The information in the following report was gathered during a trip to the suburbs of Damascus, including Harasta, Saqba, Hamoriye, Misraba, and Douma, between January 12-26, 2012, before Syrian security forces arrested and deported the author on January 26th. Over one dozen Free Syrian Army (FSA) leaders were interviewed, as well as FSA armed members and activists affiliated with the media campaign arm of the uprising called “tensikiyat.”
On January 21st, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) generated enough support from the local people of Douma to retaliate against the Syrian regime forces and force them out. As of January 24th, the Damascus suburbs of Douma, Misraba, Hammuriye, Saqba and Erbin, all less than thirty minutes from central Damascus, were under FSA control. Checkpoints are manned by militias while the Syrian army is situated on the outskirts of Eastern Ghouta, the region in which all of these suburban cities lie.
Early this week, regime forces began an anticipated assault on these cities to try to regain their control. Thus far, they have taken back Harasta, the closest city to the heart of Damascus, and there are ongoing clashes between the FSA and regime forces in Douma, Saqba, Hamoriye and Misaraba. The FSA has since gained international recognition as a key opposition force in Syria, but still very little is known of its organization and composition.
FSA Organization
Having visited over half a dozen suburbs of Damascus and witnessing Free Syrian Army (FSA) branches in each, I have found that the Free Syrian Army branches operate independently, each with their own structure and tactics. According to FSA leaders and informed parties, only central Damascus is without such a force due to difficult conditions and the overwhelming security presence there. Each local chapter has unique characteristics: while cities like Homs, Hama and Zabadani have enough men and resources to face the regime forces, others such as Qaboun, Harasta, Hammuriyah and Saqba only serve to monitor the streets in the evenings to protect civilians during protests. Some of the FSA branches have set cameras on local roads in cities where they operate in order to receive information about the regime’s security forces’ movements.
Each branch intentionally operates independently of the others. In the present security climate, in which torture by regime forces is very much a reality, the golden rule is: the less one knows the better. Such independence makes it nearly impossible to name FSA members from other cities.
An inside source who provides logistical support for the FSA said that there are 20 main branches of FSA throughout the country and 450 subsidiary branches under them. In addition, there are thousands of affiliated safe houses, some of which I had the chance to see during my stay in Saqba and Douma. Though branches operate independently from one another, FSA leaders in four of five cities that I visited stated that they talk to Riad Al-Assad, the leader of FSA, every week on Skype.
Who is the FSA?
The Free Syrian Army was created to protect innocent civilians when protests began and Syrian security forces and irregular armed thugs, or ‘shabbiha,’ responded by attacking unarmed civilians. One leader explained that recruits swear on the holy Quran before being recruited that they will give up their guns once the revolution has succeeded. When individually asked, militias couldn’t confirm the swearing upon recruitment, but they said that they are expected to return their guns after the revolution is over.
The FSA is comprised of defected Syrian soldiers, youth from cities, as well as former gang members. Though unconfirmed, estimates of total FSA soldiers number between 30,000 to 50,000. Some FSA members still serve in the Syrian National Army and provide logistical support and intelligence for the FSA.
FSA leaders insist that there is no presence of Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) within their ranks and that this is simply propaganda spread by the regime. Though activists and people connected with the FSA admit that between 5-10% of the FSA could be comprised by Salafis or the MB, it is currently impossible to confirm. On the other hand, other Syrian opposition activists insist that there is not a single MB member left in the country since they were dispelled years ago. My own informal polling suggested that, given Syria’s Sunni majority, if the MB were to participate in the first election in a post-Assad period, it would earn a considerable percentage of the vote.
