As violent attacks erupted in the town of Sidi Bouzid, the cradle of the Tunisian uprising, targeting bars and liquor stores, Islamist Justice Minister, Noureddine Bhiri, was quick to warn the puritan Salafists that they would be punished if they continue their violence. His colleague at the interior ministry, Mr. Ali Larayedh, followed suit: “Those who think that sovereign institutions such as police barracks can be attacked with impunity should know that in such cases the law authorizes the use of live rounds.” The Salafists remained undeterred.
In the Northwest, Salafists, armed with clubs and swords, continued on their rampage, burning down liquor stores and attacking police stations with Molotov cocktails. Then, on June 11, in the capital city, furious Salafists slashed several paintings that they found defamatory in a gallery situated in the northern suburb of La Marsa. Riots expanded afterwards, targeting courthouses and offices of secular parties, which led the authorities to declare an overnight curfew in some places.
Moderate Tunisians expressed deep concern about the violence. Some worried about the fate of the arts and freedom of expression in the country. The question remained, however, why were the ruling Islamists so hesitant to confront the Salafists? There are three possible explanations: (1) the two movements were so intermingled that on many issues the difference between them is hard to discern, (2) Islamists may perceive some gains from Salafist violence, and (3) with their newly acquired legal status, the ultraconservatives are already an eligible party to future elections, i.e., a potential partner that Ennahdha may want to get on board rather than confront with the use of force.
On the first issue, one should notice that the word “Salafists” means simply “the forefathers,” i.e., a willingness to return to the sources of Islam during the time of the prophet and his early companions.
Small wonder that Ennahdha’s founder, Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, was on the record saying he used to be a Salafist himself, and he attended the Salafist Islah Front Party's inaugural congress. Similarly, Sadok Shourou, a prominent MP, called at the Constituent Assembly last January for the application of harsh Islamic punishments against civilian protesters, including “killing” and “hand cuts,” calls that do not differ from the most extreme Salafist positions.
Indeed, as extreme as they may seem, these views are shared by many in the organization’s membership base, especially members who became radicalized because of long repression and imprisonment under the previous regime, and who, unlike their leadership, did not have the opportunity of a long exile in Europe and the exposure to tolerance and openness that comes with it.
More importantly, Ennahdha seems to benefit from Salafist violence. In the aftermath of the screening of the film “Persepolis” by Nessma, a private TV channel, just before last October elections, Ennahdha condemned the movie as blasphemous, and it seized the opportunity of the Salafist violence to turn “the Tunisian identity” into an electoral issue, thereby securing the Salafists’ support for its candidates at the elections and improving its status among the people.
Nowadays, Salafists are getting even stronger. Right after the revolution, the ministry of religious affairs estimated their number at about one thousand. Recent evidence proves this figure to be false: in a gathering organized in the town of Kairouan last May, Salafists numbered more than seven thousand. And in a report published by the respectable Assabah newspaper last June, the group’s membership was estimated at 93 thousand, in full control of over 400 mosques in the country (out of a total of about 3500).
With regards to the secular members of the Troika coalition, one should note that they have been weakened by both internal divisions and by an increasingly emboldened Ennahdha. President Moncef Marzouki considered Salafists a "national threat," although the recent ordeal over the repatriation of Qaddafi's former prime minister to Tripoli without Marzouki's consent exposed him to be no more than a lame duck figurehead. As for the president of the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Mustapha Ben Jaafar, though he called repeatedly for the Salafists to be held accountable for their violence according to the law, he was also quick to notice that their risk is "highly exaggerated."
Hence, the secular parties who were instrumental after last October's election in preventing the Islamization of school curricula and the introduction of sharia in the constitution have failed nonetheless to pressure the government to take forceful action on this issue. The mobilization of opposition liberal parties remains less effective than that of civil society's active human rights organizations and women and youth NGOs. Yet, popular rallies organized against Salafist violence in recent months and repeated calls to protect citizens and enforce rule of law have been insufficient. As a result, Ennahdha has little incentive to move seriously against Salafists, which explains the timidity of the measures taken.
The prospect of an Islamist-Salafist partnership bodes ill for Tunisia's traditional moderation and openness to the outside world. In the medium and long term, such a partnership is unlikely to succeed given the fierce opposition it will face from secular groups and the export-oriented business community. For the time being, however, this opposition does not seem to be strong enough to compel Ennahdha to move seriously against the Salafists or to cease contemplation of a partnership with them. Only a more forceful mobilization of Tunisian civil society at large would compel Ennahdha to take such action.
