Recent events in Lebanon have reinforced a widespread belief that civil war is imminent. As the uprising in Syria has spilled over to the northern Lebanese city of Tripoli, with clashes erupting between Alawites and Sunnis, and a number of Salafist factions turning increasingly belligerent after the arrest of one of their militant members by general security agents, some have begun to wonder how long Beirut will remain immune to the kind of sectarian conflagrations that will pit Sunnis against Shiites and plunge much of the country into mayhem.

There is no doubt that the answer lies in a number of interrelated domestic and regional factors. Key factors determining the course of events in Lebanon are Hizballah’s alignments with the Assad regime’s interests in addition to its domestic electoral calculations in anticipation of Lebanon’s 2013 parliamentary elections.

Despite tremendous efforts undertaken by the government to restore a measure of stability following the eruption of widespread violence in Tripoli, the controversial killing on Sunday of a Salafist-oriented, anti-Assad sheikh by members of the Lebanese army at a northern checkpoint sparked yet another wave of Sunni outrage throughout the country. Zealots have been expressing their anger by blocking Lebanon’s main highways and burning tires, which has proven to be tremendously disturbing to many Lebanese, whose esteem for the Lebanese army remains unwavering.

Surprised by the turn of events, pundits from across the political spectrum rushed to provide analysis. While they disagreed on many aspects of the crisis, providing differing and even contradictory accounts, their common talking point was that Hariri has been overwhelmingly overshadowed and shamefully outmaneuvered by a rising and increasingly belligerent Salafist movement in Lebanon.

This being said, the question for the March 14th Coalition is not whether Hizballah has intentionally maneuvered to provoke the ire of Salafists in the north, and not whether Hizballah will once again revert to this tactic, but rather, how will Hariri challenge the influence of the Islamists without driving his large electoral base to radicalization, while at the same time maintaining his moderate Sunni image in the eyes of his Christian allies.

This recent spate of violence in Lebanon, despite not transforming into a Shiite-Sunni sectarian clash, has called into question the aspirations of the Sunni community. Already, prominent MPs within the Hariri block have voiced sharp criticism against the army, while a delegation of Sunni clerics in Akkar went so far as to threaten the formation of a Free Lebanese Army. On the other hand, Hariri has been the subject of outbidding by Salafists in the north, who are rumored to have flaunted in their private parlors the idea of creating the “northern suburb” as opposed to Hizballah’s “southern suburb,” and to turn this suburb into a buffer zone for the Free Syrian Army. While this is all fantasy, it raises eyebrows and makes one wonder how far Islamists in Lebanon are ready to go with their sense of frustration.

Back in 2005, in the wake of Syria’s pullout from Lebanon and Hizballah’s reluctance to surrender its arms, Hariri wrongly believed that by keeping the Islamists under his control, he could use them as a counterweight to Hizballah. To do this, he embraced diverse factions of Islamic movements, linking them to his extensive patronage network of social service in exchange for their political loyalty. Most importantly, however, his efforts at keeping them under his wing ensured that no faction in his community could challenge his “Sunni legitimacy” in the long term, and therefore created the conditions for a near- solidarity of the Sunnis in Lebanon.

Yet, Hariri’s gambit backfired and he soon found himself incapable of coping with dire challenges emanating from his social and religious environment. Syria played its traditional role of sponsoring splinter groups with an extremist bent in order to prod them against the March 14th governments at critical junctures. But, to the astonishment of many in Lebanon, those same members sponsored by Hariri proved to be of violent predisposition. In February 2006, for instance, hundreds of them went on a wild rampage in the Christian neighborhood of Achrafiah during their demonstration against the Danish Cartoon depicting the prophet Muhammad, before being arrested by the Lebanese army. Today, with many of them languishing in prison without trial, the already existing climate of dispossession and grievance in which they live is being further exacerbated.

Speaking on television yesterday about the kidnapping of a number of Lebanese Shiite pilgrims by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Syria [though the FSA has denied all allegations], Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah urged his followers not to take to the street to voice their frustration. His appeal, well heeded by much of his beloved and disciplined community, raised questions about whether Hizballah is honest in its plea not to resort to the street to reach its political goals. Admittedly, Hizballah’s willingness to provoke a sectarian clash isn’t a completely distant possibility. However, doing so now will only precipitate the breakdown of the government it so tirelessly put in place.

Instead, Hizballah’s new strategy is to create conditions that allow Hariri to embroil in a costly and uncertain conflict with Islamic factions. In the run-up to the critical 2013 elections, this gambit will also help turn public opinion, especially among the Christians, against the Future Movement. Hizballah would have then killed two birds with one stone.

Despite unconfirmed information that Hizballah was behind the abduction of the militant Salafist, this does not bode well for March 14th whose unconvincing narrative of Hizballah‘s deceitful tactics will not help them attract lost hearts and minds.

Rudy Sassine is an independent journalist and researcher at Lebanese for Economy and Development.