Relations with the Broader Opposition and the Arab League
Local FSA leaders do not hide their frustration with the National Syrian Council (NSC). I was told repeatedly that the NSC is too far removed from the streets. The FSA branches I met with have no direct communication with the NSC and they appear to have no interest in future communication. The consensus within the FSA is that a “No Fly Zone” or a “Buffer Zone” is necessary. Disagreement within the NSC on this point is reflective of the division within Syria, but it is slowing down FSA efforts. FSA leaders have said that they are “running out of patience” waiting for the NSC to catch up. One leader noted that the time was coming soon when the FSA might denounce them (NSC) altogether and “put them in the same category with Assad.”
Similarly, both the FSA and activists on the ground are dissatisfied with Arab League monitors and their mission. They criticize the mission, saying that it has failed to go to the cities under siege and its monitors have not spoken to the true victims of torture. FSA sources insist that he Arab League has been manipulated by security forces, who have gone so far as to change road signs to misguide the mission.
Artillery and Supply
The FSA has two primary sources for weapons according to internal sources: First, the personal cache of defected soldiers, and second, mercenaries from within the Syrian regime’s security forces. FSA leaders claim that they are unaware of weapons provided by foreign governments, but Syrian expats in Qatar, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia send money to bolster resources. Among the weapons I surveyed were Kalashnikovs, Uzis, and Belgian-made hand guns. A spike in the cost of Kalashnikovs and bullets since the revolution began has meant that local FSAs are in constant search for money to supply ammunition.
FSA leaders reject the assertion that there are foreign fighters within the country, though they don’t hide their disappointment with the lack of financial or material support provided by foreign governments.
The FSA and a Post-Assad Period
FSA leaders are aware of the tenuous situation at hand with the Alawite population and other minority groups within Syria. They admit that the fear of recriminations makes it far more difficult for Alawites and residents of Damascus to participate in protests. Given that many Alawites see their survival as linked to that of the regime, support for Assad continues. The opposition has made clear that all Syrians will have a place in the post-Assad period; however, those who actively supported the regime’s brutality against Syrians will be punished accordingly. The FSA maintain that they are not after any minorities within Syria and they want to maintain amicable relations with them.
While the FSA plans for a post-Assad period, the recent brutal offensive taken by the regime makes it difficult to foresee such a reality. Without the active support of foreign governments, it would appear that the Assad regime will continue to use all of its resources to crack down on the rebel forces.
Ilhan Tanir is the Washington correspondent for Turkish daily Vatan and a columnist for Hurriyet Daily News.
On January 21st, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) generated enough support from the local people of Douma to retaliate against the Syrian regime forces and force them out. As of January 24th, the Damascus suburbs of Douma, Misraba, Hammuriye, Saqba and Erbin, all less than thirty minutes from central Damascus, were under FSA control. Checkpoints are manned by militias while the Syrian army is situated on the outskirts of Eastern Ghouta, the region in which all of these suburban cities lie.
Early this week, regime forces began an anticipated assault on these cities to try to regain their control. Thus far, they have taken back Harasta, the closest city to the heart of Damascus, and there are ongoing clashes between the FSA and regime forces in Douma, Saqba, Hamoriye and Misaraba. The FSA has since gained international recognition as a key opposition force in Syria, but still very little is known of its organization and composition.
FSA Organization
Having visited over half a dozen suburbs of Damascus and witnessing Free Syrian Army (FSA) branches in each, I have found that the Free Syrian Army branches operate independently, each with their own structure and tactics. According to FSA leaders and informed parties, only central Damascus is without such a force due to difficult conditions and the overwhelming security presence there. Each local chapter has unique characteristics: while cities like Homs, Hama and Zabadani have enough men and resources to face the regime forces, others such as Qaboun, Harasta, Hammuriyah and Saqba only serve to monitor the streets in the evenings to protect civilians during protests. Some of the FSA branches have set cameras on local roads in cities where they operate in order to receive information about the regime’s security forces’ movements.
Each branch intentionally operates independently of the others. In the present security climate, in which torture by regime forces is very much a reality, the golden rule is: the less one knows the better. Such independence makes it nearly impossible to name FSA members from other cities.
