A Recent History of U.S.-Lebanon Relations
U.S.-Lebanon relations have encountered a series of setbacks over the years due to Washington’s direct involvement in the Lebanese crisis in the early eighties, with military intervention in the multinational forces until the nineties, and then the regression of the Lebanese case to a very low level priority in the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. However, the Cedar Revolution of 2005 and the subsequent U.S. support for the March 14 Alliance reversed the momentum of bilateral relations and opened the door to great challenges and opportunities.
Following a number of developments on both the Syrian and Lebanese fronts—starting with the handover of power to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad through the withdrawal of the Israeli military from southern Lebanon in 2000 to the growing power of Hizballah and their refusal to hand over weapons under the oversight of the Syrian regime—Washington had to adjust how it handled each of these issues to a great extent.
However, after the events of September 11, 2001, the rise of terrorism became a major factor affecting U.S. policy towards the Middle East. No longer could decision makers in Washington ignore the repressive practices in Arab countries and overlook the aspirations of the people for freedom. On the contrary, support for democracy and freedom in countries that could form successful models, such as Lebanon, became an integral part of the new strategy adopted during the term of President George W. Bush. New parliamentary election slogans addressed the fight against extremism and the protection of fundamental freedoms and the rights of minorities.
Despite Lebanon’s lack of oil and the loss of its historic role as a trade intermediary between the West and the countries of the Persian Gulf, the Cedar Country has become a priority to Washington and has regained its importance in the international arena, especially after the Cedar Revolution accomplished the mission of the Syrian army’s withdrawal in 2005. Thus, Lebanon became regarded as one of the models of a successful democracy in an Arab country, which can be followed to improve and build new systems.
The approach taken by the administration of President George W. Bush towards Lebanon was different from previous administrations. Instead of using a military solution and getting involved in a costly dispute, Washington chose to work through the UN and other powers such as France and the European Union to help Lebanon restore its sovereignty through the Security Council’s series of international resolutions.
Nevertheless, the success of pro-independence forces to achieve the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon and the achievement of the parliamentary election to form a government in 2005 did not deter Hizballah from luring its political opponents to tug ropes internally. In various stages, Hizballah has also used its military power to turn the political equation in their favor, as occurred in 2008 when they overtook Beirut and imposed upon the government to withdraw their decisions in regards to the removal of the Hizballah network. This happened before the Doha Conference in which they successfully sought to secure their participation in the government on the basis of having a blocked third of the votes. Hizballah also succeeded in the downfall of Prime Minister Hariri’s government in the last term and in the formation of a majority government with the March 8 Alliance chaired by MP Najib Mikati.
Lebanon and the Arab Uprisings
Moreover, the outbreak of popular revolts in Arab countries and the loss of Iranian support of the Arab street led to the re-arrangement of the situation in favor of pro-independence forces in Lebanon, involving all parties in the Lebanese arena which were not formerly included. There is no doubt that today the calculations of Hizballah are more accurate and complex. Their use of excessive force to reach their goals could backfire against them due to the draining effect of the Syrian regime and the influence on the internal balance of power in Lebanon.
On the other hand, the Syrian crisis has formed a basic turning point in favor of the March 14 Alliance, which has eloquently expressed their apprehensions of the open-door policy pursued by Washington towards the Syrian regime and the invitation of President Assad to the Annapolis Peace Conference in late 2007. This put the U.S. commitment to Lebanon in doubt and memories returned of the limitations of Washington’s role in the Lebanese arena.
However, the inability of the Assad regime to curb the rebels and attain the consensus of the international community, except for Russia and China, urged the March 14 Alliance to raise their expectations and bet on the success of the Syrian revolution, though security in Lebanon is deteriorating and the international community has failed to adopt a more stringent policy toward Assad.
The first reflection of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon emerged in the city of Tripoli between the Alawite and Sunni communities when protests in support of the Syrian rebels turned into clashes between the two factions. This was followed by a series of violations of Syrian troops on the Lebanese border, killing a number of citizens, the last of whom was a photographer, Ali Shaaban, for Al Jadid Channel.
