Despite an Egyptian revolution that had for its demands standard progressive calls for freedom and social justice and very few calls for sharia law, why have Islamists risen to power so quickly and so overwhelmingly? Where did all the secular revolutionaries go once the voting booths were opened?
With one defeat after another in a constitutional referendum, and then in parliamentary and presidential elections, secular pro-revolution activists have been searching for answers to these questions. Many Western observers have also wondered what went wrong, especially after two centuries of what has broadly been called Egypt's state-led "liberal" experiment.
In search for answers, some pundits have correctly suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is simply very well organized and has been so for much of the last 40 years (ideologically, the MB has been powerful for about 80 years). Thus, springing to political action once the regime fell was effortless.
This may explain why Islamism succeeded, but none of it explains why the progressive reform movement failed. To understand that failure, we have to go back two centuries to the beginnings of the Egyptian program of modernization under the leadership of Mohamed Ali.
Ali looked at Europe and marveled at its technological progress and imperial power over other nations. He wanted Egypt to catch up with Europe as much, and as immediately, as possible. He then embarked on a state-sponsored program through which Egyptians would visit Europe to learn about modernity. These technocrats would then return to lead the process of modernizing the state bureaucracy. They would also act as economic and social reformers, uplifting Egyptian society to standards similar to those of Europe, while Ali himself sought an Egyptian empire in the Levant, the Western Arabian Peninsula, and the Sudan.
The men Ali and his descendants sent to Europe indeed returned, but they never uplifted Egyptian society to modernity.
Despite the many intellectual contributions of reformers such as Rifaa'a Tahtawy, Mohamed Abdo, Qassem Amin, Ahmed Lotfi Elsayed and others, these individuals were all products and employees of the state, not a class of intellectuals independent from the ruler. This is a critical distinction that has been increasingly emphasized by Egyptian classical liberals like myself and, independently, by friends at the Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth, and in the writings of Egyptian classical liberals such as Samuel Tadros*, who has written about this idea in greater detail and with deeper insight.
The point that many Egyptian and Western observers seem to miss is that, unlike during the British classical liberal class of the fourteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, what is often dubbed the "liberal" Egyptian class was and is not a truly independent class of reformers. British thinkers, philosophers, artists, and reformers in the classical liberal British era were typically sponsored not by the state, but by a class of merchants and artisans who belonged to what we can broadly call the bourgeois class. This class of people fought for more political and economic freedoms for themselves and for others, motivated by an enlightened self-interested classical liberal philosophy. Their tension with the state resulted in political, economic, and social progress for themselves and, gradually, for a very large swath of British society.
Ali's experiment of modernization had commenced at the heels of the period of British classical liberalism. The new model at the time was a state-led program of modernization that was the precursor of the welfare state perfected in the 1880s by Bismarck in Germany. Ali thought the group of intellectuals that he sent to visit and study in Europe could substitute for an independent class of reformers. However, this state-sponsored class of reformers never had any vested interest or ability to reform the country politically or economically, nor to approach the masses in an attempt to reform society from the bottom-up at the grassroots level. They were merely interested in creating a powerful, bureaucratic, modern state and empire.
Moreover, it did not help that Britain, the land of classical liberalism, was the European country to colonize Egypt later in the nineteenth century. Anti-British sentiments led many Egyptian intellectuals to irrationally avoid the writings of classical liberals like Locke, Smith, Hume, and Mill, and classical conservative thinkers such as Burke. Instead, they sought ideas for reform from French and German thinkers, such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Hegel and, later, Marx and Nietzsche, who were more sympathetic to the idea of a powerful, and in some cases God-like, state. At the same time, these non-British philosophers and political theorists who influenced Egyptian reformers were strongly secular and antagonistic to religion. This shaped the reform discourse in a language that most Egyptians found offensive and distasteful.
It is important to note here that this lack of appreciation for classical liberalism and its process of evolutionary reform -- as opposed to revolutionary change -- is not unique to Egyptian progressive reformers alone. The error that most of Egypt's modern reformers commit, like their Western counterparts, is believing that in the beginning there was a benevolent welfare state, with nothing before that preceded it. Such a state, they imagine, has infinite resources, capable of engendering equality and happiness for all, if only those in charge of the state were themselves honest, benevolent leaders.
This brings us back to the questions posed in the beginning of the article. Mubarak's regime, today's Egyptian secular activists have decided, was neither honest nor benevolent. Not only that, it was authoritarian and undemocratic. And they are of course right on all of these counts. They are mistaken, however, in their belief that, if only we could replace the ancient régime with a new one that can bring about a responsible welfare state, then we could resume the reform program. They desire a state-led reform process, lacking the ability and knowledge that it takes to truly reform a society from the bottom up.
The MB, on the other hand, is reaping the benefits of 40 years of a mostly well-organized grassroots program independent of the state, if not antagonistic to it, with even longer ideological roots. Its work was backed by intellectual contributions to Islamist ideology that dates back to Gamal el-Afghani in the late 19th century, who advocated for Pan-Islamic unity, and by the later works of Hassan el-Banna and Sayyed Qottb in the 20th century.