An inside source who provides logistical support for the FSA said that there are 20 main branches of FSA throughout the country and 450 subsidiary branches under them. In addition, there are thousands of affiliated safe houses, some of which I had the chance to see during my stay in Saqba and Douma. Though branches operate independently from one another, FSA leaders in four of five cities that I visited stated that they talk to Riad Al-Assad, the leader of FSA, every week on Skype.
Who is the FSA?
The Free Syrian Army was created to protect innocent civilians when protests began and Syrian security forces and irregular armed thugs, or ‘shabbiha,’ responded by attacking unarmed civilians. One leader explained that recruits swear on the holy Quran before being recruited that they will give up their guns once the revolution has succeeded. When individually asked, militias couldn’t confirm the swearing upon recruitment, but they said that they are expected to return their guns after the revolution is over.
The FSA is comprised of defected Syrian soldiers, youth from cities, as well as former gang members. Though unconfirmed, estimates of total FSA soldiers number between 30,000 to 50,000. Some FSA members still serve in the Syrian National Army and provide logistical support and intelligence for the FSA.
FSA leaders insist that there is no presence of Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) within their ranks and that this is simply propaganda spread by the regime. Though activists and people connected with the FSA admit that between 5-10% of the FSA could be comprised by Salafis or the MB, it is currently impossible to confirm. On the other hand, other Syrian opposition activists insist that there is not a single MB member left in the country since they were dispelled years ago. My own informal polling suggested that, given Syria’s Sunni majority, if the MB were to participate in the first election in a post-Assad period, it would earn a considerable percentage of the vote.
Relations with the Broader Opposition and the Arab League
Local FSA leaders do not hide their frustration with the National Syrian Council (NSC). I was told repeatedly that the NSC is too far removed from the streets. The FSA branches I met with have no direct communication with the NSC and they appear to have no interest in future communication. The consensus within the FSA is that a “No Fly Zone” or a “Buffer Zone” is necessary. Disagreement within the NSC on this point is reflective of the division within Syria, but it is slowing down FSA efforts. FSA leaders have said that they are “running out of patience” waiting for the NSC to catch up. One leader noted that the time was coming soon when the FSA might denounce them (NSC) altogether and “put them in the same category with Assad.”
Similarly, both the FSA and activists on the ground are dissatisfied with Arab League monitors and their mission. They criticize the mission, saying that it has failed to go to the cities under siege and its monitors have not spoken to the true victims of torture. FSA sources insist that he Arab League has been manipulated by security forces, who have gone so far as to change road signs to misguide the mission.
Artillery and Supply
The FSA has two primary sources for weapons according to internal sources: First, the personal cache of defected soldiers, and second, mercenaries from within the Syrian regime’s security forces. FSA leaders claim that they are unaware of weapons provided by foreign governments, but Syrian expats in Qatar, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia send money to bolster resources. Among the weapons I surveyed were Kalashnikovs, Uzis, and Belgian-made hand guns. A spike in the cost of Kalashnikovs and bullets since the revolution began has meant that local FSAs are in constant search for money to supply ammunition.
FSA leaders reject the assertion that there are foreign fighters within the country, though they don’t hide their disappointment with the lack of financial or material support provided by foreign governments.
The FSA and a Post-Assad Period
FSA leaders are aware of the tenuous situation at hand with the Alawite population and other minority groups within Syria. They admit that the fear of recriminations makes it far more difficult for Alawites and residents of Damascus to participate in protests. Given that many Alawites see their survival as linked to that of the regime, support for Assad continues. The opposition has made clear that all Syrians will have a place in the post-Assad period; however, those who actively supported the regime’s brutality against Syrians will be punished accordingly. The FSA maintain that they are not after any minorities within Syria and they want to maintain amicable relations with them.
While the FSA plans for a post-Assad period, the recent brutal offensive taken by the regime makes it difficult to foresee such a reality. Without the active support of foreign governments, it would appear that the Assad regime will continue to use all of its resources to crack down on the rebel forces.