While observers believe that Lebanon might pay a price if the crisis in Syria turns into an internal sectarian war, Mikati's government depends on the so-called “dissociation policy” in order to protect the country against the repercussions of the crisis in Syria and the preservation of internal peace and stability. While the aim of this policy is to avoid taking any political stance on the overall developments in Syria, it is clear from practice that Hizballah will likely succeed in driving the government to depart from the Arab consensus and to non-commitment with the Arab League resolutions in regards to developments in Syria, especially since the Lebanese Foreign Minister from the March 8 Alliance publicly supports the Syrian regime.
U.S. Policy Reactions
Despite doubts about Washington's capability to override the effects of the dominance of March 8 forces on resolutions in Lebanon, the experience of the past year reveals the tools possessed by Washington to exert pressure on the government and force it to meet Lebanon’s financial and political commitments toward the international community. Washington is still unable to direct the Lebanese government to distribute their armed forces on the Syrian border to deter the Syrian regime and its allies from the abduction of Syrian opposition in Lebanon and to stop violations of the Syrian military on the borders with Lebanon. Thus, Washington must reveal its efforts in monitoring the financial channels of Hizballah and in controlling the banking system, pressuring the Lebanese government to hinder Hizballah’s influence on political decisions.
The U.S. Treasury’s detection that the Lebanese-Canadian Bank is conducting money laundering operations for Hizballah increased the pressure on Lebanese Banks—obliging them to address this issue immediately and to finance the International Tribunal—was received as a message of goodwill from the international community. Also, the visit of Deputy Secretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David Cohen, to Lebanon in the last period was received similarly, sending messages to those concerned about their international obligations to adjust the banking system accordingly to prevent Iran and Syria from escaping the financial sanctions imposed on them.
The United States remains steadfast in its position toward Lebanon and has recently expressed its concern over the failure of the Lebanese government to respect the rights of Syrian refugees in Lebanese territories, and the failure to protect dissidents. However, there are fears that the noticeably deteriorating security situation reflects the two teams’ inability to reconcile conflicting interests. Therefore, it will be difficult to ask the government to fulfill the requirements and demands of the international community without bearing the consequences of the use of weapons by the March 8 Alliance.
Rudy Sassine is an independent journalist and researcher at Lebanese for Economy and Development.
U.S.-Lebanon relations have encountered a series of setbacks over the years due to Washington’s direct involvement in the Lebanese crisis in the early eighties, with military intervention in the multinational forces until the nineties, and then the regression of the Lebanese case to a very low level priority in the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations. However, the Cedar Revolution of 2005 and the subsequent U.S. support for the March 14 Alliance reversed the momentum of bilateral relations and opened the door to great challenges and opportunities.
Following a number of developments on both the Syrian and Lebanese fronts—starting with the handover of power to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad through the withdrawal of the Israeli military from southern Lebanon in 2000 to the growing power of Hizballah and their refusal to hand over weapons under the oversight of the Syrian regime—Washington had to adjust how it handled each of these issues to a great extent.
However, after the events of September 11, 2001, the rise of terrorism became a major factor affecting U.S. policy towards the Middle East. No longer could decision makers in Washington ignore the repressive practices in Arab countries and overlook the aspirations of the people for freedom. On the contrary, support for democracy and freedom in countries that could form successful models, such as Lebanon, became an integral part of the new strategy adopted during the term of President George W. Bush. New parliamentary election slogans addressed the fight against extremism and the protection of fundamental freedoms and the rights of minorities.
Despite Lebanon’s lack of oil and the loss of its historic role as a trade intermediary between the West and the countries of the Persian Gulf, the Cedar Country has become a priority to Washington and has regained its importance in the international arena, especially after the Cedar Revolution accomplished the mission of the Syrian army’s withdrawal in 2005. Thus, Lebanon became regarded as one of the models of a successful democracy in an Arab country, which can be followed to improve and build new systems.
The approach taken by the administration of President George W. Bush towards Lebanon was different from previous administrations. Instead of using a military solution and getting involved in a costly dispute, Washington chose to work through the UN and other powers such as France and the European Union to help Lebanon restore its sovereignty through the Security Council’s series of international resolutions.