The MB did all the right things to ascend to power. The only problem is that their ideology is totalitarian in nature and illiberal.
Yet, Egyptian secular progressive intellectuals, holding onto their firm belief that all good comes from and through the state, rejoice at the appointment of a leftist liberal to an insignificant government position. They convince themselves that this is just a first step. Or, they keep demanding that the state generously give the people "bread, freedom, and social justice," ignoring the fact that the state is now controlled by illiberal forces that will be willing to give, but in return asks for nothing less than the citizens' freedom. Some have even convinced themselves that a MB led government is the one to bring about political, economic, and social reforms, if for no other reason than that the MB is simply not Mubarak's regime.
The explanation for this logic is that Egyptian progressive activists and the Islamists share something in common: a fundamental, unquestionable belief that reform, secular or religious, comes from up above. Both have an illiberal totalitarian attitude about the state and its powerful role in reforming society. One is led by the banner of progressivism and the other by the banner of Islamism.
If there is to be any hope for authentic liberalism to take hold in Egyptian society, Egyptian activists and reformers have to understand that liberalism did not start in the nineteenth century with the advent of the welfare state. They need to learn about the evolution of liberalism, starting with the classical period, when the seeds of the fruits of liberalism were first sown. They also need to ground themselves in the core principles of liberalism. And, furthermore, they need to carefully read and understand the motivation and arguments made by Montesquieu, Smith, Locke, Hume, Burke, de Tocqueville, and Mill, as well as the political ideas of some of the American founding fathers (especially those of Jefferson and Adams).
And then, Egyptian activists must start organizing and working at the grassroots level. They must be able to approach the common religious Egyptian and explain the basic principles of liberalism. They must make clear, as classical liberals of the past did, that liberalism is not anti-faith. In fact, they need to make the case that it is the protector of real, true faith by separating faith from the state and vice-versa. They need to explain that economic progress does not come from the state, but that it comes through individual hard work and motivation, first and foremost, by advancing oneself economically. They need to convincingly make the case that demanding political freedom for oneself cannot be achieved without demanding the political freedom for all, regardless of religion, gender, or economic class. They need to speak of the need for the rule of, and equality before, the law. They need to explain the role of private property and how fostering this value results in a peaceful and prosperous society. Finally, they need to be outspoken and truly independent of the state; first by demanding freedom from the state for all, instead of more dependence on and servitude to it.
Maybe then, liberalism would have a real chance in Egypt's future.
Islam Hussein is an Egyptian liberal who blogs in Arabic at libraliyya.org. You can follow him on twitter @libraliyya and on Facebook (libraliyya).
*I am indebted to Samuel Tadros who has contributed many thoughts related to the subject of this article.
With one defeat after another in a constitutional referendum, and then in parliamentary and presidential elections, secular pro-revolution activists have been searching for answers to these questions. Many Western observers have also wondered what went wrong, especially after two centuries of what has broadly been called Egypt's state-led "liberal" experiment.
In search for answers, some pundits have correctly suggested that the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is simply very well organized and has been so for much of the last 40 years (ideologically, the MB has been powerful for about 80 years). Thus, springing to political action once the regime fell was effortless.
This may explain why Islamism succeeded, but none of it explains why the progressive reform movement failed. To understand that failure, we have to go back two centuries to the beginnings of the Egyptian program of modernization under the leadership of Mohamed Ali.
Ali looked at Europe and marveled at its technological progress and imperial power over other nations. He wanted Egypt to catch up with Europe as much, and as immediately, as possible. He then embarked on a state-sponsored program through which Egyptians would visit Europe to learn about modernity. These technocrats would then return to lead the process of modernizing the state bureaucracy. They would also act as economic and social reformers, uplifting Egyptian society to standards similar to those of Europe, while Ali himself sought an Egyptian empire in the Levant, the Western Arabian Peninsula, and the Sudan.
The men Ali and his descendants sent to Europe indeed returned, but they never uplifted Egyptian society to modernity.
Despite the many intellectual contributions of reformers such as Rifaa'a Tahtawy, Mohamed Abdo, Qassem Amin, Ahmed Lotfi Elsayed and others, these individuals were all products and employees of the state, not a class of intellectuals independent from the ruler. This is a critical distinction that has been increasingly emphasized by Egyptian classical liberals like myself and, independently, by friends at the Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth, and in the writings of Egyptian classical liberals such as Samuel Tadros*, who has written about this idea in greater detail and with deeper insight.
The point that many Egyptian and Western observers seem to miss is that, unlike during the British classical liberal class of the fourteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, what is often dubbed the "liberal" Egyptian class was and is not a truly independent class of reformers. British thinkers, philosophers, artists, and reformers in the classical liberal British era were typically sponsored not by the state, but by a class of merchants and artisans who belonged to what we can broadly call the bourgeois class. This class of people fought for more political and economic freedoms for themselves and for others, motivated by an enlightened self-interested classical liberal philosophy. Their tension with the state resulted in political, economic, and social progress for themselves and, gradually, for a very large swath of British society.
