The Saudi monarchs (with the exception of King Fahd--to a lesser degree) have considered Bahrain a threat to their autocratic rule for decades, though for deeper reasons than the fear of Bahrain becoming an Iranian colony. The latter is a theme the Saudi royals developed in recent years to turn their highly censored society against Iran and to draw its credulous Western allies into a war with Iran to rid the Saudi royals of their last regional, religious, and strategic rival.
Of all the Gulf States’ populations, the Bahraini people are the least socially conservative. They are religiously tolerant, politically open-minded, and accepting of ethnic, religious, and regional differences. They also happen to be only twelve miles from the oil-rich Saudi Eastern Province and its politically and socially nonconformist Saudi oil workers, who come from every corner of Saudi Arabia. Their unorthodox beliefs and practices are incongruous with the imposed Saudi way of thinking and living.
Because of Bahrain’s liberal social lifestyle and its proximity to the Saudi Eastern Province, the small island became a social sanctuary for many of the local Saudis, especially the oil industry employees. As a former employee of the oil industry, I remember vividly that most of us could not wait for the weekend to arrive so we could flee to Bahrain to enjoy movies, night clubs, and to mix with the opposite gender, freedoms denied us under the suffocating Saudi-Wahhabi religious and political arrangements.
The more we went to Bahrain, the more we resented our government, society, tradition, and even our religion which we were made to believe was responsible for our oppression and deprivation. We began to ask questions and compare our lifestyle with the Bahrainis. They are Muslims, they have mosques, they pray and read the Quran, at the same time they enjoy a social life that could get Saudis flogged and in some cases beheaded in public squares.
Furthermore, visiting Bahrain for some Saudis transcended the pleasure seeking adventures. During their frequent visits to Bahrain, anti-monarchy and anti-“oil men” (American oil companies) Saudis used their time to organize political and labor actions. Many of us were discontented with our wages and living conditions which we associated with the companies’ policy of cultural and racial condescension and discrimination against the natives. Representatives of Saudi oil employees met in Bahrain to discuss and finalize plans to carry out unprecedented strikes against the oil companies directly and the monarchy indirectly. The support for the strikes was overwhelming because the causes were shared by most Saudi employees.
The overworked and underpaid Saudi employees wanted higher salaries, transportation (buses), and air conditioning in their scorching cement barracks. They wanted comparable facilities awarded to expatriate oil workers. The strikes were massive, and the results were impressive, but they came at a high price. The strikers came from all segments and regions of Saudi Arabia. Regardless of regional background, race, or religious orientation, the planners and leaders of the strikes, as well as the strikers themselves, were united by common grievances. Consequently, their unity and extraordinary actions shook the foundations of the oil companies and the Saudi ruling family and their policies. King Saud authorized one of Saudi Arabia’s most anti-modern and ruthless officials, the governor of the Eastern Province, Abdul Aziz Bin Jlewi to crush the strikers, especially the instigators of the uprising.
The governor sent his religiously indoctrinated militia to beat and kill strikers with clear instructions to hunt down their leaders, specifically Nasser Mohammed Al-Saeed, Mohammed Ibn Namah, and Nasser or Mohammed Ibn Mammar. Some of the leaders were able to save their lives by fleeing to Bahrain and from there to Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq. Mind you, all of this happened in the 1950s at a time when the Saudi monarchy had brotherly Muslim relations with Iran under Emperor Mohammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, or the King of Kings. The Shah and his wife, Empress Suraya, were close friends of King Saud at that time.
After the strikes subsided, our travels to Bahrain were restricted and followed by Saudi spies to make sure no more plots were concocted. Since then, the Saudi monarchs have considered Bahrain a source of instability and its ruling Al-Khalifa family decadent because they allow for alcohol, movies, and a freer lifestyle.
The moral story of this account is that the residents (not all Shiites) of Eastern Saudi Arabia have been at the forefront in challenging the autocratic Al-Saud family and its repressive system. They are more secular, less nationalistic, and were once the most informed group in Saudi Arabia. This was mostly due to their interactions with oil workers from many countries and nationalities. Contrary to the statements of Saudi royals and their beneficiaries and defenders who accuse the Shiites of fomenting trouble, the leaders and strikers of 1950s were mostly Sunnis, not Shiites.
