protesters’ demands for a truly representative democracy, and the al-Khalifa's efforts to retain a Sunni dominated society, the reality is that the ultimate impediment lies in Riyadh, not Manama.
The al-Saud have sunk their talons deep into Bahrain, having staked much on retaining the Gulf monarchy as an autocratic Sunni buffer, both against an Iranian beachhead and against the threat of democratic contagion. From the Saudi vantage point, which sees its future at stake, this is a zero-sum issue. The only acceptable outcome is the continuation of the al-Khalifa monarchy, the continued suppression of protesters, and the retention in substance if not in form of the basic composition of the regime. To lose means opening up a wound which could imperil the Saudi crown.
Before the Saudi-led intervention, there was a battle of wills between the United States and Saudi Arabia. While U.S. diplomats were making the rounds in Manama, Saudi royals were on the phone with key members of the al-Khalifa family. Vigorously opposing the American advice for reform and steps towards reconciliation, the Saudi advice for a brutal crackdown won the day. By the time Saudi troops arrived on the streets of Manama, American diplomats found themselves temporarily locked out of government circles.
Where Saudi Arabia was forced to rely on advice and pressure a year ago, it can now depend upon military leverage. In mid-April of last year, the al-Khalifa family, bowing to the reality of its dependency upon the Gulf monarchies, made permanent the deployment of Saudi troops in the kingdom, ostensibly to ward off threats from Iran. This was confirmed when Saudi troops withdrew in June, leaving behind a permanent contingent. With this military presence, and the precedent established last spring when Saudi troops rumbling across the King Fahd causeway, the situation has changed significantly. The al-Khalifa family now realizes—and the U.S. should realize—that the Saudi veto is now a decisive factor in the islands’ politics.
This is not to say that the monarchy is held hostage in terms of its current political course. They are certainly complicit in the arrangement, and hope to stifle substantive reform and strangle the protest movement. However, the growing shadow that Saudi Arabia casts over Bahrain has prompted concern that the beginnings of a Syria-Lebanon style relationship is starting to take form. When the military lever is combined with the already substantial economic and cultural levers Saudi Arabia holds via its subsidies and media companies, it is easy to see the foundations of this fear. Before the Saudi intervention, observers used to say that Bahrain depended upon Saudi Arabia and the U.S. for its continued survival. Now it might be said that Bahrain and its beleaguered monarchy are reliant solely upon Saudi Arabia.
Though Saudi Arabia has firmly entrenched itself as the political gatekeeper in Bahrain, it may not mean the situation is entirely immovable. The al-Saud family opposes equitable dialogue between the people and the monarchy, but pointedly not the reconciliation process itself. They support the process in form if not in substance as a way to try and tame the furor that is building on the street. The prospect of tensions boiling over into street violence and major confrontations is not an appealing scenario to the Saudis. It would come at a time when Saudi Arabia is just beginning to emerge from its protective cocoon and flex its muscles in the region, and when the specter of the ever present Iranian menace is looming larger than ever across the region. Instability and a political black eye from imposing another crackdown is not desirable.
As always, stability is the watchword of the royal family, an ethos which affords the dim, but nonetheless existing prospect of a political opening. Though Saudi Arabia will not go easily, it may be possible to convince them to accede and support reforms like the gradual integration of the Shiite workforce and the relaxation of discriminatory policies and legislation, such as the closing of Shiite mosques. This is a move that does not surrender much power and has precedent in Saudi Arabia's own limited efforts after the Shiite rebellions in the Eastern Province in the early 1980's. To push for further and more substantive reform such as on electoral or legislative topics would be far more difficult. It would require major pressure from Washington and a significant increase in the al-Saud's own impression of their security both at home and abroad.
So, while the U.S. raises its concern over the beating of Bahraini street activists like Mr. Rajab, it should remember that the process of reform in Bahrain begins in Riyadh, not Manama. Accomplishing anything of substance will require the United States to make a decision on whether it is ready to take some risks in its relationship with Saudi Arabia and its Gulf security doctrine.
Joshua Jacobs is a Gulf Policy Analyst at the Institute for Gulf Affairs.
on this article