Ali's experiment of modernization had commenced at the heels of the period of British classical liberalism. The new model at the time was a state-led program of modernization that was the precursor of the welfare state perfected in the 1880s by Bismarck in Germany. Ali thought the group of intellectuals that he sent to visit and study in Europe could substitute for an independent class of reformers. However, this state-sponsored class of reformers never had any vested interest or ability to reform the country politically or economically, nor to approach the masses in an attempt to reform society from the bottom-up at the grassroots level. They were merely interested in creating a powerful, bureaucratic, modern state and empire.
Moreover, it did not help that Britain, the land of classical liberalism, was the European country to colonize Egypt later in the nineteenth century. Anti-British sentiments led many Egyptian intellectuals to irrationally avoid the writings of classical liberals like Locke, Smith, Hume, and Mill, and classical conservative thinkers such as Burke. Instead, they sought ideas for reform from French and German thinkers, such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Hegel and, later, Marx and Nietzsche, who were more sympathetic to the idea of a powerful, and in some cases God-like, state. At the same time, these non-British philosophers and political theorists who influenced Egyptian reformers were strongly secular and antagonistic to religion. This shaped the reform discourse in a language that most Egyptians found offensive and distasteful.
It is important to note here that this lack of appreciation for classical liberalism and its process of evolutionary reform -- as opposed to revolutionary change -- is not unique to Egyptian progressive reformers alone. The error that most of Egypt's modern reformers commit, like their Western counterparts, is believing that in the beginning there was a benevolent welfare state, with nothing before that preceded it. Such a state, they imagine, has infinite resources, capable of engendering equality and happiness for all, if only those in charge of the state were themselves honest, benevolent leaders.
This brings us back to the questions posed in the beginning of the article. Mubarak's regime, today's Egyptian secular activists have decided, was neither honest nor benevolent. Not only that, it was authoritarian and undemocratic. And they are of course right on all of these counts. They are mistaken, however, in their belief that, if only we could replace the ancient régime with a new one that can bring about a responsible welfare state, then we could resume the reform program. They desire a state-led reform process, lacking the ability and knowledge that it takes to truly reform a society from the bottom up.
The MB, on the other hand, is reaping the benefits of 40 years of a mostly well-organized grassroots program independent of the state, if not antagonistic to it, with even longer ideological roots. Its work was backed by intellectual contributions to Islamist ideology that dates back to Gamal el-Afghani in the late 19th century, who advocated for Pan-Islamic unity, and by the later works of Hassan el-Banna and Sayyed Qottb in the 20th century.
The MB did all the right things to ascend to power. The only problem is that their ideology is totalitarian in nature and illiberal.
Yet, Egyptian secular progressive intellectuals, holding onto their firm belief that all good comes from and through the state, rejoice at the appointment of a leftist liberal to an insignificant government position. They convince themselves that this is just a first step. Or, they keep demanding that the state generously give the people "bread, freedom, and social justice," ignoring the fact that the state is now controlled by illiberal forces that will be willing to give, but in return asks for nothing less than the citizens' freedom. Some have even convinced themselves that a MB led government is the one to bring about political, economic, and social reforms, if for no other reason than that the MB is simply not Mubarak's regime.
The explanation for this logic is that Egyptian progressive activists and the Islamists share something in common: a fundamental, unquestionable belief that reform, secular or religious, comes from up above. Both have an illiberal totalitarian attitude about the state and its powerful role in reforming society. One is led by the banner of progressivism and the other by the banner of Islamism.
If there is to be any hope for authentic liberalism to take hold in Egyptian society, Egyptian activists and reformers have to understand that liberalism did not start in the nineteenth century with the advent of the welfare state. They need to learn about the evolution of liberalism, starting with the classical period, when the seeds of the fruits of liberalism were first sown. They also need to ground themselves in the core principles of liberalism. And, furthermore, they need to carefully read and understand the motivation and arguments made by Montesquieu, Smith, Locke, Hume, Burke, de Tocqueville, and Mill, as well as the political ideas of some of the American founding fathers (especially those of Jefferson and Adams).
And then, Egyptian activists must start organizing and working at the grassroots level. They must be able to approach the common religious Egyptian and explain the basic principles of liberalism. They must make clear, as classical liberals of the past did, that liberalism is not anti-faith. In fact, they need to make the case that it is the protector of real, true faith by separating faith from the state and vice-versa. They need to explain that economic progress does not come from the state, but that it comes through individual hard work and motivation, first and foremost, by advancing oneself economically. They need to convincingly make the case that demanding political freedom for oneself cannot be achieved without demanding the political freedom for all, regardless of religion, gender, or economic class. They need to speak of the need for the rule of, and equality before, the law. They need to explain the role of private property and how fostering this value results in a peaceful and prosperous society. Finally, they need to be outspoken and truly independent of the state; first by demanding freedom from the state for all, instead of more dependence on and servitude to it.
Maybe then, liberalism would have a real chance in Egypt's future.
Islam Hussein is an Egyptian liberal who blogs in Arabic at libraliyya.org. You can follow him on twitter @libraliyya and on Facebook (libraliyya).
*I am indebted to Samuel Tadros who has contributed many thoughts related to the subject of this article.
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