Mohamed Bechri is a former president of the Tunisian Section of Amnesty International.
In the Northwest, Salafists, armed with clubs and swords, continued on their rampage, burning down liquor stores and attacking police stations with Molotov cocktails. Then, on June 11, in the capital city, furious Salafists slashed several paintings that they found defamatory in a gallery situated in the northern suburb of La Marsa. Riots expanded afterwards, targeting courthouses and offices of secular parties, which led the authorities to declare an overnight curfew in some places.
Moderate Tunisians expressed deep concern about the violence. Some worried about the fate of the arts and freedom of expression in the country. The question remained, however, why were the ruling Islamists so hesitant to confront the Salafists? There are three possible explanations: (1) the two movements were so intermingled that on many issues the difference between them is hard to discern, (2) Islamists may perceive some gains from Salafist violence, and (3) with their newly acquired legal status, the ultraconservatives are already an eligible party to future elections, i.e., a potential partner that Ennahdha may want to get on board rather than confront with the use of force.
On the first issue, one should notice that the word “Salafists” means simply “the forefathers,” i.e., a willingness to return to the sources of Islam during the time of the prophet and his early companions.
Small wonder that Ennahdha’s founder, Sheikh Rached Ghannouchi, was on the record saying he used to be a Salafist himself, and he attended the Salafist Islah Front Party's inaugural congress. Similarly, Sadok Shourou, a prominent MP, called at the Constituent Assembly last January for the application of harsh Islamic punishments against civilian protesters, including “killing” and “hand cuts,” calls that do not differ from the most extreme Salafist positions.
Indeed, as extreme as they may seem, these views are shared by many in the organization’s membership base, especially members who became radicalized because of long repression and imprisonment under the previous regime, and who, unlike their leadership, did not have the opportunity of a long exile in Europe and the exposure to tolerance and openness that comes with it.
More importantly, Ennahdha seems to benefit from Salafist violence. In the aftermath of the screening of the film “Persepolis” by Nessma, a private TV channel, just before last October elections, Ennahdha condemned the movie as blasphemous, and it seized the opportunity of the Salafist violence to turn “the Tunisian identity” into an electoral issue, thereby securing the Salafists’ support for its candidates at the elections and improving its status among the people.
Nowadays, Salafists are getting even stronger. Right after the revolution, the ministry of religious affairs estimated their number at about one thousand. Recent evidence proves this figure to be false: in a gathering organized in the town of Kairouan last May, Salafists numbered more than seven thousand. And in a report published by the respectable Assabah newspaper last June, the group’s membership was estimated at 93 thousand, in full control of over 400 mosques in the country (out of a total of about 3500).
With regards to the secular members of the Troika coalition, one should note that they have been weakened by both internal divisions and by an increasingly emboldened Ennahdha. President Moncef Marzouki considered Salafists a "national threat," although the recent ordeal over the repatriation of Qaddafi's former prime minister to Tripoli without Marzouki's consent exposed him to be no more than a lame duck figurehead. As for the president of the Constituent Assembly, Dr. Mustapha Ben Jaafar, though he called repeatedly for the Salafists to be held accountable for their violence according to the law, he was also quick to notice that their risk is "highly exaggerated."
Hence, the secular parties who were instrumental after last October's election in preventing the Islamization of school curricula and the introduction of sharia in the constitution have failed nonetheless to pressure the government to take forceful action on this issue. The mobilization of opposition liberal parties remains less effective than that of civil society's active human rights organizations and women and youth NGOs. Yet, popular rallies organized against Salafist violence in recent months and repeated calls to protect citizens and enforce rule of law have been insufficient. As a result, Ennahdha has little incentive to move seriously against Salafists, which explains the timidity of the measures taken.
The prospect of an Islamist-Salafist partnership bodes ill for Tunisia's traditional moderation and openness to the outside world. In the medium and long term, such a partnership is unlikely to succeed given the fierce opposition it will face from secular groups and the export-oriented business community. For the time being, however, this opposition does not seem to be strong enough to compel Ennahdha to move seriously against the Salafists or to cease contemplation of a partnership with them. Only a more forceful mobilization of Tunisian civil society at large would compel Ennahdha to take such action.
Mohamed Bechri is a former president of the Tunisian Section of Amnesty International.
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