Ilhan Tanir is the Washington correspondent for Turkish daily Vatan and a columnist for Hurriyet Daily News.
Ilhan’s very interesting eyewitness account of the Free Syrian Army raises a tough question: If the FSA really has wide popular support and several tens of thousands of men under arms, as it claims, then why is it so urgently in quest of outside intervention and support?
I believe the answer it twofold: First, the FSA in reality has nowhere near that number of fighters in the field, at least not yet. I can only guess what the real number might be, but I think perhaps at most 10,000 is a more realistic estimate. And second, equally important and even more urgent: Since the withdrawal of the Arab League monitors, especially following the Russian-Chinese UN Security Council veto last week, the Assad regime has let loose its heavy weapons, including field artillery, against Syrian civilian neighborhoods, in a way that the FSA is simply not capable of countering.
For both of these reasons, the FSA as currently configured has almost no chance of defeating Assad’s forces – and likely has little chance of withstanding their newly determined and indiscriminate onslaught — without outside support of some kind. Without such support, the odds are unfortunately very high that the Assad regime will be the party that ultimately prevails, mostly by sheer brute force. Mass peaceful protests, even if they continue in the face of this ferocious repression, will almost certainly not budge a regime willing and able to mow down thousands of its own citizens. Conferences, resolutions, more sanctions, and even more, better equipped, and more determined, monitors will not staunch the bleeding.
That tragic conclusion leads to an immediate imperative. The international community, with or without Russian or Chinese support, should find new ways to help protect the Syrian people. In practice, that could mean protected humanitarian corridors or enclaves, possibly including Idlib, Homs, Hama, Zabadani, and Deraa. It could mean credible warnings to Damascus to stop using heavy weapons (artillery, tanks, anti-aircraft guns) against its own people, and to refrain from any air attacks or use of chemical weapons, or else face the prospect of no-fly or no-drive zones imposed by outside powers. Along with such steps, the simplest, most effective, and least risky humanitarian option is to support the FSA and its mandate to protect the Syrian population.
That support should include recognition, equipment, training, funding, sanctuary, and defensive weapons. External support should strive to improve political coordination with the Syrian National Council and internal opposition groups, and to improve tactical coordination among disparate FSA elements and other civilian self-defense organizations. The material dimension of this outside support could be provided either publicly or quietly, via Turkey or via some of Syria’s Arab neighbors, with or without formal Arab League endorsement.
But even before those details are figured out, the moral dimension of explicit U.S. and other international support for the Syrian opposition is essential. And we should not fool ourselves any longer: if that moral support is not matched by material support, the Syrian opposition, representing most of the Syrian people, will almost certainly be mercilessly crushed as we watch from afar.
David Pollock is the director of Fikra Forum and the Kaufman fellow at the Washington Institute, focusing on the political dynamics of Middle Eastern countries.
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) is an interesting product of the relentless Sunni majority opposition. Ilhan Tanir gives us a realistic and somewhat troubling portrayal of this organization. It’s very establishment is closely related to the failure of the initial strategy of the regime in dealing with the protests. Assad and his cronies believed that Majazarat Hammah in 1982 achieved the desired effect of creating a barrier of fear that will deter the Sunni population from ever revolting again.
Therefore, the regime opted for a quick and brutal crackdown in March 2011, hoping to restore this sense of fear. They failed against a determined population, and as the protest continued and gathered momentum, a growing number of Sunni soldiers and officers realized the need to defend their own people against ‘’their national army,’’ a body that has never been, under this regime, a real national army, rather a force intended to maintain sectarian domination in power.
A lot of credit goes to those brave defectors who established the FSA, but Ilhan Tanir
tells us a story that is a reflection of what could be crucial difficulties to any government that will succeed the dictatorship. It is not clear if the FSA has any coherent political plan. The coordination between the FSA and the Syrian National Council (SNC) is virtually non-existent and the FSA’s organization (or lack thereof) indicates the possibility that the breakdown of the regime will give way to old scores left to be settled on a grandiose scale. This scenario is not dissimilar to Iraq after the downfall of the Saddam dictatorship, Lebanon during Harb Al-Sanatayin [1975-6], and Libya nowadays.