Nevertheless, the success of pro-independence forces to achieve the withdrawal of the Syrian army from Lebanon and the achievement of the parliamentary election to form a government in 2005 did not deter Hizballah from luring its political opponents to tug ropes internally. In various stages, Hizballah has also used its military power to turn the political equation in their favor, as occurred in 2008 when they overtook Beirut and imposed upon the government to withdraw their decisions in regards to the removal of the Hizballah network. This happened before the Doha Conference in which they successfully sought to secure their participation in the government on the basis of having a blocked third of the votes. Hizballah also succeeded in the downfall of Prime Minister Hariri’s government in the last term and in the formation of a majority government with the March 8 Alliance chaired by MP Najib Mikati.
Lebanon and the Arab Uprisings
Moreover, the outbreak of popular revolts in Arab countries and the loss of Iranian support of the Arab street led to the re-arrangement of the situation in favor of pro-independence forces in Lebanon, involving all parties in the Lebanese arena which were not formerly included. There is no doubt that today the calculations of Hizballah are more accurate and complex. Their use of excessive force to reach their goals could backfire against them due to the draining effect of the Syrian regime and the influence on the internal balance of power in Lebanon.
On the other hand, the Syrian crisis has formed a basic turning point in favor of the March 14 Alliance, which has eloquently expressed their apprehensions of the open-door policy pursued by Washington towards the Syrian regime and the invitation of President Assad to the Annapolis Peace Conference in late 2007. This put the U.S. commitment to Lebanon in doubt and memories returned of the limitations of Washington’s role in the Lebanese arena.
However, the inability of the Assad regime to curb the rebels and attain the consensus of the international community, except for Russia and China, urged the March 14 Alliance to raise their expectations and bet on the success of the Syrian revolution, though security in Lebanon is deteriorating and the international community has failed to adopt a more stringent policy toward Assad.
The first reflection of the Syrian crisis in Lebanon emerged in the city of Tripoli between the Alawite and Sunni communities when protests in support of the Syrian rebels turned into clashes between the two factions. This was followed by a series of violations of Syrian troops on the Lebanese border, killing a number of citizens, the last of whom was a photographer, Ali Shaaban, for Al Jadid Channel.
While observers believe that Lebanon might pay a price if the crisis in Syria turns into an internal sectarian war, Mikati's government depends on the so-called “dissociation policy” in order to protect the country against the repercussions of the crisis in Syria and the preservation of internal peace and stability. While the aim of this policy is to avoid taking any political stance on the overall developments in Syria, it is clear from practice that Hizballah will likely succeed in driving the government to depart from the Arab consensus and to non-commitment with the Arab League resolutions in regards to developments in Syria, especially since the Lebanese Foreign Minister from the March 8 Alliance publicly supports the Syrian regime.
U.S. Policy Reactions
Despite doubts about Washington's capability to override the effects of the dominance of March 8 forces on resolutions in Lebanon, the experience of the past year reveals the tools possessed by Washington to exert pressure on the government and force it to meet Lebanon’s financial and political commitments toward the international community. Washington is still unable to direct the Lebanese government to distribute their armed forces on the Syrian border to deter the Syrian regime and its allies from the abduction of Syrian opposition in Lebanon and to stop violations of the Syrian military on the borders with Lebanon. Thus, Washington must reveal its efforts in monitoring the financial channels of Hizballah and in controlling the banking system, pressuring the Lebanese government to hinder Hizballah’s influence on political decisions.
The U.S. Treasury’s detection that the Lebanese-Canadian Bank is conducting money laundering operations for Hizballah increased the pressure on Lebanese Banks—obliging them to address this issue immediately and to finance the International Tribunal—was received as a message of goodwill from the international community. Also, the visit of Deputy Secretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David Cohen, to Lebanon in the last period was received similarly, sending messages to those concerned about their international obligations to adjust the banking system accordingly to prevent Iran and Syria from escaping the financial sanctions imposed on them.
The United States remains steadfast in its position toward Lebanon and has recently expressed its concern over the failure of the Lebanese government to respect the rights of Syrian refugees in Lebanese territories, and the failure to protect dissidents. However, there are fears that the noticeably deteriorating security situation reflects the two teams’ inability to reconcile conflicting interests. Therefore, it will be difficult to ask the government to fulfill the requirements and demands of the international community without bearing the consequences of the use of weapons by the March 8 Alliance.
Rudy Sassine is an independent journalist and researcher at Lebanese for Economy and Development.
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