Despite intense pressure from Saudi monarchs and the religious establishment’s incitement against their Shiite citizens, the Saudi people today, regardless of region, ethnicity, or religious orientation, share comparable grievances as they did in the 1950s. They will figure out that the Saudi ruling family’s “divide and conquer” policy of turning Sunni citizens against their Shiite brothers and sisters is designed to prevent them from uniting against their common oppressor, the Saudi-Wahhabi establishment. Anyone who still thinks that the uprisings sweeping through the Arab World today will stop at the Saudi desert border is out of touch with reality and lacks the basic ability to read the magnified writing on Saudi palace walls.
The grievances that led to the uprising by the oil workers in the 1950s did not disappear; on the contrary, they multiplied, got bigger and more conspicuous. They also have spread to most parts of the country. More people have become educated; they have access to each other and to the rest of the world, thanks to modern technology. Furthermore, the majority of the Saudi population (men and women) are under the age of 30. Unlike their fathers and forefathers, they compare themselves with their rich compatriots, they question authority and more importantly, they compare themselves with their regional and global counterparts. They want freedom, good paying jobs, and liberation from a backward and stifling past from which they are disconnected, but forced to live by its rules.
Finally, the on and off demonstrations in Eastern Saudi Arabia as well as Bahrain are now conducted by the most oppressed and excluded, the Saudi Shia minority, and their grievances are shared by most Saudis, especially women and youth. Sadly, many of the Saudi and Bahraini Sunni liberals and human rights activists are shunning their compatriot Shia brothers and sisters because of the Saudi and Bahraini governments, its controlled media and religious extremists’ establishment’s depiction of the Shia as foreign agents. However, things seem to be changing. More Saudis, men and women, are beginning to realize that their compatriots in Eastern Saudi Arabia have a reason to rise up against their common oppressors, the ruling elites, their media and ruthless security apparatus.
It is in the West’s best interest to support the pro reform movement in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as it did in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. The Saudi autocratic royals cannot escape the Arab Uprising as the French foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, said in a response to a question at the Brookings Institute recently: the Arab regimes know that they have no future unless they share power with their people. It does not look like the Saudi royals, especially under the reign of the newly promoted religious extremists, Princess Naif and his brother Salman, are in mood to change the oppressive established order.
Dr. Ali Alyami is the Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, based in Washington, DC.
Of all the Gulf States’ populations, the Bahraini people are the least socially conservative. They are religiously tolerant, politically open-minded, and accepting of ethnic, religious, and regional differences. They also happen to be only twelve miles from the oil-rich Saudi Eastern Province and its politically and socially nonconformist Saudi oil workers, who come from every corner of Saudi Arabia. Their unorthodox beliefs and practices are incongruous with the imposed Saudi way of thinking and living.
Because of Bahrain’s liberal social lifestyle and its proximity to the Saudi Eastern Province, the small island became a social sanctuary for many of the local Saudis, especially the oil industry employees. As a former employee of the oil industry, I remember vividly that most of us could not wait for the weekend to arrive so we could flee to Bahrain to enjoy movies, night clubs, and to mix with the opposite gender, freedoms denied us under the suffocating Saudi-Wahhabi religious and political arrangements.
The more we went to Bahrain, the more we resented our government, society, tradition, and even our religion which we were made to believe was responsible for our oppression and deprivation. We began to ask questions and compare our lifestyle with the Bahrainis. They are Muslims, they have mosques, they pray and read the Quran, at the same time they enjoy a social life that could get Saudis flogged and in some cases beheaded in public squares.
Furthermore, visiting Bahrain for some Saudis transcended the pleasure seeking adventures. During their frequent visits to Bahrain, anti-monarchy and anti-“oil men” (American oil companies) Saudis used their time to organize political and labor actions. Many of us were discontented with our wages and living conditions which we associated with the companies’ policy of cultural and racial condescension and discrimination against the natives. Representatives of Saudi oil employees met in Bahrain to discuss and finalize plans to carry out unprecedented strikes against the oil companies directly and the monarchy indirectly. The support for the strikes was overwhelming because the causes were shared by most Saudi employees.