Tanir quotes local leaders of the FSA who are aware of these and other dangers lying ahead. Surely, they mean what they say, when promising to disarm upon the final departure of the regime and refrain from sectarian revenge. Easier said than done…
The FSA represents a challenge to the U.S., Turkey, and Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and others. They are on the ground, their ranks are swelling, their courage is tested, but they need arms, training, money and a coherent political platform.
Turkey can play a major role by creating ‘’buffer zones’’ in Northwest and Northeast Syria. Turkey, as well as the U.S. and Arab countries, should summon the leaders of the FSA and those of the SNC in order to establish a united civilian and military front. Arms supplies to the FSA will not create a force comparable to that of the Syrian National Army, or what is left of it, but they could greatly restrict the freedom of action of the regime forces.
Time is working against the Assad regime; therefore all support that could enable the FSA to continue and intensify its operations, alongside the continuing popular resistance, will help shorten the days of the dictatorship and save the lives of many innocent Syrians.
Dr. Josef Olmert is an adjunct professor at the University of South Carolina and former director of Israel’s Government Press Office and advisor to former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) was initially created because Syrian soldiers and officers began to defect from the Syrian national army once they realized that the demonstrators were not the “armed gangs” the regime claimed they were. They decided to defend the civilians and their demands for a new regime that abides by the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people. The role of the FSA (and the “Free officers” of the late Hussein Harmoush) is thus explicitly to defend demonstrators and civilians.
Therefore, discussing the armament of the FSA is dangerous. It is evident that providing weapons to the FSA would give the Syrian opposition a new strength, but increased weapons could transform these defensive groups into militias. It would allow the FSA to attack strategic positions of the regime’s military and security forces, possibly increasing the likelihood of the fall of the regime. The regime has proven its immorality. We are currently witnessing the regime’s antics in Homs (Bab’Amr, Inshaat, Rastan, etc.), where, despite the heavy civilian presence in those neighborhoods, the regime is bombing the area for the sole objective of putting an end to the armed opposition. Sadly, arming the FSA would imply more casualties among civilians.
The best way to help the FSA accomplish its mission of civilian protection is to help them organize and coordinate themselves. First, direct aid should only consist of providing telecommunication tools (satellite phones are essential in order to stay in the “shadow”). Second, the creation of a safe zone should be seriously considered. Obviously, the Turkish border seems to be the best place to create it. Even if we are still far from this option, it would allow civilians and FSA members to gather and organize, with the Syrian National Council (SNC).
It is important, however, not to create a Benghazi-like scenario. The area along the Turkish border should be a clearly designated humanitarian safe zone. This would allow for political and diplomatic solutions to be implemented, with less fear for civilian casualties. Moreover, such an area (though realistically it seems quite difficult to implement such thing at the moment) would allow the SNC to operate on Syrian grounds, putting an end to the regime’s claim of a “foreign opposition.” It would also accelerate Assad’s isolation. Russia will inevitably let its grip on Assad go if it sees that Syria is becoming both a ruined and falling state. But for this to happen, the SNC should continue to have relations with Russians officials.
As Homs is being bombed, the FSA is potentially losing manpower. The Aleppo bombing illustrates what might happen in coming weeks. No one wants to see another Iraq scenario with daily bombings. In order to avoid further escalation, which would be disastrous for civilians, the SNC should pursue its efforts in coordinating with the FSA. The opposition’s political arm must be united with its military arm. The contrary would be disastrous and could provoke decades of instability in Syria (mix Libya and Iraq and you have an idea of what could happen).
Franz Glasman is a masters candidate at the Sorbonne in Paris, specializing in Syria and the role of businessmen in the reform process and the political status quo.