The overworked and underpaid Saudi employees wanted higher salaries, transportation (buses), and air conditioning in their scorching cement barracks. They wanted comparable facilities awarded to expatriate oil workers. The strikes were massive, and the results were impressive, but they came at a high price. The strikers came from all segments and regions of Saudi Arabia. Regardless of regional background, race, or religious orientation, the planners and leaders of the strikes, as well as the strikers themselves, were united by common grievances. Consequently, their unity and extraordinary actions shook the foundations of the oil companies and the Saudi ruling family and their policies. King Saud authorized one of Saudi Arabia’s most anti-modern and ruthless officials, the governor of the Eastern Province, Abdul Aziz Bin Jlewi to crush the strikers, especially the instigators of the uprising.
The governor sent his religiously indoctrinated militia to beat and kill strikers with clear instructions to hunt down their leaders, specifically Nasser Mohammed Al-Saeed, Mohammed Ibn Namah, and Nasser or Mohammed Ibn Mammar. Some of the leaders were able to save their lives by fleeing to Bahrain and from there to Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq. Mind you, all of this happened in the 1950s at a time when the Saudi monarchy had brotherly Muslim relations with Iran under Emperor Mohammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, or the King of Kings. The Shah and his wife, Empress Suraya, were close friends of King Saud at that time.
After the strikes subsided, our travels to Bahrain were restricted and followed by Saudi spies to make sure no more plots were concocted. Since then, the Saudi monarchs have considered Bahrain a source of instability and its ruling Al-Khalifa family decadent because they allow for alcohol, movies, and a freer lifestyle.
The moral story of this account is that the residents (not all Shiites) of Eastern Saudi Arabia have been at the forefront in challenging the autocratic Al-Saud family and its repressive system. They are more secular, less nationalistic, and were once the most informed group in Saudi Arabia. This was mostly due to their interactions with oil workers from many countries and nationalities. Contrary to the statements of Saudi royals and their beneficiaries and defenders who accuse the Shiites of fomenting trouble, the leaders and strikers of 1950s were mostly Sunnis, not Shiites.
Despite intense pressure from Saudi monarchs and the religious establishment’s incitement against their Shiite citizens, the Saudi people today, regardless of region, ethnicity, or religious orientation, share comparable grievances as they did in the 1950s. They will figure out that the Saudi ruling family’s “divide and conquer” policy of turning Sunni citizens against their Shiite brothers and sisters is designed to prevent them from uniting against their common oppressor, the Saudi-Wahhabi establishment. Anyone who still thinks that the uprisings sweeping through the Arab World today will stop at the Saudi desert border is out of touch with reality and lacks the basic ability to read the magnified writing on Saudi palace walls.
The grievances that led to the uprising by the oil workers in the 1950s did not disappear; on the contrary, they multiplied, got bigger and more conspicuous. They also have spread to most parts of the country. More people have become educated; they have access to each other and to the rest of the world, thanks to modern technology. Furthermore, the majority of the Saudi population (men and women) are under the age of 30. Unlike their fathers and forefathers, they compare themselves with their rich compatriots, they question authority and more importantly, they compare themselves with their regional and global counterparts. They want freedom, good paying jobs, and liberation from a backward and stifling past from which they are disconnected, but forced to live by its rules.
Finally, the on and off demonstrations in Eastern Saudi Arabia as well as Bahrain are now conducted by the most oppressed and excluded, the Saudi Shia minority, and their grievances are shared by most Saudis, especially women and youth. Sadly, many of the Saudi and Bahraini Sunni liberals and human rights activists are shunning their compatriot Shia brothers and sisters because of the Saudi and Bahraini governments, its controlled media and religious extremists’ establishment’s depiction of the Shia as foreign agents. However, things seem to be changing. More Saudis, men and women, are beginning to realize that their compatriots in Eastern Saudi Arabia have a reason to rise up against their common oppressors, the ruling elites, their media and ruthless security apparatus.
It is in the West’s best interest to support the pro reform movement in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain as it did in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen. The Saudi autocratic royals cannot escape the Arab Uprising as the French foreign Minister, Alain Juppe, said in a response to a question at the Brookings Institute recently: the Arab regimes know that they have no future unless they share power with their people. It does not look like the Saudi royals, especially under the reign of the newly promoted religious extremists, Princess Naif and his brother Salman, are in mood to change the oppressive established order.
Dr. Ali Alyami is the Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia, based in Washington, DC.
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